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INTRODUCTION
Politik, politisch. along with the complex of
philosophems that are usually aligned with such terms-freedom. power. class. law. praxis. etc.--are words that
Heidegger hardly ever uses.

Das Wesen des politischen.

Was ist das, die Politik? are the titles of books
Heidegger never wrote.

Why?

Perhaps for the same reasons

that make him highly suspicious of words such as "ethics,"
"logic," or "physics'":
Even such names as "logic,'' "ethics," and "physics"
begin to flourish only when original thinking comes to
an end. During the time of their greatness the Greeks
thought without such headings. 1
Like these words, then. the word "politics" would need to
be avoided, for such names are the result and the work of
a metaphysical thinking the very existence of which marks
a certain distance from originary and authentic thinking.
Such words lead to an understanding of philosophy as
science and anthropology.

As such. they inevitably lead

Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in Basic
Writings. ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and
Row. 1977), p. 195-96.
1 •

1

2

to a concealment and an oblivion of the Sache selbst, viz.
the question of Being.

Insofar as they obliterate the

Sache they are to be submitted to the Destruktion or the
Abbau Heidegger speaks of in Being and Time.
would most need deconstruction.

Politics

The use of the word

itself would need to be "avoided" in philosophy.
Hence no political philosophy. no politology or
golitische

Wissenschaf~

in Heidegger's work.

Does this

mean. then, that the question concerning politics is
totally absent from the Heideggerian text?

Does this mean

that Heidegger had no "interest" in the question of
politics?

It has often been thought so.

But then: what

needs to be thought of Heidegger's decisively

poli~ical

and politically decisive engagement in nazism?

What about

the political in Heidegger. which is to say: what about
Heidegger's politics; but also: what about the political
dimension of Heidegger's thinking?
If there are no texts by Heidegger on the issue of
politics, the question of how this issue can even be
addressed properly has to be raised.

Is it even

legitimate to attempt to raise the question from a
Heideggerian perspective?

To this objection the following

answer can be brought forward: first of all, if it is
indeed true that there are no texts explicitely devoted to
the question of politics--if, in other words. there is no
"political" philosophy in Heidegger--, there are valuable

3

and decisive indications of political implications
disseminated throughout Heidegger's texts; but, most of
all. perhaps a way of thinking the question of politics in
a radical and essential manner can be retrieved from the
Heideggerian text.
In order to properly locate textually the question
concerning politics, a reading of "The Question Concerning
Technology" is imperative.

This text constitutes the

horizon within which the question can be formulated in the
most adequate way.

The question concerning technology is

to be addressed in terms of essence.

Now, the essence of

technology is, according to Heidegger.

"nothing

technological," 2 for technology is a mode of bringingforth [Hervorbrinqen], of poiesis.

As such, it is

grounded in revealing [Entberqen]: its essence is grounded
in the essence of truth.

Hence technology is not mere

instrumentality. a mere means to scientific or practical
ends.
The word "technology" is rooted in the Greek
techne.

Techne, in Greek. is the name for what we

understand today by technique or technology. viz. the
activities and the skills (the "know-how") of a craftsman
or a producer.

2 .

But techne also names the arts of the mind

"Die Frage nach der Technik." in Vortraqe und
Aufsatze (Pfullingen: GUnther Neske, 1954); trans. by
William Lovitt: "The Question Concerning Technology." in
Basic Writings, p. 287.
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and the fine arts.

In both cases, the central activity

involved is the bringing-forth, the poiesis of something.
But does this allow for the conclusion that the essential
characteristic of techne as the origin of modern
technology lies indeed in production or manufacturing?
This would perhaps be the case if Heidegger had not
retrieved from the Greek techne another determination that
makes it totally impossible for us to situate the essence
of technology in production, and that is techne as
episteme.

Techne would be another name for episteme, both

words defining knowing in the widest sense.

But to know

for the Greeks does not mean to gather a certain amount of
knowledge in what should ideally become a "universal
knowing."

Rather. to know means "to be entirely at home

in something, to understand and be expert in it." 3

Hence

techne is not only a way of producing, of making or
manipulating something.

It is also and above all a way of

opening up a space--whether for an understanding of
something, the making of a Zuhandene or the creating of an
artwork.

As an opening up, techne is essentially a

revealing and hence a mode of truth as aletheia.
Thus if technology is essentially techne, then it
too is a mode of aletheuein, of revealing.

But technology

does not reveal beings the way Greek poiesis did.

The

bringing-forth of technology is of a different kind:
3

Ibid., p. 294.
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The revealing that rules throughout modern technology
has the character of a setting-upon [StellenJ. in the
sense of a challenging-forth [HerausfordernJ. Such
challenging happens in that the energy concealed in
nature is unlocked. what is unlocked is transformed,
what is transformed is stored up. what is stored up
is. in turn. distributed. and what is distributed is
switched about ever anew. Unlocking. transforming,
storing. distributing, and switching about are ways of
revealing. 4
But for this setting-upon to take place a specific
kind of unconcealment is required: beings have to appear
as that which can be unlocked. transformed. stored up,
etc.

In other words. beings have to stand as that which

can constantly be called upon.

Heidegger calls such a

standing Bestand. "standing-reserve".

This word

designates "nothing less than the way in which everything
presences that is wrought upon by the revealing that
challenges."~

And Heidegger draws an immediate and

decisive consequence: "Whatever stands by in the sense of
standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as
object."

What is decisive in technology is that the

subject/object opposition is overcome.

Specifically, the

opposition is drawn to its most extreme possibilities.
Beings no longer stand before us, are no longer ob-jects
or Gegen-stande.

Rather. they appear as raw material. as

standing-reserve, i.e., as that which can be called upon
Ibid., p. 297-98.
Ibid .. 298.
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or used at any time and without reserve.

Man himself is

no longer a subject facing a world envisaged as object--he
has become the great exploiter of nature.
But, says Heidegger, "man does not have control
over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the
real shows itself or withdraws." 6

Does this mean that man

too belongs within the standing-reserve?

If man, in

exploiting the energies of nature. merely responds to the
demand of a kind of Unverboqenheit, then he too must
belong to the standing-reserve.

But this belonging to. or

rather within the standing-reserve does not make of man a
Bestand.

For man is the being who orders nature, even

though the unconcealment, within which the ordering
essentially unfolds, is not the work of man.

In ordering

and exploiting nature man merely responds to the call of
unconcealment:
When man, investigating, observing. pursues nature as
an area of his own conceiving, he has already been
claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to
approach nature as an object of research, until even
the object disappears into the objectlessness of
standing-reserve. 7
This way of Unverbogenheit which compel ls man to order the
self-revealing as standing-reserve Heidegger calls Geste 11.
6

Ibid. , 299.

?

Ibid. , 300.
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Physis, nature. designated in Ancient Greece the
whole of being.

As such, it included the physical world

as well as human activities, whether practical or
epistemic.

Among these activities. the bios politikos

held a major part.

Now, if the political life is as

essential today as it was in Ancient Greece, and if the
Ge-stell does indeed govern the whole of beings, then
politics too must be ruled by technology.

Ge-stell

governs "objectified nature, culture maintained in motion,
ruled politics" (my italics) . 8

To think the question

concerning politics today would amount to thinking the way
in which politics is ruled by technology.

And just as

Heidegger inquires into the question of the essence of
technology, so, in wanting to raise the question
concerning politics, we would have to inquire into the
question of the essence of politics.

Such an essence can

be named the political: in moving from the plural
substantive (politics) to the nominalized adjective (the
political) one points to the essence of politics, i.e., to
something that would allow "politics" and yet would differ
from it.

The very displacement from a problematic of

"politics"--which inevitably leads to a kind of
"politology" or "political philosophy"--to a problematic
of the political indicates a distance separating the

8 • "Ueberwindung der Metaphysik," in Vortraqe und
Aufsatze.

8

conditions of possibility for a Heideggerian understanding
of the polis or the "community" from the traditional
attempts to ground the polis in either reason, freedom,
the will. etc.

However valuable and useful such attempts

may be. they do not concern the essence of politics.

A

Heideggerian approach to the political is inevitably
linked to a deconstructionist approach to the politics of
the subject, and to think the political according to its
essence forces us into a thinking where the traditional
notions of "freedom", "reason", "spirit", "subject" are no
longer operative.
Hence to pose the question concerning politics in
terms of essence perhaps forces one into admitting that.
in the same way the essence of technology is nothing
technological, so the essence of politics is nothing
"political."

The issue then becomes to know what the

political consists in.

Specifically, the issue is to know

how the political can allow for politics. how the essence
of politics can open the space for the political life,
while itself remaining withdrawn from this very space-how, in other words, the "presencing" of politics would
always be linked to a certain "absencing": how the essence
of politics is connected to the essence of truth as
unconcealment.
And in asking about the political today, one must
also ask what it means for politics to be under the sway

9

of technology.

How can technology and politics, Ge-stell

and the political, be thought together?
political horizon of our time?

What is the

One can say with Hannah

Arendt that this horizon or this togetherness is
totalitarianism.

But one can go further and assert that

totalitarianism is not only the political horizon of our
time, but also the most general horizon of our time,
insofar as the politics of our century has gathered--and
keeps on gathering--the most extreme possibilities of
technology.

Or, to put it differently: if technology

indeed marks the completion and the closure of
metaphysics, politics has marked throughout this century
the most extreme realization and completion of
metaphysics.

Everything happens as though metaphysics had

been realized in and as politics.

Such a realization

Heidegger would have failed to acknowledge--even though.
of course, such an acknowledgment would have been
impossible without Heidegger's thinking--, thereby perhaps
rendering his political engagement possible.

Here,

perhaps, lies Heidegger's fault.
Hence politics today would perhaps most signify
the end or the closure of metaphysics.

Politics today

would mark the closure of the political as such.

So that

one primarily needs to ask what this closure consists in,
how it unfolds.

One needs to think this closure, to ask

Whether it does not constitute the very essence of

10

·
but an essence that would remain withdrawn from
politics,
the "political game.'' allowing this game in the very
movement of its retreat.

In other words, it is a matter

of asking whether. just as being is withdrawn and
concealed in the understanding of the world as will to
power, so likewise the essence of the political is
withdrawn from politics, yet allows its very totalitarian
presence.

And if this retreat is what is proper

(eiqentlich) to the political. if. in other words, the
political consists in this movement of Ziehen and
Entziehen, then one might want to conclude that what has
withdrawn never actually occurred, never really happened-was never an event.

And yet, from its very sheltering

(Verberqunq), this would never cease to occur and to
happen to us.

This would occur and reach us from its

unattainable Ort.

This owning, this Ereiqnis would be

constituted in a movement of disowning, of Enteiqnis.

The

retreat of the political would never "happen" as retreat,
and yet nothing--no policy. no politics, no history--could
happen without it.

So that a certain presence would be

made possible only through a certain absence or absencing.
The Zug of the Ent-zuq·would be the tension or the strife
of such a movement.
Truth as unconcealment would be at the very core
of the problem.

The political itself would be a mode of

Ynverbogenheit.

Like the Ge-stell, which is both a Her-

11

.§._tellen and a Dar-stellen, a producing and a presenting.
the political would be a poiesis. a way of revealing.

And

the way in which beings are revealed today in politics can
be called "totalitarianism." even though in the present
context this word does not serve exclusively to designate
the so-called politically "totalitarian" regimes.

The

very possibility of modern politics, i.e., of
"totalitarianism" in a Heideggerian sense (and that is in
a metaphysically determined sense), is based on the
understanding of nature. including man, as Bestand.

In

the word "totalitarianism," then, one would need to
understand, of course, the politically determined regimes-the emblematic figures of which are Nazism and Stalinism.
Hence in speaking of the general horizon of our time as
being stamped by these two "events." we wish to insist on
the demand that the question of the political life, of the
"being-in-common," of the community, be raised anew.

In

light of these events, one needs to ask: what does it mean
to live in common after Auschwitz or the Gulag?

What does

it mean for men to live together after these events?

But

our understanding of totalitarianism is also an attempt to
point beyond these human practices to something that
exceeds human activity and that yet renders it possible as
the ''political" activity which it is.

In other words,

totalitarianism is to be thought as a mode of revealing in
~hich

man is considered as Bestand.

So that

12

"totalitarianism'.' would also designate the way in which
politics is being ruled today. even in political regimes
that are not "totalitarian."
From a metaphysical perspective. then, there would
be a certain belonging-together of the so-called
totalitarian regimes and the so-called democracies.
First, in the sense that very often democracies define
themselves in mere opposition to totalitarian regimes. as
though the two belonged together in their very opposition,
as though democracy were the Other of totalitarianism.
But most of all in the sense that the two belong together
in a ground that Heidegger calls Bestand.

One can indeed

wonder whether our democracies are not submitted to forms
of totalitarianism that would be more subtle, less evident
and less painful. less directly and evidently violent.
surely less murderous.

One would then need to undertsand

the notion of totalitarianism not so much in terms of the
exercise of political power. but in terms of our everyday
being-in-common, ruled by a technology that would define
the community in terms of what Lyotard calls a "totality
in search of its most performative unity." 9

Such a

totality is one within which man would no longer appear as
the being standing into the open, relating himself to
Being, but as Bestand, i.e., as a performing unity (as

9

J. F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne (Paris:
Minuit, 1979), p. 102-103.
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gpima.1 laborans). as a reality which can be altered.
destroyed or even created (in genetic manipulations for
instance).

And this may be what Heidegger points to when

he writes:
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man
even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve,
and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but
the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to
the very brink of a precipitous fall, that is, he
comes to the point where he himself will have to be
taken as standing-reserve (my italics). 10
Heidegger is right in saying that the Ge-stell is "the
supreme danger."
actually thought.

Even more so, perhaps, than what he
For in reading these lines, how can one

not think primarily of the way in which man has been--and
still is--enclosed. ordered. enframed, in structures
(camps, prisons, ghettos, etc.) which always signify the
impossibility of man's existence?

How can one not think

of the way in which man, in those structures, is only
considered as standing-reserve, whether as labor force,
guinea-pig or raw material?

It is only insofar as man

reaches the point where he considers himself in the same
way he has come to consider a river or a field, i.e., as
standing-reserve, that inventing something like a gas
chamber becomes possible.

To envisage man as Bestand is

already to prepare the way to the possibility of his own
death or of the loss of his essence.
10

Politics today.

"The Question Concerning Technology," p. 308.

14

insofar as

it is grounded on an implicit understanding of

s Bestand and of man as animal laborans, defines
beings a
·n terms of a working totality, in terms of
itself l
performativity and of market value: it has been completed
in the social-technological.
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also ...
What Heidegger says about these lines by Holderlin
is most appropriate for the political.

"To

~.

says

Heidegger, is to fetch something home into its essence, in
order to bring the essence for the first time into its
genuine appearing."11

And thus, in the same way "the

essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of
the saving power," so the essence of politics, insofar as
it harbors the supreme danger, must also harbor in itself
the growth of the saving power.

From a Heideggerian

perspective, therefore, "to save" politics would be to
retrieve its essence and to bring this essence into its
genuine appearing.
Hence this text will be primarily concerned with a
move into the essence.

Specifically, it will be a matter

of tracing out, patiently and carefully, the path through
Which Heidegger's thinking is engaged.

Such path will

eventually lead us into an understanding of the essence of

11

Ibid.
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politics as techne. and specifically as poetry in the
sense of Dichtung.

Paradoxically, perhaps, the question

of the political will inevitably lead us into a reading of
Holderlin.

At this point. it will also be a matter of

radically calling into question Heidegger's enterprise,
i.e., both the move to the so-called "essence" as such and
the determination of the essence as poetry or myth.
Specifically. it will be a matter of calling into question
the very possibility of a univocal and poetic essence of
the political, and of asking whether politics does not
resist the move to the essence. whether politics can exist
outside the plurality of words and deeds in which and as
which it unfolds.

These few introductory remarks should suffice to
show what constitutes the specificity of the work one is
about to be engaged in. and to what extent such work
differs from the plurality of "texts" (books. essays,
articles. interviews) so far devoted to the question of
politics in Heidegger.

Generally speaking. there are

almost no commentaries that consider the possibility of a
political thinking in Heidegger seriously.

Specifically,

these commentaries are more engaged in an external
critique of Heidegger's involvement in nazism (Heidegger's
"politics") than in an internal thinking of how the
question of the political would need to be phrased from a

16
Heideggerian perspective.

Even though we believe that

readings engaged in tracing out some of Heidegger's
ideological reflexes can be illuminating and even
necessary, even though Heidegger's politics can in no way
be separated from his thinking in general, and
specifically from his political thinking, we do not think
that such readings will ever get to the heart of
Heidegger's thinking and political engagement.

Indeed.

such readings remain decisively withdrawn and hence closed
off from the inner logic of Heidegger's thought.

Thus,

even though, in the end, the pages that are to come will
be very critical and questioning with regard to
Heidegger's political thinking, they will nonetheless
differ from the objections and the criticisms formulated
by so many thinkers, whether of marxist inspiration-Adorno, 12 Lukacs, 13 Marcuse 14 or Bourdieu 1 e--or of any
Adorno, Theodor W, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, Zur
deutschen Ideoloqie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964);
"Martin Heidegger und die Politik," in Merkur (Stuttgart,
Heft 10, n° 235, 1921).
12 •

13

Lukacs, G., Die Zerstorunq der Vernunft, Berlin.

1955.
Marcuse, Herbert, "Beitrage zur eine
Phanomenologie des historischen Materialismus," in
Phil osophische Heft, I (1928) , 45-68: "Heidegger's
Politics: An Interview," in The Graduate Faculty
Philosophy Journal, n° 6 (Winter, 1977), 28-40.
14

e. Bourdieu, Pierre, "L'ontologie politique de
Martin Heidegger," in Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales, V-VI (1975). p. 109-156.
1

17

other philosophical inspiration--Lowith. 16 Poggeler,1 7
Schwan. 18

In spite of their different orientations and

purposes, none of these texts are actually involved in
tracing out what we have come to call the question of the
essence (in a Heideggerian sense) of politics.
However, there are a few exceptions to this general rule.
the most remarkable of which is Lacoue-Labarthe, whose
work we shall very often refer to and whose analyses will
be of the greatest help.

More recently, Derrida's De

l'esprit 19 also deals with the inner paths and textual
itineraries of Heidegger's thought.

As such. this text

can also be very illuminating.

Lowith. Karl. "The Political Implications of
Heidegger's Existentialism," Wollin ed. NGC, 117-134;
Heidegger: Denker in dlirftiger Zeit (Gottingen: Vandenhock
& Ruprecht. 1960).
16

Poggeler Otto, Philosophie und Politik bei
Heidegger (Freiburg-Mlinchen: Alber Verlag. 1972).
17 •

Schwan A.. Die Politische Philosophie im Denken
Heideqgers CKoln: Ordo Politicus, 1965).
18 .

19 .

J. Derrida. De l'esprit (Paris: Galilee, 1987).

CHAPTER ONE
Into the essence
The way into the essence is long and obscure.
Almost like a descent into Hades.
inscribed in the Heideggerian text.

It is not explicitly
Hence it needs to be

traced out in what could be considered a winding textual
itinerary.

Or perhaps even more as a whirling, as a

cirling of circles where each determination of essence
would re-unfold in a new determination.

(A)

The reasons for Heidegger's political engagement
are usually found in what is considered his most
political--i.e., politicized--text, viz. "The Rectoral
Address." 1

The Address, then, might best express

Heidegger's political "ideas," if not "philosophy".

After

the rectorate period, and that is also after the
"The Self-Assertion of the German University:
Address, Delivered on the Solemn Assumption of the
Rectorate of the University Freiburg." English
translation by Karsten Harries in Review of Metaphysics 38
(March 1985): 470-480. Henceforth RR.
1

18
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frightening proclamations of 1933-34 2

•

Heidegger might

have withdrawn from the political life and devoted himself
exclusively to teaching.

Yet on the contrary the years

following the rectorate were for Heidegger a long
Auseinandersetzunq with National-Socialism, so much so
that his withdrawal from all kinds of political activities
were at the same time a radical (re)engagement into the
question of the political. 3

Thus the most explicitly

political text ("The Rectoral Address") is perhaps not the
most decisive one in terms of Heidegger's political
thinking.

The Address is perhaps not political at all,

even though it is the actual locus of a truly political
compromise and of the support of a very specific politics.
For if--as Heidegger will insist after 1934--the political
is tied to the Greek notion of polis, the polis. in turn,
has nothing to do with the political, or rather with
politics.

This does not mean that there is a radical

change in thematics and vocabulary between the 1933 text
and the texts following.

On the contrary.

What is said

in the Rectoral Adress is maintained for the most part.
Specifically the proclamation "To the memory of
Albert Leo Schlageter" (May 26, 1933), the call to "The
working service" (June 20, 1933), and the "Call to the
plebisci t of November 12, 1933''.
2

3 •

The credit for this insight should go to Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe, whose writings inspired the comments that
follow. See La Fiction du politigue (Paris: Christian
Bourgois Editeur, 1987) and specifically "La Transcendence
finit dans la politique," in L' Imitation des modernes
(Paris: Galilee, 1986).
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The major themes and notions at work in the Address
reappear in the later texts.

And yet. there are a few

slight but decisive changes, a few shifts in intonation
and tone that constitute a decisive move away from what
Heidegger himself would perhaps call the "fundamental
tone" of the Address.

In other words, there is a move

away from the climate or the atmosphere of the Address,
even though the concern for the same problematics remains
operative.
What is this general climate?
problematics?

What are these main

The climate is born out of the historical

and political situation of Germany and by Heidegger's own
philosophical situation.
distress.

The time is a time of Not, of

Of a twofold distress.

First, the distress

points to the total collapse of· what was once lived as the
dream of a world hegemony: since the end of the First
World War. not only was Germany weakened and to an extent
humiliated politically, but it was also undergoing what
was perhaps the worst and most extended crisis the West
had yet undergone.

The collapse was not only political,

i.e., social and institutional. but also spiritual.
Second,--and the two dimensions of the distress are of
course related--Germany was undergoing its first serious
crisis of the advanced industrial economy, i.e., of what
Marx would call the Capital and of what Heidegger would
call the world of technology.
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This general collapse actually meant the nonexistence of Germany and radically put into question the
very possibility of the existence of a German people--a
possibility that was perhaps the major stake of German
thought and art in general throughout the Nineteenth
century.

But it could also have meant--and this. of

course. was Heidegger's view--that the German people d1d
not yet correspond to their proper and for some reason
concealed essence.

Since the German people is the

"philosophical people" par excellence, 4 --that is. the
people whose essence lies in philosophy or in
must answer to its essence.

science~--it

At this point. perhaps.

Heidegger's thinking meets the actuality of his time:
Heidegger actually becomes politically involved in the
distress of his time.

Heidegger engages himself in

politics. for he sees in the outburst of NationalSocialism the unique possibility and the desire to bring
the German people before their essence.
Such a statement will always--from the early 30's
to the Spiegel interview--remain at the level of
assertion. It will never be questioned nor toned down.
In the name of what. from what privileged standpoint can
such a claim be made? And what is the point of making it?
There is perhaps in Heidegger's naive and simplistic
statement an ideological overdetermination which, from the
very beginning. both enabled him to join a movement which
itself asserted a certain German superiority and prevented
him from thinking about the dangers of such an assertion.
4

l5. We recall that in the speculative vocabulary,
philosophy in its completion is science (Wissenschaft) and
knowing (Wissen).
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Heidegger's contribution to the ongoing movement
is the contribution of science.

His voice. like the

unified and homogeneous voice of Germany, is led and
sustained by science.

It is the voice of the essence and

the voice that wills the essence.
true Ftihrer of Germany.

Science must be the

Science must guide and enlighten

the will of the people as well as the decisions of the
politicians.

Heidegger writes. as the most insistent and

persistent message of the "Address": " ... science must
become the fundamental happening of our spiritual-popular
existence [unseres geistiq-volklichen DaseinsJ ." 6

Even

though the forces of "earth and blood"--which duplicate
the famous ideologem of Blut und Boden--are mentioned.
even though. then. an open support of the Nazi ideology is
inscribed in the text. the people are nonetheless
determined as historical-spiritual and their essence is
defined in terms of science or knowing.
Hence the decisive question. viz. the political
question. i.e .• the question through which the people as a
whole are brought before their essence. is to know what
the true ruling principle is.

Who for what) leads whom

and toward what. i.e .• in the name of what. is the issue.
What and where is the hegemony. from where does the
hegemony take its power. such is the question.
is quite clear:
6

RR. 474.

Heidegger
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The assumption of the rectorate is the commitment to
the spiritual leadership (Ftihrunq] of this institution
of higher learning [hohe Schule]. The following of
teachers and students awakens and grows strong only
from a true and joint rootedness in the essence of the
German university. This essence. however, gains
clarity, rank. and power only when first of all and at
all times the leaders are themselves led--led by that
unyielding spiritual mission that forces the fate of
the German people to bear the stamp of its history. 7
In other words, the Flihrung of the university is itself
led by a higher principle. the FUhrunq of the FUhrung.
viz. the spiritual mission.

Heidegger himself, then, the

leader of the university, is such only insofar as he
accepts--and resolutely wills--to be led by the spiritual
mission of the people.

The Flihrer himself, Adolf Hitler,

would be a true leader only insofar as he woulq most be
led by the spiritual mission of the German people.

From

the very outset, then, a certain subordination of the
political order is asserted.

The political itself must be

submitted to the essence of the German people, viz. the
spiritual mission.

But where is such a mission realized

if not in the university, to the extent that the
university is rooted in science?

What the "Address" first

asserts, then,--and it literally does so in the title--is
the self-assertion--and that is also the auto-nomy--of the
German university, along with its guiding or leading role
in the political sphere.

?

RR, 470.

Self-, here, means independent
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of any political directives and according to the essence
of science.

Thereby one sees that the part of illusion in

Heidegger's address is not to be neglected, for the
university was never considered by the Nazis as as an
autonomous and politically leading power.

Rather, the

university (like all the other "cultural" and "spiritual"
institutions of the State) was to be "politicized."
But what is the spiritual mission Heidegger speaJrn
of?

Heidegger himself formulates the question: "Do we

know about this spiritual mission?" 6

This question,

perhaps, is the guiding question of the Address and
constitutes the major thread into the question of the
political.

The answer is:

The self-assertion of the German university is the
primordial, shared will to its essence. We
understand the German university as the "high" school
that. grounded in science, by means of science
educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians of
the fate of the German people. The will to the
essence of the German university is the will to
science as will to the historical mission of the
German people as a people that knows itself in its
state. Together, science and German fate must come to
power in this will to essence. 9
A few remarks about the "tone" of the passage
first need to be made.

The general tone or climate of

this passage--and of the address as a whole--is clearly
Nietzschean.

"Will", "power", but also "decision" or

e

Ibid.

9

Ibid., 471.
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"battle" (Kampf) are words that appear throughout
Heidegger's discourse and around which the truly political
engagement circles.

As we all know, the Nietzschean

vocabulary inspired--or rather, was put to work by--the
Nazi ideology.

Even though these words did not harbour

the same meaning for Heidegger as for the Nazis, the fact
remains that the very use of such a vocabulary in the
politically overdetermined situation signified both a
support of the ideology at work and an indelible
compromising of its major theses.

It is not a mere

accident, then, if Heidegger, soon after the rectorate
period, will abandon the Nietzschean climate within which
his philosophy was still caught, and engage himself in
what he came to call his Auseinandersetzung with
Nietzsche's thought.

Nor is it an accident if the move

away from Nietzsche also corresponded to an increasing
dialogue with the "thinking poetry" of Holderlin. the
major stake of which. as will later be shown, was
political.
But the question of the present moment is to know
what the "spiritual mission" of the people consists in.
Heidegger's answer is quite straightforward: The mission
of the German people is science.

That by which the German

people is determined in its essence, that by which it
becomes truly historical is science.

The Auftraq of the

German people, i.e., that by which it is guided or led,
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conunanded and destined is science.

Wissenschaf.t, then,

is

that without which there can be no German people as such,
no history and no politics.

It is the very condition of

possibility of the existence of Germany as Volk.
essence.

Its

To be essentially what it is. the German people

must will, must be devoted to and strive for nothing but
science: " ... science must become the fundamental happening
of our spiritual existence as a people." 10
But what is science?
science?

What about the "essence" of

Once again, Heidegger's answer is

straightforward: science is

11

knowing 11 or "philosophy":

"All science is philosophy. whether it knows it and wills
it--or not." 11

But such is the case only insofar as that

which determines all sciences in their essence is the
"beginning" of the West, and that is the "setting out" or
the "breaking open" (Aufbruch) of Greek philosophy.
Philosophy, science, is itself defined a few pages later
as "the questioning holding of one's ground in the midst
of the ever self-concealing of what is."12

In the setting

.

out of Greek philosophy, "for the first time, western man
raises himself up from a popular base and. by virtue of
his language, stands up to the totality of what is. which
l.O

Ibid.' 474.

1

Ibid., 472.

12

Ibid., 474.

i
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he questions and conceives as the being that it is."i 3
Science. in other words, is nothing but the
radicalization of the existence of man in the world.

It

is nothing but the radicalization of what Being and Time
calls the "ek-sistence" or the "transcendence" of Dasein.
What the Rectoral Address does, then, is a mere reassertion of one of Being and Time's fundamental theses.
The Address is perfectly consistent with Heidegger's other
texts--both with the preceding and the following ones 14 :
in it, it is nothing but a matter of philosophy, of its
role and its essence.

But for the slightest twist, the

Address could be considered as operating at the level of
all the other "purely" philosophical texts.

This twist

lies in the fact that, unlike what is said in Sein und
Zeit, the Dasein Heidegger speaks of here is related to a
specific people, a people which, moreover. is
1 3

Ibid., 471-72.

In "What is Metaphysics?". for example, Heidegger
writes: "Man--one being among others--"pursues science".
In this "pursuit" nothing less transpires than the
irruption [Einbruch. this time, and not Aufbruch] by one
being called "man" into the whole of beings, indeed in
such a way that in and through this irruption beings break
open and show what they are and how they are." (Basic
Writings, 96)
In "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger writes: "Eksistence is ... exposure to the diclosedness of beings as
such ... The ek-sistence of historical man begins at that
moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand
with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what
are beings? ... The primordial disclosure of being as a
whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the
beginning of western history are the same ... (Ibid .• 12814

29)
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privileged over other people.

The German

people is the "metaphysical people" par excellence.

But

to say this is tantamount to saying, according to the
essence of science that has been unfolded so far, that the
German people is more radically ek-sistent than others,
that it stands more radically before the totality of what
·
lS.

This displacement--or perhaps only this placing--of

fundamental ontology into the political is a decisive move
that perhaps undermines and disrupts the very notion of
fundamental ontology.

For how can a Dasein ek-sist more

radically on the basis of a common relation to beings and
in the sharing of a specific language, and no longer on
the basis of the elements that defined "resoluteness" in
Being and Time?

Is Heidegger's unquestioned Germano-logo-

centrism that which primarily enabled his political
engagement--or at least that whiGh could not stop it?
The move from Being and Time to the Rectoral
Address is not the move from a Dasein thought outside an
historical and political framework to the historicizing
and the politicizing of Dasein.

The sections on

"Temporality and Historicality" in Being and Time clearly
thematize the historico-political dimension of Dasein and
the possiblity of an authentic Being-with-one-another:
... if fateful Dasein [Dasein is fateful insofar as it
is free for its own death, i.e., insofar as it
comports itself resolutely to its owrunost
possibility], as Being-in-the-world, exists
essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a
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co-historizing [ein Mitgeschehenl and is
determinative for it as destiny [GeschickJ. This is
how we designate the historizing of the community, of
a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself
together out of individual fates, any more than Beingwith-one-another can be conceived as the occuring
together of several subjects.
But the question, then, is to know how the destiny. the
community or the people is constituted. The passage
continues:
our fates have already been guided in advance, in our
Being with one another in the same world and in our
resoluteness for definite possiblities. Only in
communication [i.e. in language] and in struggling
[i.e. in the struggle in the midst of beings] does the
power of destiny become free. ~
1

The key word here is "world", for the world is the space
of the struggle in the midst of beings and the space
within which apeople comes to be through language.
world is the space of science or philosophy.

The

So that the

emergence of the political--the emergence of a destiny and
a community or a people--is rooted

in Dasein's

fundamental attitude in front of beings, viz. science.

In

Being and Time already. then. the independence or the
primacy of the metaphysical over the political was
asserted.
But there was no primacy or privileging of Germany
as a people.

There were no allusions, such as there will

be in Introduction to Metaphysics, to the German people as
the "metaphysical people" or to Germany as the "center" or

sz

384.
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the "heart" of the West.
Where, then, does the Germano-logo-centrism come
from?

Why, in other words, does the spiritual mission--

the will for science--fall upon the German people?

Why,

after the Greeks, do the Germans have to take up and
represent the destiny of the West?
privilege come from?
be said about it.

Where does the

There is, perhaps, not much that can

For nowhere can an explanation be found

in Heidegger's texts.

The question is perhaps an

impossible one, primarily because it seems that the
privilege of the German people--and that is primarily of
the German language--was itself never an issue for
Heidegger.

The problem of the move from a philosophical

or metaphysical privilege to the dedication to a certain
politics was never an issue.
issue?

But could it have been an

Is it not the very characteristic of the

metaphysical to be overdetermined by the political?

But

then: do metaphysics and politics belong together, in a
way that Heidegger would have not sufficiently
acknowledged--viz. essentially?

And yet, at the same

time, who besides Heidegger would have pointed more
adamantly to this belonging-together?

And was not

Heidegger unable to think--and that is to put into
question--his political engagement precisely because of
his own metaphysical convictions, preferences,
commitments--presuppositions?

Precisely because of his
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subordination of the political to the philosophical?

And

then. would Heidegger's "case" be exemplary in that it
would show how the political is always dominant, most of
all. perhaps. when it is ignored or merely submitted to
another order--the philosophical order?
So. once again. one is faced with the question of
philosophy, of science and knowing.

With the question of

the "spiritual mission" which the Germans would need to
take up to become a true people, an authentic community.
What is the essence of knowing?

To inquire into the

essence of knowing is, according to Heidegger, to inquire
into the original and hence decisive experience of
knowing, and that is the Greek experience.

Heidegger

writes, in what is perhaps the central passage of the
whole address:
Here we want to regain for Q1!!: being [Daseinl two
distinguishing properties of the original Greek
essence of science.
Among the Greeks an old story went around that
Prometheus had been the first philosopher. Aeschylus
has this Prometheus utter a saying that expresses the
essence of knowing.
techne d'anankes asthenestera makro (Prom. 514,
ed. Wi 1.)
"Knowing. however, is far weaker than necessity."
This is to say: all knowing about things has always
already been delivered up to overpowering fate and
fails before it.
Just because of this, knowing must develop its
highest defiance; called forth by such defiance, all
the power of the hiddenness of what is must first
arise for knowing really to fail.
Just in this way,
what is opens itself in its unfathomable
~nalterability and lends knowing its truth.
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Encountering this Greek saying about the creative
impotence of knowing, one likes to find here all too
readily the prototype of a knowing based purely on
itself, while in fact such knowing has forgotten its
own essence, this knowing is interpreted for us as the
"theoretical" attitude--but what do the Greeks mean by
theoria? One says: pure contemplation; which remains
bound only to the thing in question and to all it is
and demands. This contemplative behavior--and here
one appeals to the Greeks--is said to be pursued for
its own sake.
But this appeal is mistaken.
For one
thing, "theory" is not pursued for its own sake, but
only in the passion to remain close to and hard
pressed by what is as such.
But, for another, the
Greeks struggled precisely to conceive and to enact
this contemplative questioning as one, indeed as the
highest mode of energeia, of man's "being-at-work."
They were not concerned to assimilate practice to
theory; quite the reverse: theory was to be understood
as itself the highest realization [Verwirklichunq] of
genuine practice.
For the Greeks science is not a
"cultural good," but the innermost determining center
of all that binds human being to people and state. 16
By quoting the passage in its entirety one is able to show
how the Lraditionally distinguished--if not merely
opposed--notions of techne, praxis and theoria are thought
together in Heidegger's text, in such a way that the
political itself gets essentially defined through these
notions.
The first crucial thing to note with regard to the
passage is that "Science" or "knowing"--and that is
"philosophy"--means techne.

To define techne as knowing--

and that is essentially as philosohy as a standing firmly
in the midst of beings--is to take this notion away from
its purely "technical" determinations.
:1.6

RR, 472-73.

In techne, it is
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not a matter of actualizing skills with a view to the
making of an artifact.

It is rather a matter of theoria,

which is itself defined as "the passion to remain close to
and hard pressed by what is as such."

Theoria too is

taken away from its usual abstract and merely
contemplative determinations.

For man theoria is a mode

of energeia, of being-at-work: in theoria something is
actually realized or "put into work" (the word Heidegger
uses is Verwirklichung).

Praxis itself--the political

notion par excellence--is being put into work in theoria.

so

that the political itself--the existence of a people

and a state or a polis--is through and through
"technical."

Knowing or techne--i.e. the combat against

the power of Being, the combat through which a relation to
what is in general and a disclosedness of beings, as well
as the opening up of possibilities for a historical Dasein
are rendered possible--is itself praxical: it is the very
condition of possibility or the essence of the political
as such.

To put it abruptly and in terms that are not

specifically Heideggerian: the philosophical--or the
metaphysical: Dasein's being-in-the-world--and the
political are contemporaneous or co-originary.

( B)

At this point the reading of the Rectoral Address
must be interrupted.

But the investigation into the

,_...
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intimate--and in a way abysmal--relation between techne
and the political is only beginning.

Indeed, one is now

about to be engaged into another circle.
one may recall the general or traditional thesis
concerning Heidegger's engagement in National-Socialism,
as well as his rupture.

After he resigned from the

Rectorate, Heidegger might have withdrawn from political
life: since he had come to politics through the
university, it would have been natural that he also leave
politics when he was no longer at the head of the
university.

Having left the front of the political stage,

he might have devoted himself entirely to problems of
"pure" philosophy.
But then what are we to think of the declaration
he made to the two journalists from the Spiegel who were
questioning him about his politics?

The statement reads:

After I resigned from the Rectorate, I limited myself
to my task as a professor. In the summer semester of
1934, I held a lecture course on "logic." The
following semester. 1934-35, I held my first lecture
course on Holderlin [on the hymns "Germanien" and "der
Rhein"}. In 1936 began the courses on Nietzsche. All
those who could hear heard that what was at issue was
a confrontation [Auseinandersetzungl with nationalsocial ism.
During this period, Heidegger also delivered his course
Introduction to Metaphysics (1935)(the culminating point
of which is a discussion of the famous chorus from
Sophocles' Antigone), the different versions of The Origin
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he work of Art (1936), as well as the other Holderlin

-iectures on "der Ister"
of

t

and "Andenken."

Following these historical remarks, two set of
questions need to be raised:
1 . Is Heidegger's statement concerning his
Auseinandersetzung with national-socialism to be taken
seriously?

In other words. do the texts and lectures

following 1934 engage a debate--indeed a philosohical one-with national-socialism, and thus necessarily with the
question of the political?
2. If so, how can this be related to the fact that all the
lecture courses. from 1934 to the end of the war. focus on
the question of art, and specifically on the question of
poetry or Dichtunq--whether in Sophocles or in Holderlin?
How, in other words, did the question of the political
come to be formulated in connection with the question of
art and poetry?

How did the question of the poetic become

the central question of--and here one must hear the double
genetive--the political?
If the question concerning art were a question of
aesthetics, as it has been in the whole history of
philosophy; if, in other words. the question of art were a
question concerning the "beautiful" and the imitation or
mimesis of the beautiful--then surely it would have very
little to do with the question of the political as it has
been formulated so far.

This does not mean that it would
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have nothing to do with the question of the political as
such.

on the contrary.

It would perhaps have very much

to do with Nazism and with the way this movement, through
the mouth of Hitler or Goebbels, considered politics as
the highest form of art: as the true artwork.

17

But

Heidegger's thinking about art is precisely engaged in an
attempt to free art from aesthetics.

In art. the

beautiful is not primarily what is at issue.

The

discourse about art is not primarily a discourse about the
beautiful.

At least if the beautiful is a matter of

judgment, specifically of judgment of taste.
But what is art?

And how can we talk about art?

Art, in its essence, is techne.
least not primarily--"art".

Techne does not mean--at

It does not designate any

kind of making, whether poietic (craft) or artistic.
Rather, techne--as shown in the Rectoral Address--means
knowing.

This determination will remain throughout

Heidegger's publishing career.

In "The Question

Concerning Technology" (1954), for example, Heidegger
writes:
From earliest times until Plato the word techne is
linked with the word episteme. Both terms are words
See, for example, the pages devoted to the
question of art in Mein Kampf, or the letter Goebbels
wrote Wilhelm Furtwangler and that was published in the
newspaper Lokal-Anzeiqer on April 11, 1933: see also the
article published in the Volkischer Beobachter (April, 24,
1936) entitled "Art as the Ground for the Creative Power
in Politics."
17
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for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be
entirely at home in something, to understand and be an
expert in it.ie
And closer to the Rectoral Address, in a politically
decisive text, viz. in Introduction to Metaphysics, he
writes: "Techne--which denotes neither art (Kunst) nor
technology (Technik) but a 'knowing'

('Wissen')." 19

Or

again, in the same text: "Techne means neither art nor
skill, to say nothing of technique in the modern sense.
we translate techne by 'knowing. '" 20
But what is ''knowing"?

What is "knowledge"?

The

first part of the Introduction provides a preliminary
sketch: knowledge, says Heidegger in a somewhat enigmatic
way, is that in which "the norms and hierarchies are set,"
that "in which and from which a people comprehends and
fulfills its Dasein in the historical-spiritual world (in
der qeschichtlich-qeistigen Welt)." 21

A little further:

But to know means: to be able to stand in the truth.
Truth is the manifestness of beings. To know is
accordingly the ability to stand [stehen] in the
manifestness of beings, to endure it [bestehen].
Merely to have information, however
abundant. is not to know ... for to know means to be
able to learn ... Ability to learn presu.pposes ability
to question. To question is the willing-to-know
:i.e

Basic Writings, p. 294.

Einftihrunq in die Metaphysik (TUbingen: Max
Niemeyer Verlag, 1987), p. 13. Henceforth EM.
19 •

20

EM. 122.

21

Ibid. • 8.

38

analyzed above: the resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit]
to be able to stand in the openness of beings. 2 2
If we now wish to gather the different
determinations of knowing in order to delineate its
essence. we can say that knowing is a mode of existing in-of standing out

unto~-unconcealment

in that it is

precisely defined as the ability to stand in the open of
what is manifested, and in such a way as to determine the
historical-spiritual Dasein of a people.

Once again,

then, the very possibility of the political is being
ordered to the emergence of knowing or philosophy, i.e.,
to the ability "to stand in the openness of beings."
But how does such knowing essentially unfold?
What does it mean. "to stand in the oppenness of beings"?
In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger decides to trace
out this unfolding in the great Greek beginning, and
specifically in the first chorus from Sophocles' Antigone.
This (viz. the recourse to Greek poetry) is the crucial
move.

The Introduction initiates the political way into

poetry.

There is a decisive move, for from the

Introduction onward, there will be a privilege--a
political privilege--of the "artistic" and specifically of
the poetic over the "forces of work" and the "forces of
combat," also of "blood and earth"--the more directly
"political" forces.
22

Why such a move?

Ibid., 16-17.

Why such a
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privilege?

Again, the answer is a matter of essence.

The

move is a move toward the essence of knowing or techne;
the privilege of the poetic is a privilege of essence.
Beginning with the Introduction, the word techne will
progressively and decisively be reoriented in the
direction of art.
Techne, then. also--and more and more--means
"art".

Why?

First of all because, as a mode of

aletheuein or unconcealing, it is necessarily a mode of
poiein, which Heidegger translates as herstellen (producing) or hervor-brinqen (bringing-forth).

Second--and

this point depends on the first one--because, as a mode of
standing amid beings in the way of mastery or domination,
techne is necessary to the poiesis or making· of the pieces
of equipment and artifacts.

But if making or producing is

a mode of knowing, the highest mode of techne is,
according to the Greeks, poetry, i.e., the pro-ducing or
bringing-forth of something through language.
In his reading of Sophocles' Antigone, Heidegger
is concerned with tracing out the originary and essential
meaning of knowing in the Greek world.

Hence Heidegger is

engaged in a historical (qeschichtlich) reading, i.e., a
reading which itself can be decisive for the opening of
our own future: "Only the most radical historical
knowledge can make us aware of our extraordinary tasks and
preserve us from a new wave of mere restoration and
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uncreative imitation." 23

A "radical historical" knowl

is a knowledge which reaches the very root of history as
the origin that marks the essential unfolding of
knowledge.

Thus a radical knowledge is a knowledge

situated in the "destinal" outburst marked by the great
·Greek beginning.

Only in standing in the originary

destiny can there be a future for the German Dasein.
is in this sense that one needs to understand

It

Heidegger's

statement according to which only the radical historical
knowing can "make us aware of our extraordinary tasks."
This sentence constitutes perhaps the whole of Heidegger's
truly political vision as well as his historical ambition
for Germany as Volk.

The destiny of the German Dasein can

only be opened up from the Greek destiny understood as
Geschick.

On this particular point, then, there is no

difference from the Rectoral Address.

The difference lies

perhaps in the fact that now (in 1935), in order to free
11

.Q..ill: [i.e.,

"we" the German people] extraordinary tasks,"

Heidegger resorts to the analysis of Greek historical
knowledge, i.e., of techn& and of its most unconcealing
form: poiesis--poetry:
... we shall now consult a thinking poetry [ein
denkerisches Denken] of the Greeks and particularly
that poetry in which the Being and (the corresponding)
Dasein of the Greeks was in the truest sense created:

23

EM 96.
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the tragedy.24
The tragedy Heidegger focuses on is Sophocles'
Antigone.

Specifically, Heidegger's analysis bears on the

first c h orus.

2!5

The chorus, according to Heidegger,

provides an answer to the question "who is man?" and not
to the metaphysical question, viz. "what is man?"

The

question, then, is not metaphysical but historical--and
that is always, for Heidegger, political.
What does the chorus say?
It starts off by evoking the deinon, which
Heidegger translates by das Unheimliche, the uncanny.
Polla ta deina becomes: vielfaltig das Unheimliche,
manifold the uncanny, which can also be translated--but
none of these substitutes are quite satiRfying--as the
strange, the dis-quieting, the extra-ordinary, the disorienting, the monstruous, etc.

Heidegger then moves on

to define the deinon as the terrible (das Furchtbare), in
the sense--and here Heidegger plays with the semantic
field of walten (to rule, to dominate, to be violent to)-of "the overpowering power [das Uberwaltiqende Walten]
which compels panic fear, true anxiety as well as the
collected, silent awe that vibrates in itself." 26
24
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-that--an d th 15

i· -

~

where the overpowering or the essent i a 1

violence of power is contained--the Unheimliche is to be
understood as "that which casts us out of the 'homely,•

cg.a§.

HeimischeJ the customary, familiar, secure." 27
The Unheimliche thus defined (or re-defined),

1- .

e. , this overpowering [Uberwaltigunq] or originary

violence [Gewalttatiqkeitl is nothing other than what
"What is Metaphysics?" depicted as the incommensurability
of Being or nothing.

In relation to such uncanniness, man

is determined as to deinotaton, das Unheimlicheres, the
strangest or most uncanny.

Such is "the basic trait of

the human essence," and not some "particular attribute of
man. as though he were also something else." 26

Such is

man's basic trait, precisely insofar as the tragic saying
about man does not speak of man but of Dasein. and that is
in such a way as to encompass "the extreme limits and
abrupt abysses of his being."29
Now if man,

in his essence--and the essence of

man, in this context.

is indeed the non-human or the human

under erasure--is das Unheimlicheres, the reason is
twofold.
First of all,--and here the Introduction is in
27

Ibid .. 115-116.

28
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per f ec

t accordance with what is said about Dasein's

endence beyond beings in "What is Metaphysics?"--man
tr an Sc
"departs from. flees from the limits which at first and
for the most part are customary and familiar to him.
Hence man can be defined as "the violent one,"

1130

i.e .. as

the one who "surpasses" the limits of the familiar, and
"indeed precisely in the direction of the uncanny in the
sense of the overpowering."

In other words, the violence

of the strangest of all is perpetrated against the
strangeness of Being and, as a result, originates a
polemos, a Kampf--a struggle: "We shall fully appreciate
this phenomenon of strangeness only if we experience the
power of appearance and the struggle with it as an
essential part of Dasein."
Second, insofar as man is "the violent one," he
perpetrates violence against the overpowering--i.e.,
against being or nothing--, he "gathers" it and "lets it
into the open," into manifestness. into appearance.

In

other words. man is the being--indeed an extraordinary
one--which lets being (nothing) be.

Man is the being by

which that which essentially withdraws and resists
presentation is brought to the fore and presented.

In and

through man as Da-sein, Being is there.
Consequently. insofar as man is defined as the uncanny. insofar as the paths he opens up amid beings are
30
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stamped by exile, are a-poria.

it is not surprising that

"the point at which all these paths meet," the "ground and
place of man's Dasein"--in other words, what the Greeks
called the polis and which tends to designate "the there.
wherein and as which the Dasein is as historical" 31 --is
itself defined as a-polis. i.e .. as the place which would
not provide man with the quietness or the way (poros) by
which he would comfortably dwell in the midst of beings.
The true polis is "the place of history, in which, out of
which, and for which history happens [Geschichte
qeschieht] ." 32

Now that which happens according to the

truly historical destiny is Being.

And to free a place

for Being, to give Being its 'there' implies to let man
essentially unfold as das Unheimlicheres.
What does this essential unfolding consist in?
How does Being come to manifest itself in the uncanny?
Such questions, i.e., such historical questions--and not
historiographical, anthropological or ethnological
questions--are answered in the chorus from Antigone.

For

in this tragedy it is a matter of "a poetic project of
man's Being, drawn from its extreme possibilities and
31

32

Ibid., 117.

The question of the polis--and that is, of
course, the question of the political--will become
increasingly important in Heidegger's texts. Both in the
Parmenides lecture course (WS 1942-43) and in the "der
Ister" lecture course (SS 1942) Heidegger devotes extended
analyses to the question. We shall return to this
question further on.
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limits." 33

And these are the possibilities and the limits

evoked in the chorus, inasmuch as they constitute the
world and the place of man as Dasein.
What are those possibilities and limits?

There is

the overpowering power of the sea. violent and wild. with
which man

collides.

There is the earth in its

undestroyable ruling, which man transforms and shapes,
thereby revealing his own violence.

There are the living

creatures which live in the sea and on the earth and which
suffer the overpowering power of nature, whereas man
"casts his snares and nets," "snatches the living
creatures out of their order, shuts them up in his pens
and enclosures." 3 4
Hence the sea, the earth and the sky define the world
within which man essentially unfolds as the deinotaton.
Thus it is not a matter of describing "nature" as we
usually understand it; nor is it a matter of tracing out
the "evolution" of man in such nature.

Rather, it is a

matter of the world from which man essentially unfolds as
what it is, viz. as Dasein.
Likewise, when the chorus comes to characterize
man, it is not a matter of enumerating the qualities and
the faculties of this being, but of grasping it in its
most extreme possibilities.
33
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It is not by accident, then,
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that language. understanding. Stimmunq, passion and
building are mentioned as belonging essentially to man and
as being inherently violent.

All these characterizations

are not "faculties" that man would possess and that he
would use so as to break out into beings.
possess such powers.

Man does not

Rather, such powers possess man: in

and through them, man happens as who he is--as a
historical being.

Hence these powers belong essentially

and in the strictest sense to man, and yet man is most
remote from his essence when he believes he possesses or
has invented these powers: "How could man ever have
invented the power which pervades [durchwaltet] him. which
alone enables him to be a man?" 3 15
In the Durchwaltiqung, then. man's being is at
issue.

Why?

What characterizes this Durchwaltigung?

In

what sense is it different than the Umwaltiqung proper to
the overpowering power man suffers and with which he
collides?

Durch-walten literally means to rule through,

to per-vade.

In the Umwaltiqunq, man is dominated in such

a way that the overpowering power encircles man in an
environing world, in an Umwelt, and so both "oppresses"
[bedrangt] him and "inf lames" [befeuert] him.

The

Durchwaltiqunq, on the other hand, goes and runs through
man, and so reveals him as who he is.

Indeed, man comes

to be who he is in the Durchwaltiqunq, i.e .. in the
315

Ibid. , 120 ..

47

.

v10 1e

nee of language and of poetic saying, in the violence

of thought and in the violence of the building or founding
of the Qolis.

In other words, man finds himself only in

the violence of this Durchwaltiqung, which is itself

essentially an opening up by which beings are uncovered as
such.

In the Durchwaltiqung, then, the manifestness of

beings in the open and of the place proper to the Being of
man is at issue.

Only in the ruling which per-vades man

and carries him in this very pervading can man--or Dasein-find the 'there' of his Being.

'Illis 'there' is defined

as an essential belonging together of poetic saying--the
primal form of poiesis--, of thinking and of the founding
of polis.

'Ille three dimensions are rooted in the

Durchwa 1ti guJJ.9:..
In comparison with the Rectoral Address, there is
a certain displacement of the field proper to the
political.

'Illis displacement is itself a political move--

a move away from the 1933 engagement.

Indeed, the

discourse about the political--about what Heidegger calls
the polis--is now completely void of both the Nietzschean
vocabulary ("will," "power," "decision," etc.) and the
JUngerian vocabulary (particularly the thematic of the
worker), both of which were very much at play in the
Address.

'Ille forces of "knowing" are no longer mentioned

alongside the "working" and the "military" forces.
political is now totally and exclusively ordered· to

'Ille
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knowing. to

techn~.

At this point.

techn~--and

that is

Dasein's Being-in-the-world--is defined in terms of three
essential elements: poetry, thought. polis.
seem to be co-originary.

The three

Unlike what has been suggested

earlier, the possibility of the polis does not seem to be
grounded primarily and essentially in poetry.

Poetry is

mentioned alongside thinking and the polis, and even if
the three are essentially thought together. poetry is not
explicitly said to be the essence of the polis.

Yet the

polis is revealed in its essence through a poetic saying
which is said to be a "thinking poetry."

Hence poetry.

thinking and the political seem to be inextricably bound
together.

Yet so far nothing has been said about the

nature of the bond.
It is at this point in the analysis of Sophocles'
poetic saying. i.e .. in the last stanza which. according
to Heidegger. "brings everything that has been said so far
in its inner unity," that Heidegger's analysis of techne
as Wissen is completed.

Thus everything happens as if the

whole of the poetic saying would converge on this
"machination," this machanoen which Heidegger interprets
as techne.

If the passage did not focus on the question

of art, it would merely repeat what was said in "The
Rectoral Addresss":
Knowledge is the ability to put into work [das InsWerk-setzen-konnen] the Being of any particular being.
The Greeks called art in the true sense and the work
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of art techne, because art is what most immediately
brings being (i.e. the being that stands there in
itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something present
(the work). The work of art is a work not primarily
because it is wrought [gewirktJ, made, but because it
brings about [er-wirkt] Being in a being. Here, to
bring about means to bring into the work; and in the
work. the emerging power, physis, comes to
shine. It is through the work of art as being Being
[das seiende-Sein] that everything else that appears
and is to be found is first confirmed and made
accessible, explicable, and understandable g_.§. being or
not being.
Because art in a pre-eminent sense brings Being to
stand and to shine in the work as a being, it may be
regarded as the pure and simple ability to put to work
[Ins-Werken-setzen-konnen], as techne. The puttinginto-work is an opening that brings Being about in the
being. This superior, actualizing opening [erwikende
Eroffnen] and keeping open is knowledge. The passion
of knowledge is questioning. Art is knowledge and
therefore techne.3 6
As Lacoue-Labarthe brilliantly points out, 37 the
decisive (i.e. the politically decisive) shift from the
Rectoral Address to the Introduction--and that is the
shift to the question of art--is accomplished in the
tenuous and yet crucial move from the problematic of the
"Being at work" [gm Werk seinJ to the problematic of the
"putting into work."

It is in this slight and yet

decisive shift that the question of art first appears.
Lacoue-Labarthe writes:
If, as certain texts of 1933 might suggest.-particularly "The Call to the Service of Work" (or any
particular passage of the Address)--Heidegger's
36
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• Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe. L'imitation des Modernes
(Paris: Galilee, 1986), p. 191.
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"political" discourse was ever supported by an
ontology of work and of the Worker, such
ontology has now disappeared without a trace. 36
The move to the question of art would then primarily be a
political move, i.e .. a move away from a "politicized"
discourse into a problematic through which the question of
the political would be engaged anew.
What is crucial in the passage quoted from
Heidegger is that everything comes to focus on the
question of the "work," specifically of the "putting [or
bringing]

(in} to· (the) work."

The passage anticipates in

a very condensed way what will be unfolded in "The Origin
of the Work of Art" {1935/36).

There. the question of art

takes another decisive turn--a turn which will eventually
bring Heidegger to his very political reading of
Holderlin.

( c)

Once again. the question is a question of essence.
Of another essence.

Also of another circle.

A circle

rendered even more complex by the fact that "The Origin"
is itself presented as a circle, more specifically as a
circling within the circle.
The analyses to follow will henceforth be engaged
in tracing out as economically as possible the main lines
3
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of "The Origin."

The hinge on which the whole of "The

origin" tu rns is the essential connection between art and
truth.

The fundamental and decisive conclusion of the

text is that art is das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit,

i.e., truth's putting itself to work. into the work-truth's putting itself to work in putting itself into the
work of art.
But how?

How does truth happen in art?

art a happening of truth?

How is

Heidegger takes the "example"

(but is it really an example?} of a pair of peasant shoes.
specifically of the shoes as depicted in Van Gogh's
paintings.

The paintings depict a piece of equipment,

viz. a pair of shoes.

How does the piece of equipment

manifest its equipmental character?
its use?
shoes.

How does it stand in

Heidegger insists that the shoes are peasant
What the paintings would reveal, then, would be a

piece of equipment in a very specific use,
precise environment.

in a very

Indeed, the shoes as depicted by Van

Gogh point to the "t;!arth" on which they tread daily.

They

also disclose the "world" of the peasant woman, viz. the
world of labour, of the walks across the fields, but also
of impending birth, of the necessity to withstand want, of
threatening death.

As Heidegger puts it:

This equipment belongs to the earth and is protected
in the world of the peasant woman.
From out of this
protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its

resting-within-itself [lnsichruhen]

.39

In other words, the shoes do not simply "belong" to world
and earth in the artwork, like any other thing would.
Rather, the shoes allow world and earth to be there for
the peasant woman.
Heidegger now reflects on what has happened in the
course of the description of the pair of shoes.

In

describing the shoes, one did not go to the shoes but one
brought the shoes toward oneself by means of a painting.
In so doing, one revealed the truth of the pair of shoes.
The artwork is that which enabled us to know what shoes
are "in truth."

But in this process. it is not only the

essence of equipment that has come to light.
of art itself is also manifested.
its disclosive power.

The essence

Art revealed itself in

Art itself is a happening of truth.

Specifically, art is truth's putting itself (in)to (the)
work.
But what is truth?

Truth in "The Origin of the

Work of Art" is rethought as aletheia, as the happening of
clearing and concealing which first makes it possible for
beings to come to presence.

"The Origin" is thus to be

thought in the wake of the rigorous determinations of
truth developed in "On the Essence of Truth."

39

Art is not

.
"Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege
(Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann. 1950), p. 23.
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truth itself but a happening of truth.

It is only one of

the ways in which truth--as the strife or the polemos of
clearing and unconcealing--happens.
happen?

But how does it

How does truth's putting itself into the work

happen?
In art truth happens as the strife (Streit)
between world and earth.

In other words,

in art the

(essential) strife between clearing and concealing happens
as the strife between world and earth.

It is important to

note at this point that the strife that is essential to
truth is different from the strife proper to art.

The

strife between clearing and concealing happens in art only
insofar as the work of art brings the strife between world
and earth into play.

How does the strife in art occur?

In order for the work to show itself as it is in
itself--i.e. in its "pure self-subsistence" [reines
Insichstehen]--and not in relation to something else (as
in thecase of a piece of equipment). the work has to open
up a world:
Where does a work belong? The work belongs, as
work, uniquely within the realm that is opened up by
itself. For the work-being of the work is present in,
and only in, such opening up.4°
The world is that which first lets beings be, lets them
come to presence: "By the opening up of a world, all

40
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ain their lingering and hastening, their
things g
remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits."41

In

the opening up of a world, men themselves find their place
and can stand in the midst of beings as an historical
Dasein.

The world opened up by the work of art is a

happening that never ceases to happen, an Ereignis--i.e.
the very possibility of a history and a destiny: the
possibility of the political as such.

This is perhaps

most clear in the description Heidegger gives of the Greek
temple, in which the world continues to "world":
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at
the same time gathers around itself the unity of those
paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster
and blessing, victory and disgrace. endurance and
decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being.
The all-governing expanse of this open relational
context is the world of this historical people. Only
from and in this expanse does the people first return
to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation. 42
The description of the temple continues, yet in a
new paragraph:
Standing there, the building rests on the rocky
ground .... Standing there, the building holds its
ground against the storm raging above it ...
After the description of the world, Heidegger moves to the
earth.

As though, in the movement of his description,

41
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Heidegger wanted to show that world and earth belong
together. that they cannot be mentioned separately, that
they call and respond to each other. that they are both
equally rooted in the work, in the temple.
The earth the Greeks called physis, which
Heidegger translates as Aufqehen. emergence.
"that to which,

Earth is

in the course of emergence [i.e. in the

process of physis] everything emergent is as such brought
back and sheltered.'"43

The earth is that which shelters

or harbours [birqt] things in such a way as to secure and
conceal them at the same time.

As such, earth resists

disclosedness, it withdraws from openness or
unconcealment.
How is the work of art related to world and earth?
In each case, the relation is reciprocal.

As regards

world, the artwork stands within the world, and yet the
world is opened up by the artwork.

Heidegger expresses

this connection in terms of an Aufstellunq, of a settingup: the artwork is set up within the world, and yet the
artwork itself sets up a world by a gathering
(Versammlung) of different relations CBezUge) in which man
gets the shape (Gestalt) of his destiny.

Likewise, as

regards earth, the artwork is set forth (hergestellt),
produced from earth by virtue of its being made out of
some earthly material.
43
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But in being set forth from earth,
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the work of art is being set back into earth in such a way
as to set forth earth.
Hence the setting up of world and the setting
forth of earth belong together in the work of art.

Their

unity constitutes the Insichstehen of the work of art.
But what kind of unity is this?
belong together?

How do world and earth

They belong together in opposition or

essential strife, i.e., in polemos:
... the relation between world and earth does not
wither away into the empty unity of opposites
unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting
upon the earth, strives to surmount it.
As selfopening, it cannot endure anything closed. The earth,
however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to
draw the world into itself and keep it there. The
opposition of world and earth is a strife. 44
Insofar as world is that which is opened up, that within
which beings can come to presence, it is striving with the
sheltering and the withdrawal proper to earth.

Likewise,

earth, as Zurilckbergen, strives to shelter and withhold
world within itself.

Neither world nor earth can give the

other up without giving itself up.

Strife strives for

strife. and it is only in strife that world and earth are
revealed as such.
Truth, then, happens in the work of art as the
strife of world and earth.

The work of art is a being

that is brought forth or pro-duced so as to establish

44
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truth as the strife of world and earth.

But the work of

art is not first brought forth so as to then establish or
set truth.

Rather,

in being brought forth, the work of

art becomes the setting for truth and is itself set into
truth.

Hence the bringing-forth [Hervorbrinqen] of the

work and the setting [Stellen] of truth are actually the
same.

To name this sameness--which is nothing other than

the very essence of art--and the complex of determinations
attached to it, Heidegger uses the word Gestalt, which
anticipates the word Heidegger will later use to define
the essence of art and technology, viz. Gestell.

The

Gestalt--the meaning of which is lost if translated
without reserve as shape or fiqure--gathers all the
determinations of ''The Origin."

In such a word one has to

hear the result of the setting [Stellen] of truth in the
work--a setting which includes the play of Aufstellen
(setting up a world/being set up in a world) and
Herstellen (setting forth earth/being set forth out of
earth).

The Stellen or the reciprocal play of the

Aufstellen and the Herstellen in the work of art is said
to be a Feststellen, a setting firm.
Now in the Addendum to "The Origin of the Work of
Art" the Stellen is interpreted as thesis--as
Hervorbrinqen--, which is itself a mode of

poiesis.4~

So

~
"We must think of 'to set' [stellen] in the sense
of thesis ... The Greek 'putting' [Setzen] means placing, as
for instance, letting a statue be set up.
It means
4
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that,

·n the end. the bringing-forth of the work or the

l

setting of truth as strife in the Gestalt is poiesis in
the originary sense.

That poiesis that is equated with

the thesis or the Stellen Heidegger calls Dichtung-poetry (in an originary sense).

Techne, then. or what

Heidegger calls Wissen. is essentially poiesis, Dichtung.
poetry--i.e. a setting of truth into a bringing-forth:
The word techne denotes a mode of knowing. To know
means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing,
which means to apprehend what is present, as such.
For Greek thought the nature of knowing consists in
aletheia, that is. in the uncovering of beings.
It
supports and guides all comportment towards beings.
Techne, as knowledge experienced in the Greek manner,
is a bringing forth of beings in that it brings forth
present beings as such beings out of concealedness and
specifically into the unconcealedness of their
appearance. 46
The shift toward an "artistic" understanding of techne is
now confirmed. for techne is now essentially defined as
Hervorbrinqen. and that is as poiesis, as poetry in the
originary sense--as a happening of truth.

Truth happens

in art as poetry: "All art. as letting the advent of the
truth of beings happen. is as such essentially poetry
[Dichtung]" (HW 59).

The political too, then, insofar as

it is essentially submitted to knowledge, would primarily
laying. laying down an oblation.
Placing and laying have
the sense of bringing here into the unconcealed, bringing
forth into what is present. that is, letting or causing to
lie forth."
46
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be a matter of poetry.
But what about this Dichtung?

To what extent is

it a question of poetry in such poiesis?

To say that all

art is essentially Dichtung is not tantamount to
attributing "poetry" (Poesie) as an artform a privilege
that would result from an "artistic" axiology in which
poetry would hold the highest position.

Rather,

it means

that art, insofar as it is considered in its essence, and
that is insofar as it essentially unfolds as art, is
poetry in the originary sense.

All art, whether pictural.

sculptural, architectural, etc., is poetry, poiesis, a
bringing-forth of the work of truth.
Yet' Heidegger insists that the linguistic form of
Dichtung, viz. Poesie, has a certain privilege among the
arts.

But again, this privilege has nothing to do with

artistic "taste"; it is not an aesthetic judgment.
privilege is a privilege of essence.

The

For language as such

is essentially and originarily poetic:

language is what

first opens up the clearing, so that "where there is no
language. as in the being of stone, plant and animals,
there is also no openness of what is." 47

Where there is

no language, where there is not the gift (the es qibt) of
language, there is also no openness for beings, no world:
no happening of being, no Ereignis.

Being 'gives'

itself

as the gift of language. as and in the being (but is it a
47
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;Q._eilJQ?) by which the whole of beings is opened up.

All

arts. and that is techne as a whole, are ordered to the
primary and originary emerging of language as Dichtung.
All arts take place, are brought forth in the space opened
up by language.
It is in that sense that one has to understand
Heidegger when he writes in the "Letter on Humanism" that
"language is the house of Being.'' or when he takes up the
line by Holderlin which reads "poetically man dwells."
Man dwells poetically insofar as he finds the Da- of his
historical Da-sein in Dichtung.

It is of the utmost

importance to emphasize the fact that the whole discussion
of "The Origin of the Work of Art" culminates in an
analysis of art in its essence--i.e. poetry--in connection
with the possibility of history and destiny.

The ultimate

stake of "The Origin" is identical with the stake of the
analysis of the chorus from Antigone in Introduction to
Metaphysics and with the stake of the Rectoral Address:

in

each case, it is a matter of defining the essence of
techne as knowing, and that is as the way in which beings
as a whole are disclosed to a historical Dasein.
But the essence of knowing has now taken a new
turn.

Everything that was credited to the sole knowing

and to its "will" and "power" in the "political" discourse
of 1933 is now, in 1935. attributed to poetry and art, to
art as poetry.

But the project remains quite the same.
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It is still a matter of giving a people the possibility of
setting up a world and of initiating a history from the
opening up of beings as a whole in language:
Whenever art happens--that is, whenever there is a
beginning--a thrust enters history, history either
begins or starts over again ... History is the
transporting of a people into its appointed task as
entrance into that people's endowment (HW 64).
Art, poetry, is now what Heidegger used to call in 1933
the spiritual-historical existence of a people.

Art is

historicity or historicality itself, and that is the very
possibility of the political, if the polis is indeed "the
historical place, the there in which, out of which, and
for which history happens" 48 :

"Art is history in the

essential sense that it grounds history" (HW 64).
But where does this grounding power come from?
Where does the political power of poetry come from?
Insofar as language-- and that is the saying (das Sagen)
in its poematic project, i.e.,

in its capacity to say

world and earth in their strife--is what first opens up a
world and a destiny for a historical Dasein, the
possibility of that people's essence and acting is
grounded in language.

In other words, poetry can be said

to be supremely and essentially historical or political in
that in the space it opens up language speaks itself
originarily.
48 •

Art. Being and History (the political)

EM 117.
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belong together.

The history of art is also the history

of Being, that is the history of thought--whether
metaphysical or pre-metaphysical.

Hence Heidegger can

write:
Always when beings as a whole demand, as beings
themselves, a grounding in openess, art attains to its
historical essence as foundation.
This foundation
happened in the West for the first time in Greece.
What was in the future to be called Being was set into
work, setting the standard.
Beings as a whole thus
opened up were then transformed into beings in the
sense of God's creation. This happened in the
Middle Ages. This kind of being was again transformed ·
at the beginning and in the course of the modern age.
Beings became objects that could be controled and seen
through by calculation.
At each time a new and
essential world arose.
At each time the openness of
beings had to be established in beings themselves, by
the setting-firm [Fest-stellenJ of truth in figure
[Gestalt]. At each time there happened
unconcealedness of what is. Unconcealedness sets
itself into work, a setting which is accomplished by
art (HW 62-63).
It is perhaps in this passage that the necessary link
between art, truth as aletheia and history is most
explicitly inscribed.

History--and by history one has to

understand the emergence of a relation to beings as a
whole such that the entire domain of man's dwelling on
earth, viz. his Gods, his thinkers, his rulers, his
science, in short his polis, is determined by such a
relation--emerges when art happens, when truth puts itself
(in)to (the) work.
In 1933 Heidegger dreamt of such a new beginning.
But this world lacked the only thing that could provide it
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with such a beginning (such an Anfang) and constitute it
as a true world, viz. an art, a Dichtunq, a Sorache.
that such an art did not exist.

Not

But the poet whose saying

continues to stand as the future of the Germans was never
quite recognized.

It was never actually considered as

Germany's truly historical and political power.
Holderlin--and these are the last words of "The Origin of
the Work of Art," words that indeed concentrate the whole
of Heidegger's political ambition for Germany--is the poet
"whose work still confronts the Germans as a test to be
stood."

These closing words open up the necessity of a

reading of Holderlin in which Heidegger will be engaged
for some twenty years.

This reading will confirm the

movement sketched out so far, viz. a withdrawal from the
political--that is from the political life--into the
essence of the political, specifically into the poetic
saying of Holderlin as the poet of the Germans.

(D)

But before engaging oneself in the reading of the pieces
on Holderlin, it is necessary to consider the texts in
which the political is most explicitly related to its
essence, viz. to truth and art.

In Introduction to

Metaphysics, Heidegger only devoted a page to the question
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of the polis, without relating it explicitly to the
essence of techne and truth.

We recall that in the 1935

text we were only able to po.int to what seemed to be an
inextricable bond between the polis and techne as the
happening of truth in poetry.

But the nature of the link

remained unclarified, because the essence of techne was
itself being clarified.

And through the reading of "The

Origin of the Work of Art," the essence of knowing or
techne was revealed as poetry, as Dichtung.

How, then, do

techne, truth and the polis belong together?
In at least two different texts of the same
period. one of which constitutes a re-reading of the
chorus from Antigone in connection with Holderlin (which
in itself says very much about the political discourse
Heidegger is trying to articulate), Heidegger devotes
analyses to the question of the polis, and that is to the
question of the essence of the political.

These texts are

the lecture courses gathered under the title Holderlin's
Hvmne "der Ister" (SS 1942) and Parmenides (WS 1942/43).
The polis too is a happening of truth,
essentially.

But techne and the polis belong together as

happenings of truth.

The polis is not a happening of

truth alongside other unconnected modes of happening of
truth.

Techne and polis are grounded in truth as

aletheia.

Or, to put it in German terms--but this

translation is a translation back into the Greek world,
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back into the essence of what is meant by polis, techne.
aletheia--, Wissen and polis (and much would need to be
said about the untranslatability of this word) are
grounded in truth as Unverbogenheit.

The translation of

the Greek into German is the very problem of the
political.

For "the political" is itself a translation--

indeed an historical translation--of its essence. viz. the
QOlis.

In the move from the Greek polis to the City or

the modern State, and hence to the discourse about "the
political," what gets lost and forgotten is the polis
itself.

What is lost or forgotten,

in other words, is the

fundamental experience through which the polis appeared as
what it is--as a happening of truth as aletheia.
The political today would still be grounded in
truth; it would still be a happening of truth.

But truth

itself is no ·longer experienced as unconcealement.
Rather,

it is experienced as technology, as a mode of

techne (of knowing) that has no longer anything to do with
the essence of techne, viz. poetry.

To name the essence

of technology as well as the essence of techne, Heidegger
will use the word Ge-stell, a word that points both to the
essence and to that which remains most remote from the
essence.
How, then, does truth happen in the Greek polis?
And how does truth happen in the modern State?
In the 1942/43 lecture course on H5lderlin.
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Heidegger writes:
The 12olis does not let itself be "politically''
determined. Hence the polis ... is not a "political"
concept. 49
The £Olis, and that is the essence of the political, is
itself nothing "political."

But what is it, then?

It

primarily refers to an activity, to a verb. specifically
to the verb pelein, which Heidegger translates as regen,
to arise, to

emerge:~ 0

The word pelein is old and means: to arise, to come
forth, to find and observe one's place and one's
abode.
Pelein is, in Homer and Hesiod, the current
word for einai, which we translate by "being" [ ... )
Pelein: to spring up and come forth (auf- und
hervorkommen] out of oneself, and thus to
become present (anwesen] (GA 53, 88-89).
Hence pelein means to come to presence, to come forth into
the open of the clearing and there to find one's place in
the midst of beings.

The polis, then, becomes the place

or the there--the Da---of historical Da-sein.

But man can

have a polis--can become historical--only to the extent
that he can experience the pelein of beings, i.e., only
insofar as he can relate himself to the truth of beings.
Martin Heidegger, Holderlins Hymne "Der Ister,"
Gesamtausgabe 53 (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann,
1984), p. 99. Henceforth GA 53.
49 •

~0 .

Heidegger's translation of the first two lines of
the chorus from Antigone reads:
Vielfaltig das Unheimliche,· nichts doch
Uber den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt.
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:Man

is said to have the polis as the place of his

historical essence only insofar as he is the only being

the mode of Being of which lies in its relation to beings
as beings. and that is to the truth of Being:

Man is put in the place of his historical abode, in
the polis. because he and he alone can relate himself
to beings as beings, to beings in their unconcealment
and concealment ... (GA 53. 108)

The polis is now explicitly defined as the pivot
or the whirl around which everything revolves.

It is

defined as the place within which the unconcealment of
beings can take place.

In other words,

it is defined as

the place of the happening of the truth of beings.
hence also as the place of techne.

And

Techne as knowing, and

that is Dasein's mode of Being in the midst of beings.
always occurs from within the polis.
techne or philosophy belong together.

So the polis and
The polis is always

grounded on the relation of a people to the truth of
beings.

The polis is essentially "technical," and that is

essentially poetic: the essence of the political is
nothing political.

The polis is the place in which techne

can unfold in its essence and a people be gathered in this
essence and hence become historical.
In §6 of the
~1

Parmenides.~ 1

which, to a certain

Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, Gesamtausqabe 54
(Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982). Henceforth
GA 54.
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extent. constitutes a reading of Plato's Republic,
Heidegger tries to show how intertwined the notions of
QOlis. mythes (and that is Dichtung or Sage) and aletheia
are.

Heidegger's "political" discourse has now come to

focus on Plato, specifically on the necessary connection
between the Republic as a discourse about the polis and
the mythoi that are told at the beginning of book VII--·
often considered as the most important book of the whole
dialogue--and at the very end of the dialogue itself.
With respect to the very strategic occurences of these
'myths,• the question is: How is it that, in its most
decisive moments, a discourse about the polis must turn to
myths?

What about the mythic in the political?

Everything happens as though the very essence of the polis
could unfold only in and through mythoi,

in and through

poetic sayings.
Before he even considers the essential belonging
together of aletheia, mythes and polis, Heidegger sets out
to sketch the privileged link between aletheia as
Unverbogenheit and the mythos as Sagen.

Mythos alone--and

that is precisely not logos in the sense of "discourse"-can say the "origin," viz. truth as aletheia.

Why?

Because the mythes is the original or originary saying,
the saying of the beginning (anfanglicher Sagen) that
corresponds to the origin (Ursprung) .
Philosophy, on the other hand,

The logos proper to

insofar as it is
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metaphysical, would already be somewhat remote from the
origin.

For metaphysics and its history are precisely the

move by which truth as aletheia is progressively
"translated" as "correctness." and that is as that which
is opposed to "falsehood" {das Falsche).

Philosophical

discourse is precisely the mark of "the transformation of
the essence of truth" (der Wesenswandel der Wahrheit), and
that is the shift from truth understood as aletheia, as a
complex play of concealment and unconcealment, to truth
understood as the rectitude of the gaze.

The difference

between thought and poetry (Denken und Dichten) on the one
hand. and metaphysics on the other hand lies in this
shift.
Such a shift is most clearly enacted in Plato.
Thus, if there is to be a resurgence of the origin in what
constitutes the initial gesture of metaphysics, and that
is in the determination of truth as that which is most
unconcealed, as that which can shine forth in the midst of
beings--in other words as idea or eidos, as the 'looks'
(Aussehen) of a being: as absolute presence--, then such
resurgence will not occur through the rigour of
philosophical discourse but rather through the thinking
substance of the mythos.
One now understands how mythos and aletheia, Sagen
and Unverbogenheit essentially belong together.

One might

also understand why, at the very end of metaphysics, in a
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time of distress. nothing can be expected from
"philosophy" and why Dichtunq alone--specifically
Holderlin's Dichtung--can show us the way to the origin.
But if the belonging together of mythos and aletheia now
seems established, the connection with the polis remains
unclarified.

What, then, about the connection between

aletheia, mythes and polis?
First. there is in Plato's text a connection that
could be considered as external.

As we suggested earlier.

the mythos from which Heidegger retrieves Plato's doctrine
of truth is to be found in one of the central books of the
Politeia. specifically

at the very beginning of book VII.

Now the dialogue as a whole is oriented towards a
discussion of the polis.

Why, then a mythos about

aletheia in book VII and a muthos partly about lethe in
book X?

How are we to articulate the connection between

the Politeia as a whole and the myths about aletheia and
lethe?
Second, if there is to be an essential connection
between aletheia, mythos and polis in the Greek world, one
might presume that the notions of polis and mythos will
undergo the same radical re-determining the notion of
aletheia undergoes in the Heideggerian text.

Hence the

essential connection would not be thought in terms of what
we understand today by truth (i.e. correctness). myth
(i.e. a me're tale, a fictitious story) and the political
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(i.e. that which is related to the modern state).

The

modern conception of the state is as remote from the Greek
Q_oli.§. as the modern conception of truth is remote from the
Greek aletheia:
The difference between the modern state, the Roman res
publica and the Greek polis is, with respect to its
essence, the same as the difference between the modern
essence of truth. the Roman rectitude and the Greek
aletheia (GA 54, 132).
The two points we have sketched out are closely
intertwined in Heidegger's analysis of the
Plato's Politeia.

poli~

in

Although Heidegger's reading bears

primarily on Plato, he extends his conclusions about the
polis to the whole of the Greek experience of the
political.

And such extension. as will later be shown,

raises serious

questions.~ 2

The connection Heidegger draws between the polis
and aletheia seems to be a mere assertion, a thesis that
he would need not bother arguing.

Heidegger writes:

... the essence of the Greek polis is grounded in the
essence of aletheia. This connection between aletheia
and polis must also be presumed, and not necessarily
grasped, on the basis of a simple consideration. For
if truth as unconcealment determines all beings in
their presencing [Anwesenheit] (and for the Greeks
this means in their Being). then the polis too, and it
above all, must stand through aletheia in the sphere
of this determination ... (GA 54. 132)

See chapter 3.
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so

far. the connection between aletheia and the polis is

merely posited: the connection must be presumed, the polis
too must stand, etc.

But it remains unclear why the

connection must be presumed.

Now Heidegger provides a

short explanation at the very end of the sentence quoted
above, but this explanation will get unfolded in the
following paragraph.

The understanding of the connection

is primarily based on the understanding of the polis:
... if however the polis means this: that in which the
humanity of the Greeks has the center [die Mitte] of
its Being.
Hence the essential belonging together of the
polis and aletheia depends on the understanding one has of
what the Greek experience of the polis was.

It is here

defined in terms of spatiality, in terms of whereness and
not of whatness.

There is at play a certain displacement

of the way in which to conceive the polis.

For the polis

no longer answers the question "what is man?"
longer "a political animal."

Man is no

Rather, the polis answers

the question that bears on the whereness of man.
man?

Where is man's Being?

the Da- of Dasein.

In the polis.

Where is

The polis is

Man stands in the polis as in the

center of his Being.
The polis becomes the place within which which man
is related to beings in their unconcealment, the place
within which he dwells as a historical being.

The polis
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appears in its essential connection with the truth of
Being:
What is the polis? When we bring an essential insight
into the Greek experience of the essence of Being and
truth--an essential insight that illuminates
everything--then the word itself gives us the right
indication. Polis is the polos, the pivot, the place
around which, in a peculiar way, revolves everything
which appeared to the Greeks in beings. The pivot is
the place towards which every being turned so
that it shows in the region of this place what
application and involvement it has with Being.
As this place. the pivot le
the being in its
Being appear accordingly in the whole of its
involvement. The pivot neither makes nor creates the
being in its Being, but as the pivot it is the site of
the unconcealedness of beings in the whole. The polis
is the essence of the place, so we speak of the
regional place of the historical dwelling of Greek
humanity.
Because the polis always lets the whole of
beings come forward in the unconcealedness of its
involvement in some way or another, the polis is
essentially related to the Being of beings.
Between
polis and Being an original relation rules (GA 54,
132-33) .
From the outset, it is crucial to note that the oolis is
defined in terms of its "original relation" to Being, •:t.nd
not in terms of the web of interconnections and
interactions between the members of the polis.

Such

interactions would be primarily guided by a founding
relation of the community to Being.

In that regard, there

is a continuity between the 1942/43 lecture course and the
Rectoral address: the authentic leader of the community is
the one who is himself led by the guidance of an essential
and original relation to Being.

It is only insofar as

beings as a whole are governed by the same relation to
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Being that a polis can exist as a relational and praxical
totality.

Without an original and founding relation to

Being, there can be no political or praxical life.

Hence

the polis is not primarily the result of a communitarian
gathering. of a social contract or a revolution.

Rather,

the polis is primarily the space within which the truth of
beings can

occur.~ 3

In the paragraph that immediately follows.
Heidegger proceeds to bind together even more decisively
the polis and Being.

Just as the opposite or counter-

essence (Gegenwesen) of truth,

i.e.

lethe, belongs

essentially to truth as aletheia, so the polis unfolds as
its counter-essence and non-essence (Un-wesen), viz. as&.=
polis and hypsipolis.

In binding the polis with aletheia

in such a way, Heidegger introduces--or rather
reintroduces--the major determinations of the polis
thematized in section IV of Introduction to Metaphysics
along with the determinations of truth thematized in "On

To admit an essential and original relation
between the polis and Being is already to admit that what
was once posited as the privileged relation of Being to
time is now, to say the least, put into question, if not
radically disrupted. For if the polis, as "the essence of
the place," is indeed the horizon within which truth as
unconcealment occurs originally, then the question of time
appears as merely derivative.
In the last chapter, we
shall attempt to show how the question of the political
can also be considered, in more promising terms, from the
project of fundamental ontology. specifically from the
ecstatic structure of Dasein.
In such an attempt, it will
be a matter of putting the emphasis on the connection
between time and community.
~3 .
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the Essence of Truth" and in "The Origin of the Work of
Art."

Heidegger writes:

Now if, as the word indicates, the strifely essence
belongs to aletheia, and if the strifely [das
Streithafte] appears also in the opposite of the
Verstellenl5 4 and the forgetting [Vergessen], then all
extreme counter-essence and hence all non-essence of
the unconcealed and of beings, i.e., nonbeing
[das Unseiende] in the manifoldness of its counteressence, must rule in the polis as the place of the
essence of man.
Here. the original ground for each
phenomenon. which Jacob Burckhardt first presented in
the fullness of its scope and manifoldness, is
concealed: it is the frightening, the horrible, the
disastrous that belong to the Greek polis. This is
the ascent and the fall of man in the historical
place of his essence--hypsipolis, apolis--: by far
exceeding the place. deprived of the place is how
Sophocles (Antigone) names man.
It is not a
coincidence if this word defines man in the Greek
tragedy.
For the possibility and the necessity of the
"tragedy" itself springs from the sole ground of the
strifely essence of aletheia (GA 54, 133-34).
Thus man is defined as apolis, as being without a place.
Yet this apolis belongs together with the polis.
belong together in their very opposition.

The two

The place of

man cannot be thought separately from his being thrown out
of the place into the monstruous, the unresting.

This

constant and necessary dis-placement, dis-locating, this
throwness into the unfamiliar is precisely the place of
man.

Thus we see how the major themes of "On the Essence

of Truth" (truth as strife) and Introduction to
!5 4

Verstellen: "disarranging, putting one thing in
the place of another, hence obstructing, disguising,
counterfeiting" (John Sallis, Delimitations--Phenomenology
and the End of Metaphysics [Bloomington & Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1986], p. 183.
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Metaphysics !the Walten and the Uberwaltigung of the
Unheimliche) are now intertwined in a political
problematic.

Indeed,

just as the strife appears as the

essential trait of truth in "On the Essence of Truth," so,
here, the polis is its counter-essence and non-essence.
The polis is itself the place of the ruling (Walten) of
this extreme tension between essence and counter-essence,
being and non-being. concealment and unconcealment.

It is

the place of the essential strife between the overpowering
power of physis, which throws man out of a place, and the
"technical" mode of Being of man. by which man finds a
place in the midst of physis.
But what is perhaps most important and radically
new in

thi~

passage is the essential connection that is

explicitly drawn between Greek tragedy--and that is Greek
poetry--, the polis and aletheia.

What is at stake in

what Heidegger says is the essential belonging together of
truth, of language as poetry and of the political.

This

belonging together is rooted in a primal experience of
truth.

The experience of truth of an historical people

commands both a specific relation to language and a
specific relation to the polis.

If the essence of truth

is experienced as aletheia, then the relation to the
Political, and that is also to the discourse about the
Political, will be totally different from the essence of
truth experienced as Ge-stell.

Hence it is not a

77
coincidence, as Heidegger points out, if the essence of
the political emerges in Ancient Greece through tragedy.
There is a certain "necessity" attached to the very
existence of tragedy in Ancient Greece: tragedy is the
discourse, or rather the saying that is best able to
recapture the ground from which the polis essentially
unfolds. viz. aletheia.

Like the polis understood as the

essence of the place of man, and that is also as its
counter-essence, tragedy itself "springs from the sole
ground of the strifely essence of aletheia."

Philosophy,

on the other hand, would be unable to say the essence of
the political, for it is itself the result of the shift or
the change--the Wandlunq--of the essence of truth.
Heidegger does not say more about Greek tragedy in
its connection with truth and the polis.

Yet the

indications he gives constitute a decisive continuation of
the discussion of Introduction to Metaphysics,

in the

sense that they emphasize a connection that remained
somewhat unclarified in 1935.

Moreover, these indications

also serve to prepare the way to Heidegger's reading or
re-reading of Plato's Republic.
The Republic is often considered Plato's most
important dialogue, the dialogue that would most reveal
Plato's "philosophy."

Plato also marks the beginning of

Philosophy, and that is, for Heidegger, the decisive
transformation in the essence of truth.

What. then. about
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the rise of metaphysics in its relation to the political?
How is it that philosophy emerges and becomes an explicit
stake in a discourse about the polis?

What needs to

thought of the co-emergence of the philosophical and the
political?
The Republic could be said to be (still) ''Greek"
to the extent that it would be grounded in some way in
that which defines the very essence of Greekhood, and that
is the experience of truth as aletheia.

And yet. if that

text also marks the beginning of philosophy, it is also a
decisive move away from such an experience.

Hence the

Republic would remain in a way undecided between
philosophy and non-philosophy.

In the very elaboration of

the beginning of metaphysics, the trace of non-philosophy
would be retained.

in a most concealed way.

Similarly, in

what is presented as a "philosophical" discourse--as a
logos--about the polis, the Greek experience of the polis
would still be at play.

The connection between aletheia

and the polis would still be operative, not in the logos
of the text but rather in the mvthoi told at certain
strategic moments of the dialogue.

In the mythoi or the

mythic the essence of truth and hence of the polis would
be recaptured.
Such is the project in which Heidegger is engaged:
to show how the mythic dimension in the Republic still
retains the essential Greek experience of the polis.
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Specifically. Heidegger is engaged in showing how a
in which the essence of truth as aletheia is virtually
presupposed occupies the very center of the Politeia, thus
governing the logic of the entire political discourse.
According to Heidegger, the "allegory" of the
cave--the myth that is perhaps most referred to and most
commented upon in philosophy--is itself to be related to
the closing myth of the dialogue, viz. the myth of Er.
The two myths belong together, for what is at stake in
both of them is the essence of aletheia in its essential
strife with its counter-essence.

The dialogue as a whole

would be contained in the space of the two reciprocally
responding myths, so that the question of the political
would itself be attached to the myths about aletheia and
lethe.

The discourse about the polis would unfold in the

space delimited by the myths about truth.
The polis would unfold in the space broached by
the strife between lethe and aletheia.

The polis arises,

man becomes historical when he comports himself to this
extreme tension and takes it up in its very violence,
actually conforming himself (sich fliqend) to its order
(Fug)!'.5!'.5,

Such a free co.nformity, such a voluntary and

~~
'Order' is only one possible translation of the
German Fuq which, as Manheim points out in a note of his
translation of Introduction to Metaphysics, "does not
occur in modern literary German" (p. 160). The meaning of
the word in Heidegger's vocabulary is actually threefold:
it is understood first as "joint and framework (Fuqe und
Gefliqe); second as decree, dispensation, a directive that
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active submission. Heidegger c;:il ls FUgsan:J.keit, which is
the German for dikaiosyne.

This word, Heidegger says,

means "the emergence (das Aufqehen) of the essence of man
in the order and his standing within the order, dike"
(137).

Dike, which is usually translated as "justice." is

indeed the explicit stake of the Politeia.

From the very

start, the opening discussion between Socrates and
Cephalus bears upon "justice."

But this word which. for

us Romans and Christians, is a juridical and political
notion, actually points, according to Heidegger, to that
which constitutes the essence of the polis, viz. the
strifely joint between lethe and aletheia in which man is
to dwell.

Once again, Heidegger attempts to trace a

notion that is constitutive of our juridical and political
modernity back to its essential origin--an origin which is
not itself political.

Rather.

it points to an experience

of truth as aletheia that remains most remote from us:
To interpret dike out of modern justice and Roman
iustitia is as impossible as to interpret the polis
out of the Modern State or the Roman~ publica.
Dike as the order that orders man in the relations
(Verhaltnisse] of his comportment finds its essence
out of its bearing (Bezuq] to aletheia, but in no way
is dike determined by and through its relation to the
Polis (142-43).
Rather,

it is dike, and specifically dike in its

the overpowering imposes on its reign; finally, as the
governing structure (das fliqende Gefliqe) which compels
adaptation (EinfUgung) and compliance (Sichfliqen)"
llntroduction to Metaphysics. 123).
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relation to techne that determines the polis.

Heidegger

is more explicit about such a connection in his commentary
on the chorus from Antigone in Introduction to
Metaphysics.

In this passage, dike is considered in its

essential and originary relation to techne.

The violence

that man uses against the overpowering power of physis is
techne.

Man is the being with

techn~.

i.e .. the being

which, by means of this essence, is the strangest and most
violent among beings.

But the violence proper to the

overpowering power of physis or Being is called dike.

The

two forms of deinon are in opposition or strife, and the
polis is the place of such strife.

The strife recalls the

play of strifes described in "The Origin of the Work of
Art."
truth.

Like the work of art. the polis is a happening of
In the polis, man bursts forth against dike

through techne: man sets himself against physis, and in
setting himself against it brings it forth, discloses it
in a world, in his world: in the polis.

In turn, physis

as dike is the overpowering that disposes (verfilgt) of all
techne.

In spite of techne, man can never master physis,

for physis is both the power that always exceeds the power
of man. the power that unsettles man and throws him away
from his place, and the power that is self-concealing and
self-sheltering, the power that emerges only in
withdrawing.

But it is crucial to note that man as such

happens in the strife between techne and dike.

In such

•
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strife, man essentially happens as political.

The

political as such, and that is primarily the polis.
emerges from out of the conflict between techne and dike.
The QOlis is the place in which and as which the strife
between techne and dike occurs.
Heidegger is now in a position· to gather in a most
condensed passage all the determinations related to the
essence of the polis:
Because the polis is the where as which and in which
the order (Fug) is unconcealed and concealed [sich
entbirqt und verbirgt], because the polis is the way
in which the unconcealing and concealing of the
ordering takes place, so that in this taking place the
historical man specifically comes to its essence and
non-essence, such is the reason why we call the polis,
in which the Being of man in its relation to beings as
a whole is being gathered, the essence of the
place of historical man (141-42).
The passage indicates the complex of determinations in
which the polis is caught.

Indeed the polis,

in its

whereness. is essentially related to the way in which dike
occurs as a strife between concealment and unconcealment.
Only in this strife can man come to his essence, which is
to say, because of the very structure of the strife, to
his non-essence.

What is at stake in such a relation is

precisely the possibility of historicity, the possibility
of the political as such, if what is meant by polis is the
place within which man can unfold according to his
essence, and that is according to his essential relation
to Being as aletheia.

Because of the strifely character
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of aletheia on which the polis is grounded. the oolis
reveals itself in its counter-essence, and that is
essentially in its dis-placing and placelessness
(JD'psipolis, apolis):
~hole,

in his relation to beings as a

man finds his place in being thrown out of a place,

in being without a place.

The proper place of man is

always his own negation or counter-essence.

The essence

of the place is a certain placelessness. a certain retreat
from the place--a retreat that indeed constitutes the
place from its very dis-placement.

The essence of the

2olis is always concealed but also sheltered and secured
in its non-essence.

In the polis, man is essentially

related to the truth of beings as aletheia.

For the man

of the Greek polis, the polis is nothing but the place
within which the totality of beings can emerge according
to their self-secluding and self-sheltering essence.

The

saying which fits such experience of the polis is the
mythos--whether in the form of tragedy (Sophocles) or
dialogue (Plato).

With Plato, the Greek world comes to

its completion: through a conception of truth as idea or
eidos, the essence of truth is progressively preparing the
way to truth as homoiosis.

Simultaneously, the

Philosophical discourse is taking over the more concealed
and veiling mode of saying--the mythos--which is more akin
to the essence of truth.

As a consequence of such

transformation, the experience of the political becomes a
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matter of "justice" and management of public affairs, and
the discourse about the polis is no longer to be found in
poetry as Dichtung but in a mode of discourse named
"philosophy."
Here we are, then, back to our opening and guiding
hypothesis: the essence of the political is its very
retreat.

For if the polis appears only in and as its

counter-essence.
also a-polis.

if. in other words. the polis is always

its presence being also its unavoidable

absencing, then the political is always withdrawn,
withheld. secured--essentially.

To say that the essence

of the political is essentially withdrawn is to say that
the political as such is articulated as withdrawal.

Hence

the "esse·nce" of the political is not something that would
need to be recaptured or recovered in the depths of time
lost: it is not something that once took place as a unique
event and then faded away. disappeared into the depths of
history.

Rather, the essence of the political, as

essence. never ceased to govern the political.

The

essence is a happening, an Ereiqnis that never ceases to
happen, even today, perhaps most of all today.

And we

have to wonder whether the political would not resemble
the words of language Heidegger speaks of in the
Parmenides volume:
We ought not think that the words of language
initially possess pure fundamental meanings, and that
with the passage of time the latter get lost and
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become deformed.
fundamental
root meani
remains quite concealed and appears only in what one
calls the 'derivative' (31).
With respect to the political. the 'derivative' could be
politics, even though the derivative has become the
dominant and the all pervasive.

But like the meaning of

words. the political did not get effaced in the course of
time. through use or misuse.

Rather. the essence of the

political would always already be effaced. concealed,
apparent only in politics. only in what is grounded in the
essence of truth as Ge-stell.
Because our time is most remote from the essence
of truth as its counter-essence; because technology
governs the way in which beings as a whole become manifest
for us--and that is as beings merely present, merely
ready-to-hand, and not as beings that come out of
concealment--. the political too remains most remote from
its essence, and that is from its counter-essence.

And it

is insofar as the political today is most remote from the
Polis that, just as Heidegger speaks of the "end" or the
"closure" of metaphysics, so we can speak of the closure
of the political.

But to speak of the end or the closure

of the political is not to acknowledge a terminal point
(today? tomorrow? or was it yesterday?) at which the
political would cease.

Rather, it is a matter of

acknowledging how, together with the philosophical, the
political is now gathered in its most extreme
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possibilities.

It is a matter of acknowledging how the

total and global presence of beings, and that is the
~

negation of

~he

essentially withdrawing and concealing

dimension of Being is at the same time the very condition
of possibility for the overwhelming and totalitarian
presence of the political.

The 'State.' according to

Heidegger. is the ultimate,

i.e.,

~he

political.

the completed form of

The state is the political form that fits

the necessity for man to rule over beings as a whole.

It

is the form that corresponds to the epoch of technology.

In the midst of beings, man is fully aware of himself and
of his absolute and total ascendancy over beings.

And the

State is the place within which man can comport himself
with beings and with men according to technology as a mode
of truth.

With technology, the political has become

"unquestionable" (fraqlose).

To the unquestionableness of

the political in its modern form

Heidegger opposes the

FragwUrdigkeit (that which is question worthy, that which
is called into question), the fragility of the Greek
polis.

The political today belongs together with the

totalitarian tendency of technology.

As Heidegger puts

it: "The unquestionableness of the 'political' and its
totality belong together."!5 6

But this unquestionability

or indisputability of the political whole, of the total
politics and the political totality is not the result. as
!56

GA 53, 118.
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"naive minds" (naive Gemi..iter-) could figure, of the
"fortuitous will of dictators."!57
re~ult

Rather, it is the

of the history of the essence of truth.

Hence the

total penetration of the political--and that is its
totalitarian presence--is not the deed of Hitler,
Mussolini or Stalin.

It is not a question of names and

individuals.

it is a question of destiny, of

Rather,

Geschick: the 'decision' (which is not a matter of free
will) was made long ago; the fear and trembling which
animated our Century could be heard long before the actual
events.

The events were long since destined, not as a

fate or a fatality. but as a metaphysically extreme
possibility.

And the political today marks perhaps the

most extreme possibility of metaphysics. the possibility
in which and as which metaphysics exhausts itself.

The

political today will have perhaps marked an end with airs
of

funerary mask, of terror. of fire and ashes.

!5?

Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO
Holderlin and the Future of Germany
H5lderlin. der Dichter,
dessen Werk zu bestehen den
Deutschen noch bevorsteht ...
Martin Heidegger. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.
The previous chapter brings us to the question of
poetry (Dichtung) as the central question of the
political.

Poetry is not the expression of the political,

it is not the way in which the political expresses itself,
reaches out of itself in words.

Such would be the case if

poetry were essentially concerned with "expressing"
something--whether feelings.
realities.

lived experiences or inner

Such would be the case. then.

if the political

were to exist first in itself and then in words.

Rather.

the political arises in and through language as poetry.
The words of poetry are not that in which the political is
translated. but that in which it emerges as such.
that the political

.s!.§.

To say

such emerges in language

(essentially determined as poetry) is to draw an essential
and necessary connection between the two dimensions, the
belonging together of which, as we have seen,
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lies in

89

truth as unconcealment.

(A)

But what is the essence of poetry, if poetry is
such as to let the political emerge as such?
this question,

To answer

it is necessary. according to Heidegger. to

turn to the poet whose poetry poeticizes the essence of
poetry.

Such a poet is Holderlin 1

.

To poeticize

(dichten) is to show, to render something manifest in a
specific saying.

In that sense, poetry is most akin to

the language of the Gods as Holderlin understands it:
und Winke sind
Von Alters her die Sprache der Gotter 2
Poetry is not the "expression" or the "translation" of the
1anguage of the Gods into "human" 1 anguage.

In poetry.

it

is not a matter of interpreting and of bringing into
language an esoteric "message" of the Gods.

Rather.

it is

a matter of "echoing" in the people the signs that come
from the Gods. 3

It is important to emphasize the fact

Thus I shall henceforth be engaged in a close
reading of Heidegger's pieces on Holderlin, specifically
of Holderlin's Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980),
Gesamtausgabe 39. Henceforth GA 39.
1

2

Friedrich Holderlin,

"Rousseau," lines 39-40.

See Martin Heidegger, Holderlins Hvmnen
"Germanien" und "der Rhein" (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann. 1980), 32: "Poetry is the echoing of those
3
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that Hei::leggar uses the word "echo" to point to the
specific activity of the poet, for if the word "echo"
indeed

carri~s

a sense of derivation or secondarity in

comparison to the more originary and primary sense of the
showing of the Gods, it nonetheless escapes the merely
mimetic dimension that would be present in words such as
"copy". "image". "expression". "translation", etc.
showing of the poet is such as to let

The

Dasein of a

people be in the dimension of the signs of the Gods.

It

is a showing by which the Gods become manifest in their
showing dimension.

In the showing of the poet. what is

brought about is the very showing of the Gods as showing.
But such Winken is essentially different from a mere
Zeichen, a mere showing that would consist in pointing to
something or bringing someone's attention to something.
Such Winken is not obvious.

The words in poetry are not

"signs" or signifiers that refer to a signified that would
itself lie somewhere, secured and self-sufficient.

Words

are rather essentially active and productive, poietic: in
the movement of their Winken something becomes manifest.
More: Something is actually instituted.
But what is instituted?

The answer is: Being.

Or

rather: Being in the historical existence of a people.
Since Being is that which alw,ays already is. that which

signs in the people (das Weiterwinken dieser Winke in das
Volk)."
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remains. the saying of the poet can only institute Being
in a specific language, can put it to work in language, in
such a way as to institute it in the historical existence
of a people.

The existence of a

p~ople

is actually

instituted in and through language, in and through the
poietic activity of the poet.
"origine.ry language of
But why poetry?
for example?

;1

Hence poetry is the

people" [Ursprache eines Volkes].
Why poetry more than philosophy,

How is it that language. and more

specifically poetry, is essentially related to man's
historical and political Dasein?

And if the essence of

poetry indeed lies, as Heidegger suggests, in the fact
that it exposes the Dasein of man to the whole of beings,
the question remains to know how a "construction of
language" 4 --what Holderlin calls a "dialogue" CGesprach)!5-can actually take up such an original task.

How can

language in the form of poetry. and that is in the form of
what is traditionally considered as a mode of pure
discourse, actually institute Being, in such a way that
the Dasein of a people would essentially be related to
Being in this very institution?
Why, then,

is the poetic privileged over any other

Martin Heidegger, GA 39, 59.
Viel hat erfahren der Mensch.
Der Himmlischen viele genannt,
Seit ein Gesprach wir sind
Und horen konnen voneinander.
Holderlin--IV, 343.
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kind

of- 1 anguage:")

Because it is not a form of exoression

of language among other forms of language. but rather the
very essence of language, and that is the very way in
which language essentially unfolds as language.
the primary, originary mode of language.

Poetry is

Language as we

conceive of it in our average, ordinary understanding is
nothing but a derivative mode of this primordial and more
essential mode.

Language as a mode of expression--

whether in its ordinary and most

corru~on

form. viz. in

"idle talk", or in its more unusual and sophisticated
form. viz. in philosophical discourse--is already a
"fallen" mode of language, i.e .. a mode that is already
situated at a certain distance from the essence of
language.

Language in its essence is not expression.

For

to express something through words, it would first be
necessary for man to possess language as something readyto-hand.

Now language in its essence is not something

that can be possessed, and hence used or even manipulated.
Such uselesness, or rather the impossibility of putting
language to work in such a way that it would manifest the
inner life of a subject is what is revealed in poetry as
Dichtunq.

Poetry alone .. as Heidegger puts it, accounts

for the fact that "we do not possess language, but
language possesses us. for better or for worse." 6
But to say that language possesses us is
6

GA 39. 23.
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tantamount to saying that we are always already caught
in language, thrown into language, in such a way that our
essential relation to beings, and to the Being of beings,
is always, from the very outset, a relation of language.
Thus to think language in its essence is to think it in
its necessary and primary relation to Being.

In the act

of poeticizing the poet takes up this essential relation
to Being, brings it to language, to a specific language
which Being as such is instituted.

i~

In the poetizing act

of the poet there is a specific instituting, a specific
initiating of Being, and not only an "expression" of
Being.
In a way, poetry says nothing but the fact that
man is in language.

In other words, the Being of man, the

Sein of Dasein is held by language.

Insofar as man is

held by language, he is the there of Being.

Language is

the disclosedness of Being: in language the unconcealment
of beings--i.e., the originary unconcealment along with
its immediate and simultaneous covering-up--is completed.
There is a world, i.e., there is manifestation or coming
into being--in other words, fhere is Being--only insofar
as there is language.

The world can "world" for man only

insofar as man dwells within language.
man would be like an animal.

Without language,

"poor in world" (weltarm), or

94

1 n:e a plant. "without a world" (weltlosl

7 :

His relation

to the world would no longer be a relation to Being in its
unconcealment.

He would no longer be exposed to the whole

of beings, to the violence and the strangeness of beings.
Nor would he any longer be exposed to the threat of nonbeing, a threat that essentially belongs to Being.

He

would no longer take up, institute and shelter the
overpowering power of physis.

He would be without a

history or a destiny:
Wherever language is not encountered, as in animals
and plants, there is, in spite of life, no opening of
Being and hence no Non-being (Nichtsein] and no
emptiness of nothingness. Plants and animals stand
below all of this, for they are ruled solely by blind
desires and frantic flights.
The world rules solely
where language is encountered. Only where the world
is encountered, and that is where language is
encountered, the supreme danger also is encountered.
the danger par excellence, i.e., the threat of
non-being upon Being as such (GA 39, 62).
Through language, then. man becomes "the witness
of Being."
Being.

In language man supports Being and responds to

Man is,

of Being.

literally, responsive to and responsible

Hence to be the witness of Being is to be

active in the midst of the very strifely character of
Being.

In such witnessing. it is a matter of taking up

the unconcealment of beings, in such a way that Being
7

See Heidegger's winter semester 1929/30 lecture
course (Gesamtausqabe 29/30, p. 276 ff.) and Introduction
to Metaphysics (p. 34); see also Jacques Derrida's
discussion of the issue in Del' Esprit--Heidegq~r et la
Question (Paris: Galilee, 1987).
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itself would be instituted in language. and would yet
remain threatened by non-being in the very taking up of
Being.

In other words,

in instituting Being, it is also a

matter of instituting and keeping open the very threat of
Being. and of dwelling within this threat.

Such dwelling,

as will later be seen, can be understood as supremely
political.
The danger linked to poetry is twofold.

On the

one hand, there is a danger that belongs to the very
essence of poetry as the taking up in language of Being in
its relation to its counter-essence, viz. non-being.

Such

taking up--what Heidegger calls "the danger of the
essence" (and one must hear the double genetive)--is the
most difficult and delicate task.
according to Heidegger,

Such a danger.

is expressed.in H6lderlin's

statement according to which "language is the most
dangerous of all goods." 0

But on the other hand, this

activity of the poet, this instituting and initiating
moment is doomed to fall

(verfallen): sooner or later,

it

is doomed to being perverted, covered-up, obliterated in
ordinary discourse.

Hence there is a different type of

danger, a danger which, from the very outset, threatens
the essence of poetry.

What is a matter of Anfang. of

radical beginning in poetry is progressively but
inevitably doomed to fall into the familiar and almost
e

Friedrich H6lderlin, Fragment 13, IV, 246.
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.

- , domain of ordinary discourse.

Such :alling

tr1VlctJ.

belongs to the very essence of language. even though it
constantly threatens the most powerful and disclosive
dimension of language. viz. poetry.

The counter-essence

of language, viz. that which, from the beginning,
undermines the essence of language. belongs essentially to
language.

From the very start. the uncanny or unfamiliar

essence of language is always about to fall into its
counter-essence, into its own negation:
But the poetic saying falls [verfallt], it becomes
"prose", first in the true sense, and then in the bad
sense, and finally becomes idle talk [Gerede]. The
scientific conception of language and the philosophy
of language start off from this daily use of language
and hence from its fallen form, and thus consider
"poetry'' as an exception to the rule.
Everything
stands on its head (GA 39, 64).
For the most part we--and that is "we" Westerners--today-and that is at a time when the Gods have fled--live in
fallen language.

11

We" today are perhaps most remote from

the essence of language. and that is from the very
possibility of an authentic history and an authentic
destiny, if poetry is indeed the "primary language
[Ursprache] of a people."

We today would then be most

endangered, most threatened by counter-essence.
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.
Indeed, the "necessary domination" of the counter-
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e~sence

can in turn be thought of as an impulse to assert

anew the essence of which the counter-essence is
dialectical) contradiction.

Cnon-

At the time when the Gods

have fled and when the earth remains without any Gods, at
the time, then, of what Holderlin calls the Not, there is
still a space for a saying that would indicate such
distress and that would prepare the way for the coming of
new Gods.

Even at the most remote point of proximity frcm

the origin and the essence of language lies the
possibility of a radically new beginning.

Even in the

most fallen language lies the possibility of historicity,
i.e .. of a future that would be the destiny of a people.
Such possibility, according to Heidegger,
Dichtung of Holderlin.

lies in the

Hence the very possibility of a

future, the possibility of history and of actuality lies
primarily in language as poetry.

But to say this does not

mean that poetry constitutes a program or a project for
history, a program that would then need to be 'applied' to
the 'concrete world', as though poetry were something
abstract that would require its own translation into
concrete terms.

Rather, it means that poetry, insofar as

it is Dichtung and not mere Poesie, essentially unfolds as
Geschichte, and not as mere Historie.

This, in turn,

means that an essential connection is made between
language as poetry and the very possibility of history and
destiny:
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The poetic is the fundamental joint [das GrundgefUgel
of the historical Dasein, and that means: language as
such constitutes the original essence [das
ursprlingliche Wesen] of the historical Being of man.
The essence of the Being of man cannot first be
defined and then, afterwards and in addition. be
granted with language. Rather. the original
essence of his Being is language itself (GA 39. 6768) .

In poetry language as such happens.
comes into being.

La

Such happening is supremely historical.

for it is also the happening of man in time. the coming
into being of an historical Dasein.

The coming into being

of language is the beginning of the historical time proper
to man.

In the coming into being of language man comes.

literally. to be: ·The Being of man, specifically the Being
of a historical Dasein, occurs in language.

The poet is

the one who institutes Being. who brings it to language.
to the language of a specific historical Dasein.

In

bringing Being to language, the poet places Being in the
Dasein of a people.

In inscribing Being in the language

of a people, the poet actually opens up the very
historicity of the people, the very space and time within
which the people will become historical.
the saying of the poet is grounding.

In that sense,

And the destiny--and

that is also the grandeur--of the people will depend on
whether it will remain within the sending of the poet's
saying. or whether it will progressively close off what
was once opened up by the poet, viz. the totality of
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the Gods. the earth. men. history.
Throughout, then, the question of history and the
question of the political as essentially linked to
history, will be a matter of language. specifically a
matter of language as poetry, and, of poetry as it
essentially unfolds in Holderlin's saying.

( B)

all essential and great
things could arise only
because man had a homeland
and because he was rooted in a tradition.
--Martin Heidegger, "Interview" with Der Spiegel.

The emergence of the political in poetry is always
the emergence of a specific epoch of history, the
beginning of a new historical
specific Dichtung.

(geschichtlich) time in a

According to Introduction to

Metaphysics, the essence of the Greek polis is determined
in Sophocles' Antigone.

But where is the essence of

Germany--and that is, for Heidegger. of the West-determined?

Who is the poet whose saying is such as to

reveal the historical-political situation of the West as
well as its destiny?

The answer is: Holderlin.

Holderlin

is the poet through whom Heidegger addresses the question
of the historical-political situation of Germany at the
end of metaphysics.
Heidegger began to lecture on Holderlin in the
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Winter semester of 1934-35. right after he resigned from
the Rectorate.

Through an incessant reading of Holderlin,

from 1934 to the end of the war. Heidegger will be
concerned with coming to grips with the historialpolitical reality of his time, and that is with what he
will later call--all too carelessly and simplistically-the emergence of technology through ''l'l.mericanism" and
"Sovietism."

But during that same period, Heidegger will

also be concerned with thinking the historical and
political situation in which Germany was caught.
Specifically, he will be engaged in an Auseinandersetzunq
with his 1933-34 political involvement and statements as
well as with Nazism as a whole.

His writings of the time

constitute a move away from politics into the question of
the political, essentially defined as withdrawal.
Heidegger will be concerned with thematizing the retreat
of the political, that is both the withdrawal from
politics and the retreat of the political
that essentially withdraws).

(the political

Such a confrontation remains

for the most part implicit (although it is sometimes made
explicit) and operates at the level of Geschichtlichkeit.
But it is also total,

in the sense that it engages the

totality of Heidegger's thinking.
In the Winter semester of 1934-35, Heidegger
lectured on Holderlin's hymns, "Germanien" and "der
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11

fil)e1_n .

9

The context of this lecture course was

politically very determined--if not overdetermined:
Heidegger had just resigned from his Rectorate and the
lecture course on two of Holderlin's hymns seem to mark
the break with all kinds of political engagement or
responsibility.

After 1934, everything happens as if

Heidegger had definitively withdrawn from politics and had
himself to problems of "pure philosophy" and

devot

"poetry".

Yet this withdrawal from politics is

essentially linked to Heidegger's reading of Holderlin.
Furthermore, I beljeve Heidegger's reading of Holderlin to
be a way of reengaging the question of the political, in a
way that puts not only his own engagement into question.
but also the very way in which the political is being
thought and lived, whether in America, in the Soviet Union
or in Germany.
9 .

10

Throughout, Heidegger's reading of

See appendix for full quotation of the hymns.

If, in Heidegger's view, America and the Soviet
Union can indeed be thought together, it seems, on the
other hand, that Germany (i.e. the essence of Germany) is
conceived of as the only possible future of the West. To
the extent that Germany, along with Ancient Greece, is the
country of the "metaphysical language" as well as the
"center of the West", it cannot be thought together with
Americanism and Sovietism. The privilege of Germany will
remain unquestioned in Heidegger, and much will need to be
said about such a privilege (see chap. 3). Yet the
Holderlin lectures constitute an attempt to think the
essence of the political outside the political framework
of the Nazi period. Even though these lectures reassert
in a way the privilege of Germany over any other
"country"--and that is over any other language--, they do
so in a way that radically undermines the metaphysics of
National-Socialism.
10
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HBlderlin will be truly--even though often al!u8ively and
cryptically--historical and political.
The 1934-35 lecture course opens up what we
believe to be Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with the
political reality of his time.
not merely incidental.
the national poet,

The choice of Holderlin is

Indeed. for Heidegger Holderlin is

i.e .. the poet fer whom the f in.1 l staJ.:e

of his Gedicht is the possibility of a history and a
destiny for the German people.

The very consideration of

Holderlin's poetry in such terms already calls into
question the legitimacy of the Nazi regime: to pose the
problem of the possibility of a destiny and. an authentic
or proper history that would be heralded in Holderlin's
poetry is already to deny the political reality of the
time any kind of legitimacy.

From the very outset,

in the

"Preliminary Remark" of the 1934-35 lecture course.
Heidegger speaks of Holderlin as "the poet who still
confronts the Germans as a test to be stood" and whose
work "still deprived of time and space has already
exceeded our historizing/historical bustling activity
[unser historisches Getue] and grounded the beginning of
another history." 11

To speak in such terms is to submit,

almost explicitly, the political reality of Hitler's
Germany to a higher historical and destinal possibility, a
possibility contained in a poet's saying.
11

GA 39, 1.

This is made
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even more explicit in the fol lowing sta.terr.ent. where t";;e
"we" Heidegger uses seems to involve the totality of the
German people, and hence where the "we" seems to be
historical

(geschichtlich):

We do not wish to conform Holderlin to our time.
On
the contrary, we wish to submit ourselves as well as
those to come to the poet's measure [MaJ3 J (GA 39. 4 i .
To bring the totality of a people's

desti~y

~nder

the

saying of a single poet is perhaps "naive", "unrealistic"
and "elitist"--although the matter will appear to be much
more complicated than what such terms seem to indicate.
But at the same time, it is also the manifestation of a
thinking engaged in an attempt to think the political and
the possibility of an authentic German history outside the
ideological framework imposed by the Nazis.

It is, for

•

example. an attempt to think the relation between poetry
and the possibility of history outside of the biological
framework:
The writer Kolbenheyer says: "Poetry is a biological
function necessary to the people." Little
understanding is required to note that this also holds
true for digestion, which is also a biological
function necessary to the people .... When Spengler
defines poetry as the expression of the soul proper to
each culture, it also holds true for the
making of bicycles and automobiles .... From the very
start. such definiton brings the concept of poetry to
a domain that excludes the slightest possibility of
grasping the essence. All of this is so hopelessly
dull ... (GA 39, 27)
Heidegger's reading of Holderlin is engaged in an
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This does not mean that Heidegger's approach

to Holderlin is "historical."

On the contrary.

It is not

a matter of reading Holderlin with a view to contributing
to the history of literature and to Holderlinian
scholarship.

Rather.

it is a matter of indicating the

historical dimension. and

tha~

is t

dimension of Holderlin's poetry.

essentially destinal

So that,

in the end.

it

is not a matter of situating Holderlin in his time. but of
situating ourselves in the horizon of the radically new
saying of the poet, a saying which.
exceeds our time.
seriously,

in its very founding.

In other words, to read Holderlin

i.e., to read Holderlin as the poet of the

future of Germany. one is required to undergo a radical
transformation.

In such a reading, one is no longer

allowed to trace the poems back to Holderlin's time. and
to show how they "illustrate" that time.

In other words.

if one wishes to read Holderlin seriously with Heidegger,
one cannot read him as a romantic author.

Rather, one is

required to call into question the actuality of our time,
in the name of the radically new measure that Holderlin
institutes.

For us, readers of Holderlin,

it is a matter

of thinking the new historical beginning initiated in
Holderlin's poetry.

For the German people,

of "broaching its actuality." 12
12

GA 39, 213.

it is a matter

Hence such reading is far
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•han a reading

mor e "'

informative.

t would be merely pleasurable or

What is at stake here is the future of
~

Germany and of the West.

The stake. then, is both

historical and political.

It is both a matter of

identifying the time in which we live and of thinking
whether this time is open to a future.
And what is t:-,e new "measure" that Hol

What is our time?
lin would

institute?
The sixth section of the 1934devoted to these questions.

lecture course is

The section is entitled: "The

determination of the 'We' from the horizon of the question
of time," and consists in a commentary of the line of
Germanien which reads:
... none of us knows what is happening to him (V. 271
The 'We' that is operative here corresponds, according to
Heidegger, to the question "Who are we?" and not to the
question "What are we?" 13

The 'who' of man is privileged

over his 'what', and the difference is temporal.

What is

essential is to know what time the 'We' refers to:
But the 'us' and the 'we' the poet speaks of here, are
they the people of yesterday, the Germans of 1801? Or
should those of 1934 also be included? Or does
Holderlin mean the Germans of 1980? Or even those who
are without a year? What chronology is referred to
13

One recalls that the question of th~ 'who' of man
also governed Heidegger's reading of the chorus from
Antigone in Introduction to Metaphysics. The question is
the same, but the time has changed.
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here, and what is the time which is in poetry (GA
49)?
Furthermore, .the time of the 'we'. and that is the time of
a people. is essentially different from the time of the
'I'. the individual time.

Where does the difference lie?

The title of Sa--"The measurable time of the individual
and the original time of the people"--provides ·v·<llu.able
indications.
itself.

There is a certain dissyrrunetry in the title

On the one hand. the time of the individual would

be measurable; it would be the time for which we would
have a measure.

On the other hand, the original time of

the people is not said to be measurable.
to be "original."

It is only said

Unlike the time of the individual. the

time of the origin would be unmeasurable.

Or rather. we

would lack a measure to evaluate the time of the origin.
Why?

How does the original time flee from measurable

time. from chronology?
In the original time of the people, something
radically new, something "initial" (anfanqlich) is
instituted.

Insofar as this time is radically new. it is

the transgression and the negation of all the standards,
the laws, the measures.
that originates.

The time of the origin is a time

As such, it is its own law (Gesetz), its

own positing (Setzung), its own measure (MaB).

It is the

founding of a new beginning, a founding that involves
violence against its own time.

This new beginning is such
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as to escape all measure. all grasping: it only opens t
abyss of its self-positing and institutes the violence of
its law.
Such instituting is the privilege of the
"creators" (die Schaffenden).

They are primarily the

poets, 1 4 and then the thinkers and the State founders:
The historical Dasein of a people--its rise. its pe
its fall--originates in poetry. From the latter
[arises] authentic knowing, in the sense of
philosophy.
And from these two, the actnalization of
the Dasein of a people as a people through the State-politics originates (GA 39, 51).
·
The creators "ground (qrUnden) the historical existence of
a people," and this grounding constitutes its own
justification (BegrUndunq).

The grounding act of the

creator is self-grounding. and the measure or the
justification of such grounding cannot be found outside
the act itself.

Such is the contradiction which the

creators originate: Insofar as they are founders. they set
new standards and new laws for the future; they broach a
new beginning of history.

And yet, such founding is

always made at the cost of a transgression of a given
time, of a violence produced against the standards and the
laws of this time.

So that the creator is always ahead of

Here "primarily" does not mean chronologically
"first." We have just emphasized the fact that the time
of the origin is precisely such as to transgress all
chronological determinations and all measurable
evaluations.
Its primacy is rather to be understood in
historical (in the sense of Geschichte) terms.
14
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But ,if someone audaciously thrusts high above his own
time, the today of which is calculable. if. like the
poet. he is forced to thrust and to come into the free
(das Freie), he must on the other hand become a
stranger to those to whom he belongs in his lifetime.
He never knows his people and is always a scandal to
them.
He questions true time for his own time. and
each time places himself outside the time cf the
today (GA 39, 50).
Because of his very nature. the creator cannot be
'at home'

in the time of his today.

He is always beyond,

ahead.

in a time that opposes and negates the present

time.

Hence the situation of the creator is a situation

of exile. of unfamiliarity. of Unheimlichkeit. even though
his creation is precisely such as to found a new and more
proper dwelling for the people to come.

The very

possibility of an authentic dwelling presupposes an
absence of dwelling, a thrownness out of the familiar into
the vertjginous abyss of the uncanny.

In other words, the

very possibility of a place in which a people's Dasein
will become historical--i.e., the very possibility of a
polis--presupposes an absence of place. a radical
displacement.

Hence,

in his throwness out of the time and

the space of his epoch, in his essential Unheimlichkeit.
the creator is also necessarily unheimisch,
uncanny, obscure: monstruous.

i.e., strange.

A certain monstrosity is at

play in each creator, for what is broached by the creators
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is

cisely such as to exceed and threaten all the

standards and the measures with which we define
"normality".

What is. then. Holderlin's specific monstrosity?
What is the abyss with which it confronts us and in front
of which we are to stand if we wish to be with a future?
What is the specific character of Hol

lin's creation?

W11at must be the character of his founding if it is such
as to reveal the essence and open the future of an entire
nation?
The abyss that Holderlin opens beneath our feet is
the abyss proper to our time.
Gods.

The a.byss is the absence of

To stand before the abyss. to endure the vertigo

that such a situation implies is the "grandeur" and the
"mission" of the German historical Dasein.

For to endure

the flight of the Gods or the "distress" is not to
renounce the possibility of a future.

It is not to

renounce the possibility of the divine.
renounce the Gods that have fled.

But it is to

And this is by no means

a "pessimistic" or "nihilistic" attitude.

On the

contrary:
The true renunciating, i.e., the renunciating that is
carried and granted by a fundamental tone that
authentically unfolds. is creative-generative (GA 39,
94) .

To experience the absence of the Gods is already in a way
to prepare oneself for the coming of new Gods.

To wait
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is to free the space f cr
coming of the Gods.

Such waiting is what Holderlin calls

the "sacred mourning"

(das Heilige Trauern). and it

constitutes the fundamental tone (Grundstimmunq) of the
poem "Germanien".

The mourning refers to the Gods that

have fled, which does not mean that it consists in a
"nostalgic attachment to the nast."
standing-fast-within-ones~lf

Rather.

it

J.~

",:::,

(ein In-sich-fest-stehen) and

a Bestehen of the 'there' and the here."

(94)

Hence the

fundamental tone is not only specific to the poem, but it
also stands as a fundamental attitude that the people's
Dasein must take up in its 'there' and its 'here'.
Rather,

it stands in the poem as that in which "the time

of the people" unfolds and the "world-destiny
(Weltgeschickl of the earth of the homeland'' is at issue.
Whenever the earth is "prepared for the Gods." it is
sacred.

And the sacred earth is what Holderlin calls the

Vaterland.

Ultimately, then, Holderlin would provide the

earth on which he dwells with a sacred dimension.

In

other words, it is a matter of turning Germany into a true
Vaterland.

It is a matter of politics--if politics is

indeed the way to provide the polis with Gods.
What is the Vaterland?
the land of the fathers,
people" (120).

It is the Land der Vater.

"the historical Being of a

Such Being, Heidegger says, "is poetically

instituted, assembled by thought, placed in a knowing and
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in the activity of the State founder."

1 !!5

I-Iere

triad. the tryptic or the triangle of the creators is
mentioned once again: the poets, the thinkers and the
statesmen.

Hence the Vaterland or the homeland (what

could also be called the polis, if the Dasein at stake
here were not the Dasein of the West at the end of
mataphysics but the Anci

Greek Dasein), that

would ground the political in its essence.

wh~ch

is the result

of a threefold activity. the first of which alone is said
to be truly "instituting".

As has been already pointed

out, the privilege or the primacy of poetry over the two
other founding activities cannot be thought of as merely
"chronological".

Rather, it is to be thought as

"logical", if what is meant thereby is that the Vaterland
can be posited as such only in logos. only in language
essentially determined as poetry.

In other words, the

very possibility of history, the Vaterland, the political
in its essence can originate solely in and through
language.
What is the Vaterland?
Germanness?

What is the essence of

In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger comments

on the word Vaterland in Holderlin's "Heimkunft" in the
following way:
The word is thought here in an essential sense, not
patriotically or nationalistically but
terms of the
1!5

GA 39, 120.
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history
Being. The essence of the homeland.
however. is also mentioned with the intention of
thinking the homelessness of contemporary man from the
essence of Being's history .... when Holderlin writes
"Homecoming" he is concerned that 'his coutrymen find
their essence. He does not at all seek that essence
in an egoism of his nation. He sees it rather in the
context of a belongingness to the destiny of the West
[my italics) . 16

This passage is extremely dense and very illuminating with
regard to the question of the political.

In a way.

it

does not say precisely what the homeland consists in.
Rather,

it seems to repeat what has already been said with

respect to the Greek polis in its relation to Being.
Indeed. both the Greek polis and the homeland are to be
thought according to their essence. and that is according
to their relation to the history of Being.

Both the polis

and the homeland escape the traditional political
determinations. that is. the Roman determinations:

like

the polis, the homeland is neither a natio nor a patria.
And if man today is homeless, i.e., without a home or a
homeland that would correspond to his essence, it is not
because of a loss of national identity, because of wars of
division or, on the contrary, because of factical
reunifications of different people.

Rather,

of the lack of an essential relation to

it is

ing.

cause

Heidegger

insists on the essential difference between a level of
discourse that would be merely ontic and historisch, on

16

"Letter on Humanism" in Basic Writings, 217.
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the one hand. ontological and geschichtlich on the other
hand.

To a patriotic discourse that would sing of the

homecoming in the
~ould

horizon of a national egoism. and that

be grounded in a metaphysical. Roman and historical

conception of the political, Heidegger wishes to oppose a
discourse that would point to the essence of the homeland,
i.e .. a discourse that would be grounded in the
historical-destinal dimension of Being.

To a homeland

conceived in terms of "a mere space delimited by external
borders. a natural region. a place as the possible scene
of such or such event that would take place",

17

Heidegger

opposes what he takes to be the essence of the homeland.
The question, now,

is to know how the essential

homelessness of our time can give way to a homecoming-how,

in other words, there can be such a thing as a

homeland.
What is this essence?
(Vaterland)?

When is there a homeland

When, Heidegge.r says, "the earth" (die

Erde)--i.e., "the earth of the homeland" (die heimatliche
Erde)--is "prepared (erzogen) for the Gods." 18

In other

words. what is essential to the homeland. i.e., that
without which there cannot be such a thing as an authentic
history and a historical Dasein--that without which there
would be no political life--, is the element of the
17

GA 39, 104.

18

Ibid.
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divine.

The opening of the earth to

powe1- of the

is "the same" as the emergence of the homeland.

In

greeting within itself the coming of the Gods. the earth
becomes "holy".

But such holiness is not to be understood

in Christian terms.

In the holiness of the earth it is

not a matter of peace and tranquility.
bri

saintliness and serenity to the p

con~rary.

The Gods do not
le.

On the

In becoming holy. the earth becomes the space

of the "storm" of the Gods. and is hence "torn open in i
grounds and abysses [in ihren Grlinden und Abgrlinden
aufgerissen wird]

."1. 9

To keep the rift open, to endure

the earth in its abysmal openness, that is to "poetically
dwell on this earth" 20 --such is the historical-political
possibility and mission of the people:
The great turns of the time of the people always come
from out of the abyss. and each time to the degree in
which a people goes down into it, that is goes down
into its earth and possesses a homeland (GA 39, 106).
But there is always the temptation to quiet the storm. to
turn the uncanny and the monstrous into the familiar and
the obvious.

There is always the temptation to transform

the homeland into a mere gee-political space, the tendency
to forget the abyss on which the homeland is grounded.
But how can .the homeland be grounded on an abyss?
19

2 0

Ibid. . 105.
Holderlin, VI. 25.
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How can an abyss ground at all?

Is the abyss not

precisely the absence of ground. the very impossibility of
ground?

Heidegger poses the following paradox:

The abyss [isl where the solidity and the
specificity of all grounds disappear, and yet where
everything constantly finds itself for the dawn of a
new becoming (GA 39, 105-106) ...
The contradiction which we. as an historical Dasein. are
to take up and preserve as contradiction, can be
formulated in the following way: the radical beginning or
the "new becoming" initiated and instituted by the poet-in other words the basis or the launching of the
possibility of a future and a history--, insofar as it is
radical, cannot originate from causal determinations.

In

the temporality proper to the beginning--in historical
(geschichtlich) temporality--it is not a matter of
historiography.

For the beginning initiated in the poet's

saying is--by its very nature--such as to exceed the
standards and the means which render Historie possible.
In this very excess, poetry opens up the abyss from out of
which it originates.

In the very institution or grounding

of the beginning, the abyss is broached.

The grounding of

the beginning reveals primarily its own and essential
absence of ground.
What Heidegger says of the Anfang in history is
most akin to what Hannah Arendt says of politics and of
the radical beginnings in politics--even though, unlike
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Arendt. by politics Heidegger does not primarily mean the
occurence and sharing of freedom in a common space.21
politics, then, exists or does not exist;

its emergence at

a certain time and space is inexplicable;

it is the mark

of a. radical beginning.

Moreover, politics originate here

and there only to disappear without leaving any traces.
for example, speaking of the Resistance.

in the words of

Rene Char. as a "1 ost treasure," Jl.rend.t writes:
The men of the European Resistance were neither the
first nor the last to lose their treasure.
The
history of revolutions--from the summer of 1776 in
Philadelphia and the summer of 1789 in Paris to the
autumn of 1956 in Budapest--which politically spells
out the innermost story of the modern age, could be
told in parable form as the tale of an old-age
treasure which. under the most varied circumstances,
appears abruptly, unexpectedly, and disapears again,
under different mysterious conditions. as though it
were a fata morgana. 2 2
That which H. Arendt suggests could be told in a parable.
in a mythos is taken more literally by Heidegger.

For

such mysterious emergence appears indeed through mythoi,
through poetry--through Holderlin's poetry, for example.
What is most striking in Arendt's statement, with respect
to Heidegger. is that it asserts the same radical--and
21
But even this is not obvious: it could be argued
that the polis or the Vaterland in Heidegger is indeed the
sharing of freedom in a common space. but that such space
would first need to be made common through the sharing of
a common relation to the forces of Being. a relation
centered around the presence of common Gods.
22 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future .(London:
Penguin Books. 1961), p. 5.
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11.ence uncanny, mystericus--power of the beginning.
It also asserts the same fragility of the
beginning, the beginning's tendency to vanish into
oblivion.

Still interpreting the words of Char. 23 Arendt

suggests that the "inheritance" is most often left without
a "testament", i.e., without a tradition--"which selects

and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates
where the treasures are and what their worth is." 24

In

other words, most often. the time--or the future--opened
up by the beginning is suddenly closed off.

Whenever we

do not move ourselves within the time broached by the
radical beginning, whenever we do not "remember" the
origin, history only becomes the "sempiternal change of
the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in
it." 2 !5

"Remembrance"--which Arendt. in a most

Holderlinian (and Heideggerian) way, says is "one of the
most important modes of thought"--is not only that without
which there would be no past for a people. and hence no
true political community, but also. paradoxically, that
without which there can be no future.

Without

remembrance, there can be no will for a future.

Still

speaking of the Resistance, Arendt writes:

Notre heritage n'est precede d'aucun testament-"our inheritance was not preceded by any testament."
23

24

Between Past and future, p. 5.
Ibid.

118

Thus the treasure was lost not because of historical
circumstances and the adversity of reality but because
no tradition had foreseen its appearance or its
reality, because no testament had willed it for the
future.
The loss, at any rate, perhaps inevitable in
terms of political reality, was consummated by
oblivion, by a failure of memory ... 2 6
The "treasure"--the origin or the forgotten
beginning: the homeland--. according to Heidegger. would
be heralded in poetry.

But

i~

would be of

responsibility of the historical Dasein to live under the
power of such a beginning.

A demand, a certain ethics.

perhaps. would be at issue in keeping the origin alive,
remembering the past.

in

No politics--no political programs

or theories--would actually unfold from such remembrance.
but a certain tradition could indeed unfold from it.
Through remembrance, a political community would exist as
such.
For the past,
dead,

in the words of Faulkner, "is never

it is not even past."

Likewise, for Heidegger, the

ancient Gods--without which the earth would not be the
homeland--are not merely gone.
a way.
presenc~

They are still 'there'

in

They are in a way present--but in a mode of
that remains decisively absent.

They are not

actually present, and yet they remain as the Gods which
may no longer be called upon.

They remain in the mode of

a having been (Gewesenheit), which Heidegger
26

Ibid., p. 6.
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differentiates from the mere past (Vergangenheit).

What

Heidegger says of the having been is remarkably close to
what Arendt says of the past.

Heidegger writes:

What is past is irremediably closed off. impossible to
bring back; it lies firmly in the past which, as
language adequately says, is a space-time [Zeitrauml.
and a lumber room as it were, in which everything that
has passed by, that has gone away is piled up .... What
is past lies before the door of the present and can
never come back in it nor enter it.. The having been,
however, continues to be, and we ourselves are this
having been in the way in which. in placing it before
us, in saving it. in bringing it forward or also in
rejecting it and wanting to forget it, we let it
come to stand within our Da-sein. The shadows of
those that have been come to visit us again, come to
us, are to come [sind zu-kilnftiq] (GA 39, 108).
Arendt, in a commentary on a text by Kafka 27 , writes:
... not only the future--"the wave of the future"--but
also the past is seen as a force, and not, as in
nearly all our metaphors, as a burden man has to
27
The text--a parable--reads as follows:
He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind.
from the origin. The second blocks the road ahead. He
gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him
in his fight with the second, for he wants to push him
forward, and in the same way the second supports him in
his fight with the first, since he drives him back.
But
it is only theoretically so.
For it is not only the two
antagonists who are there, but he himself as well, and who
really knows his intentions? His dream. though, is that
some time in an unguarded moment--and this would require a
night darker than any night has ever been yet--he will
jump out of the fighting line and be promoted. on account
of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire
over his antagonists in their fight with each other.
The story is the last of a series of "Notes from the year
1920," under the title "HE." Translated from the German
by Willa and Edwin Muir in The Great Wall of China. New
York, 1946.
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shoulder and of whose dead weight the living car: c.:.--even must get rid of in their march into the future ...
This past, moreover, reaching all the way back into
the origin, does not pull back but presses forward,
and it is, contrary to what one would expect, the
future which drives us back into the past. 28
What is most striking about these two texts is that they
are engaged in a reworking of the traditional conception
of history through a radical re-thinking of time.

More

specifically, both texts tend to literally dismantle the
linear conception of history, in such a way that the
notions of past and future no longer function as moments
of a chronological sequence.

In such a radical

dismantling, the past--and what is meant by past is the
origin or the beginning which is so decisive, abrupt and
sudden, so abysmal, that most often the mere actuality of
the time is not in a position to recognize it as what it
is and hence to free the space for its own actuality-becomes that which remains ahead, that which is still
decisive for our future. that which actually discloses the
historical and political future.
In such time, which Heidegger cal ls "authentic'",
it is a matter of hearing the echo of the origin.

It is a

matter of recovering the "lost treasure"--the homeland:
the very possibility of a history and a political
community gathered in its essence--which was once
instituted in Holderlin's poetry and which is still
28

Between Past and Future. p. 10-11.
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preserved in it.

Specifically, it is a matter of

renouncing the ancient Gods, and in this very
renunciation, of preparing the way for the coming of the
new Gods.

In other words,

fundamental tone.

it is a matter of entering the

For the fundamental tone is that in

which the homeland is preserved, that in which "the
destiny of a people and the relation to its Gods is taken
further and brought together in unity. " 29

But such unity--

-the unity of the origin: the original or originary unity-is not a quiet, peaceful and strifeless unity.

On the

contrary:
The fundamental tone is original primarily because it
does not artificially assemble the uttermost
oppositions, the decided renouncement and the
unconditional expectation, but lets them rather
unitarily spring from the most original essence of
temporality (GA 39. 117).
Such "original holding together" (ursprlinqlich
Zusammenhang) is, according to Heidegger, what will later
be called--specifically in the poem "der Rhein"-"Innigkeit."

It is of the utmost importance to grasp the

true meaning of this word, for it will appear to be
decisive for the understanding of the political.

In this

word the most active and original forces of Being in their
connection with an historical Dasein are named.

In order

to unfold the meaning of the word, it is necessary to

29

GA 39, 117.

refer to "der Rhein" and to Heidegger's comrn.entary in §19

of the 1934-35 lecture course. even though the indications
provided in § 10 are already decisive.

Innigkeit

ordinarily has a plurality of meanings: ardour, fervour,
cordiality, sincerity, tenderness, all of which seem to be
related to feelings, specifically to intimate feelings.
Hence it also has the meaning of "intimacy".

In his

reading of Holderlin. however. Heidegger is very c
not to read in the word

Innig}~ei

ious

t the determinations that

define it in ordinary German:
Now a misunderstanding first needs to be avoided:
'Innigkeit' does not mean the mere 'inner life'
[Innerlichkeit] of an emotion in the sense in which a
'lived experience' would be shut up in itself [im
Sinne des Bei-sich-verschlieBens eines 'Erlebnisses').
Nor does it mean a particularly high level of 'feeling
warmth' ('Geflihlswarme'J.
Nor is Inniqkeit a term
appropriate to the 'beautiful soul'and to the way it
is situated in the world.
The word in Holderlin has
no flavour of dreamy or inactive sentimentality (GA
39, 117).

Hence all the traditional meanings are set aside, so as to
gain a more originary access to what is at stake in the
word.

The word is actually opposed to its ordinary

determinations.

The passage continues:

Quite the contrary.
It means primarily the supreme
force of Dasein.
Second: this force is asserted in
its thorough confrontation with the most extreme
contradictions of Being.
The Dasein which is spoken of here is the historical
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oasein of a people.

30

What is decisive in this passage is

the essential connection drawn between "the supreme force"
of a historical Dasein or a people and "the most extreme
contradictions of Being."

In other words, the

decisiveness of the passage lies in the essential
belonging together of a people as historical on the one
hand and Being as contradiction on the other.

The

historicity or the very possibility for a people to

a

history lies in the proper dwelling of the people within
the essential unfolding of Being.

The Inniqkeit, then,

is

the very holding together of Being in its contradiction,
the very holding together of what is most held or torn
apart.
to

Inniqkeit inscribes the possibility for a people

in access to its own history through an essential

relation to the contradictory and strifely unity of Being.
Hence Innigkeit is most akin to the gathering or the
legein proper to Being.

Innigkeit is a form of logos. a

form of gathering that gathers in poetry the fundamental
and originary polemos.

Inniqkeit is what the Ancient

Greeks called harmonia, the harmony of the forces of Being
30

Heidegger quotes the two following passages from
Holderlin, both of which essentially relate the Inniqkeit
to the Dasein of a people:
" ... with the Ancients, where each of them, with their
senses and their souls, belonged to the world which
surrounded them. much more Inniqkeit could be found in
certain characters and relations. as in us Germans, for
example." (Letter to his brother, Jan. L 1799: III. 366)
Still speaking of the Greeks:
" ... das -Innige Volk, vom Gottergeiste ge:r:listet."
(IV, 91, V. 90)
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in

ir opposition.

The most appropriate translatio::. of

Jnnigkeit would then perhaps be "harmony," if one could
still hear the echo of the Greek harmonia.
The reference to the Greeks. and specifically to
Heraclitus, is not, of course, an accident.

Holderlin's

poetry is a constant reference to the world of Ancient
Greece. not as an object of romanticism or of p0etic
inspiration. but as the origin that remains decisive for
our future.

Hence to say--as Heidegger does--that

Holderlin's understanding of Being is closest to
Heraclitus' is not to acknowledge a mere transhistorical
coincidence.

Rather, it is to draw an essential

connection between the dichtendes Denken of Heraclitus and
the denkendes Dichten of Holderlin.
Hol

It is to point to

lin's greatest proximity to the origin.
Like the harmonia Heraclitus speaks of 31

,

the

Inniqkeit is not a "tensionless accordance, nor a
concordance that would occur through a compensating
withdrawal of the oppositions; rather, the opening of the
authentic contradiction opens up the harmony, which means:
provides the antagonistic powers with their respective

31

For example in Fragment 51: "They do not
understand that--and how--what is for itself opposed to
itself is in itself in accordance with itself:
antagonistic harmony [palintoporos harmonie]. Or fragment
54: "The harmony which is not revealed is more powerful
than the one which is revealed."
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32
1 imi ts. "

In other words. the harmonia is the space c,.f

the essential unfolding of the originary polemos.
in Holderlinian terms--: the Innigkeit (harmony)

Or--put
is the

space of the essential unfolding of the Feindseliqkeit
cenmi ty). 33
Heidegger expresses the activity proper to the
feindseligkeit in the following way:
In their opposition, it is not only one power that is
posited against the other [in other words. in the
vocabulary of "der Rhein." not only the "origin" Cder
Ursprung) against the "purely sprung up" (das

32

GA 39, 124-25.

The German notion of Feindseligkeit enables us
to think something that is not immediately present in the
Greek notion of polemos. Seliqkeit means beatitude or
felicity. Thus it has a strong connotation of peace, of
serenity and tranquility. Feind. on the other hand. means
the ennemy. the person to whom one is attached by a link
of antagonism. The Feind-Seligkeit, the enmity. then.
would name a relation .which would bring together different
elements even while holding them seperate.
In such a
relation. each element would require the opposing
antagonism to be what it is. The latin inimicus. from
which the French inamical and inimitie. as well as the
English enmity are derived. would perhaps be the closest
translation. The in- of the inimicus or the en- of the
enmity would name the impossibility of the tranquil
friendship, the opposition to it. But it would also name.
simultaneously, the belonging together of friendship with
its opposition. The Feindseliqkeit would then be most
akin to the way Heidegger interprets the Greek philein.
And yet. Holderlin's Feindseliqkeit. as well as his
Innigkeit, say perhaps more than the Greek philein and
polemos. Holderlin's poetry is not the mere translation
or equivalent of the Greek saying. but rather a dialogue
with the origin--a dialogue the ultimate purpose of which
is the possibility of a future for the Germans: "Holderlin
is not Greekhood but the future of the Germans." (GA 39,
3 3

255)
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Reinentsprungene)J 34 ; each power [the "birth", the
"ray of 1 ight". the "need", the "breeding"] tries to
take the other's power away from itself in a will to
displace it and put itself before it, to hide it and
conceal .it. Thus the enmity is a reciprocal
concealing [ein wechselweises Verberqen], the
happening of a concealment that rules in itself (GA
39,

249).

The contradictory essence of enmity can be formulated
thus: in a way, enmity is that which is most active and
productive. that which is most actual--that in which
contradictory and most extreme forces of Being are
articulated; and yet. at the same time, because of its
very nature, enmity essentially withdraws from actuality.
Like Heraclitus' physis. H6lderlin's Feindseligkeit ''likes
to hide."

In the very unfolding of its contradictory

forces. enmity essentially unfolds as concealment. as
sheltering. as withdrawal.

To be engaged in the originary

fight of Being is to be engaged in its withdrawal.

It is

34
Heidegger is commentating the fourth stanza of
"der Rhein." The stanza reads:
A mystery is the purely sprung up.
Even
Song may hardly unveil it.
For as you began. so you will remain,
And much as need can effect,
And breeding. of still greater power
Is capable birth
And the ray of light
That meets the new-born infant.
But where is anyone
To remain free
His whole life long and his heart's desire
To fulfil alone, thus,
From propitious heights. like the Rhine.
And from so wholy a womb
So happily born. like him?

to be eng.:iged in what Holderlin calls the "sec::-et"
(Geheimnis) 3

!5

or the "mystery" (Rathsel) 36

essentially unfolds as secret." 3 7

:

"harmony

To be engaged in the

secret is to be engaged in a relation that will let the
secret be as secret.
relation to language.

Hence it involves a specific
It involves a language the nature

of which will be the same as the nature of the secret.
Such is the poetic language:
The bringing-to-understanding [das Zum-Verstehenbringen] of the secret is indeed an unveiling, but an
unveiling which, at most, is allowed to be completed
in the song, in poetry <GA 39, 250).
Both poetry and Being involve concealment and withdrawal
. 3!!5

36

37

O drink the morning breezes
Until you are opened up
And name what you see before you;
No longer now the unspoken
May remain a secret
Though long it has been veiled;
For modesty behoves us mortals
And most of the time to speak thus
Of gods indeed is wise.
But where more superabundant than purest
wellsprings
The gold has become and the anger in heaven
earnest.
For once between day and night must
A truth be made manifest.
Now threefold circumscribe it.
Yet unuttered also, just as you found it.
Innocent virgin. let it remain.
--"Germanien," VI.

A mystery are those of pure origin.
Even song may hardly unveil it.
--"der Rhein," IV. v.46 f.
GA 39. 250.
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as their specific modes of truth or manifestation.
secret proper to Being--or, in Holderlin's words, to
Lnniqkeit--is most preserved in poetic language.
say this is not enough.

But to

For poetry is the very

institution of Being, the very way by which Being comes to
be as what it essentially is, viz. as withdrawal.

To

reveal and institute Being in its essentially withdrawing
dimension is the essence of poetry: "The unvei 1 ing of t
secret is the only and proper task of poetry in general
and as such." 38

Holderlin is the poet who reveals the

essence of poetry.

He is the poet of the poets.

As such,

he does nothing but institute Being in language.

And yet,

he is also said to be "the. future of the Germans."
.

What

is specific to Holderlin. then, is his historicaldestinal--his political--dimension: Holderlin would be the
true Flihrer of the Germans.
essence of Germanness.

His poetry would shelter the

But at the same time, it would do

nothing more than reveal the essential concealment of
Being.

How, then, can Holderlin simultaneously be the

poet of the poets and the future of Germany?

How can he

be the future of Germany--and that is the poet of the
"homeland"--in the very instituting of Being?

How. in

other words, do the poetic and the political belong
together?
The two belong together because they are
38

Ibid.
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essentially the same:
The "homeland" is Being itself. which fully bears and
assembles the history of a people as a Dasein: the
historicity of its history. The homeland is not an
idea in itself. abstract and supratemporal. Rather,
the p0et sees the homeland historically in an original
sense. The proof of this lies in the fact that from
the outset the poet's fundamental metaphysical
attention to the Being and the staying instituted by
the poets. who thus resist the decline. is related to
the "homel.:rnd" ... The Being of the homeland.. i.e .. of
the historical Dasein of the people, is
ienced as
the true and only Being from which the fund.a.r:1e11ta. l
position can arise and gain its joint [GefUqeJ
in
beings as a whole (GA 39, 121-22).

The homeland, and that is the very possibility of a
history and a destiny--what we have come to call the
essence of the political--is Being itself.

This sameness

implies that the homeland be "enclosed in the secret.
essentially and forever." 39

The homeland is the very

condition of possibility of historicity.
that which essentially withdraws.

And yet it is

It is that which allows

history and the political in its very withdrawal.
actuality essentially unfolds as withdrawal.

Its

The homeland

is what is most proper (das Eiqenste) and most original
that which is closest.

But the proper is also that which

is most withdrawn and concealed--that which is furthest.
Holderlin's "Homecoming" 40 is perhaps the poem
that best expresses this paradox.

The poem is the journey

39

GA 39, 120.

40

See Appendix for full quotation of the poem.
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that brings Germany back to its essence.

It is the long

march to the origin and hence to that which.
never ceased. to be closest.

in a way,

In other words, the paradox

lies in the fact that never before were "we"--and that is
primarily the Germans--more remote from what is closest.
What you seek, it is close and is already coming
to you.

41

But this paradoxical structure belongs to the very essence
of proximity:
The essence of proximity is manifest in that it brings
close what is close in keeping it afar.
The proximity
to the origin is a mystery. 4 2
The return to the origin or the homeland is not merely a
matter of recovering something forgotten or hidden.
Rather, it requires that one engage oneself in the secret
of the origin, and that is primarily in its essential
withdrawal.

Such is the task of the poet.

The elegy

"Heimkunft" is the return to the origin, and not merely
the narrative of the journey.

It is the journey by which

Germany is made sacred, the journey by which Germany
becomes the land for the coming of the new Gods.

But in

order to return to the homeland, to experience the origin
41

Friedrich Holderlin,
Verwandten," IV, v. 56.
42

"Heimkunft--an die

Martin Heidegger, Erlaliterungen zu Holderlins
Dichtung (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971).
23. Henceforth EHD.
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in its essence, the poet first needed to leave the soil of
the v.3.ter 1and.

The exi 1 e was necessary to grasp the

origin in its essence.

There can be no home or no

familiarity (no Heim, Heimat, or Heimischkeit), and hence
no unfolding of what is most proper to a historical
Dusein, without the experience of exile (Unheim,
Unheimischkeit):
The love of exile [Unheimischsein] with a view to
finding oneself at heme (Heimischwerdens] in what is
proper is the essential law of destiny through which
the poet is destined in the founding of the
"homeland's" history.43
Or perhaps even more explicitly:
The historicity of history has its essence in the
return to the proper, a return which can be completed
only in the form of a journey abroad [das Fremde 44 ] .4~
What Heidegger here calls the proper (das Eigene)
is what Holderlin also calls "the national" (das
Nationelle). without which there would be no homeland.
Both notions serve to name the major stake of Holderlin's
poetry.

Also the major difficulty: "We learn nothing with

more difficulty than the free use of the national ... the
43

Ibid .. 83.

44 As Heidegger emphasizes it, one should hear the
experience of difference in das Fremde. The journey
abroad is the experience of the uncanniness and
unfamiliarity of the radically other, of the non-_proper.
4

!5.

EHD. 90.
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use of the proper is the most difficult."4s

What is most proper to the Germans?

And how is it that

that which is most proper is so difficult to use freely'?
In the same letter, Holderlin writes: "I believe that it
is precisely the clarity of representation that is
originally as natural for us as the fire from heaven is
for the Greeks." 47

The "clarity of representation" and

the "fire from heaven" are the two elements by which a
land can become sacred.

Such was the Greek polis, which

combined its natural and most proper element (the fire
from heaven) with what was most foreign to it and most
remote from it (the clarity of representation).

The polis

occured as the space of poetry, of thinking and of art.
As such, it rendered the encounter with the Gods possible.
But the fire from heaven is that which is most foreign to
the Germans.

As long as the Germans have not experienced

this uncanniness and strangeness, as long as they have not
undergone the long journey, they will not exist as such.
Their existence as a people involves their appropriating
the un-proper, and in this very appropriation, their
becoming themselves.

Without such a double movement,

there can be no future for the German people: "the absence

46

Letter to Bohlendorf (Dec. 4, 1801)

47

Ibid.
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dysmoron is

g_estiffL.

weakness. " 48

On the otl-;er

hand, the clarity of representation is what is most proper
to the Germans:
The ability to conceive. the art of the project, the
construction of scaffoldings and enclosures, the
placing of frames and compartments, the carving up and
the regrouping--this carries [the Germans] along.
Yet
this natural trait of the Germans is really not what
is proper to them before this ability to conceive is
aubmitted to the test of conceiving the
inconceivable ... 4 9
The Germans. then, need to prepare the land for the coming
of the Gods.

It is primarily a matter of experiencing the

fire from the Gods in letting oneself be thrown out of the
familiar into the uncanny. It is a matter of letting
oneself drift away into the monstrous, into the realm of
the unfamiliar where the lightning of the Gods might
strike.

It is only in his travels to the south of France.

where he is reminded of Ancient Greece. that Holderlin can
actually experience the fire from heaven:
Der Nordost wehet,
Der liebste unter den Winden
Mir, weil er feurigen Geist
Und gute Fahrt verheiBet den

Schiffern.~ 0

The "navigators" are, according to Heidegger, the poets on
Friedrich Holderlin,
of Antigone, V. 258.
46

49

~0

"Remarks" on the translation

EHD. 84.

"Andenken," L v. 1-4.
translation of the poem.

See Appendix for
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their way to the far off country.

And the north-east

wind--the wind that blows in the direction of the southwest and that clears the skies so that everything shines
in its full manifestness--is the promise of the encounter
with the fire from heaven in the foreign country.

If the

poet can withstand the test of the burning fire, then he
will be ready to return to the homeland and found a new
historical beginning under the skies where the clarity of
representation is sheltered.
Hence the proper or the essence is proper only
insofar as it is confronted by and combined with the nonproper or the non-essence.

The proper emerges as such

only in being thrown out of itself, only in being
expropriated in the non-proper.

In a way the non-essence

or the non-proper is more essential to the proper than the
proper itself.

The non-essence is more proper to the

proper than the proper.

That which is most remote and

most uncanny--in other words the non-essence--is more
essential to the essence than the essence itself.

To be

in the essence--in the homeland--is to be thrown out of
the essence, without an essence.

But the non-essence of

the essence--and that is the essence of the essence--is
almost always covered up, forgotten.
outset.

From the very

The homeland, the origin, is always already

withdrawn from itself.

The origin (Ursprung) is a

springing up (Entsprinqen).

But in its springing up, the
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or-i·;;rin closes itself off fsich verschlieBtl: it manifests
itself as that which it is not.

Or rather: in what it

shows of itself. it does not show itself.

It conceals

itself (sich verbirqt) and withdraws (sich entzieht)
behind what is freed from it.

For the most part, then,

one is not situated in the dimension and the power of the
origin:
... We are the forgotten--of destiny [Geschick];
nee
we are no longer granted a fate [Schicksal] but we
must wander among the events and fly loosely before
our own essential origin.oi
Or again:
... We never come spontaneously before the locY.ed door
that would bring us to the homeland; spontaneously, we
wander here and there. 5 2
As has already been shown. the key to the door c.:tn
only be found in poetic language, specifically in
Holderlin's poetry.

For Holderlin's poetry is the poetry

that institutes the homeland in its essence (in its
withdrawal), i.e., the poetry that frees the space for the
coming of the Gods and that thus provides the Germans with
the possibility of a destiny.
What is most decisive about Heidegger's reading of
Holderlin is that it forces the reader to radically
EHD, 89.

Ibid.
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rethink history and the pol it i ca. l.

For if the e sence of

a people--and that is also its future--is heralded only in
poetry and is articulated in a concealed manifestness,
then the usual approaches to the historical and the
political are radically undermined and interrupted.
History and politics would no longer be a matter of
concrete facts and decisions

~ased

on a linear

understanding of time and on an understanding of fully
manifest actuality.

Nor would any "disccurse" about

history or politics gain an originary access to what is
essential to--and decisive for--a given people at a given
time.

This does not mean that such discourses are idle

talk.

Nor does it mean that there is no historiographic

truth:
There is a historiographic truth [historische
Wahrheit]. But to conceive it as such, the ones who
conceive it must themselves first be under the power
of history [GeschichteJ (GA 39, 197).
Thus. when Heidegger says that Holderlin is "the
poet of the future of the Germans", or when he says that
we have to "open up the actuality" 03 of Holderlin's
poetry. one might suspect that the notions of "future" and
"actuality" mean something other than what is usually
meant by such words.

03

GA 39,

197.
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( c)

Only a god can still save us.
The only possibility with which we are
left is to prepare in thinking and
poetry a disposition for the arrival
or the absence of the god in our decline.
For me Holderlin is the
poet who points to the future.
the poet who awaits the god ...
Martin Heidegger--"Interview" with Der Spiegel.

What kind of future is Heidegger speaking of?
What does it mean to free the actuality of a poetry?

What

needs to be done so that Holderlin's poetry becomes
actual?

The question of the relation between Holderlin's

poetry and its actuality is of the utmost importance.

It

is even considered by Heidegger as "the task" and the
"ultimate goal" of the 1934-35 lecture course.
prescriptive task,

The

in which poetics and politics are most

explicitly entangled,

is defined in the following terms:

1. Holderlin is the poet of the poet and of poetry.
2. Holderlin is also the poet of the Germans.
3.
Because Holderlin is all this in a concealed and
difficult way, poet of the poets as poet of the
Germans, he has not yet become the power in the
history of our people. Because he is not yet that, he
must become it. To contribute to this is
"politics" in the highest and most proper sense, to
such an extent that whoever achieves something in this
.domain need not discourse about the political (my
italics) (GA 39. 194).
How can Holderlin become the power in the history of the
German people?

What kind of politics would unfold from
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such a demand?

What does such a demand dictate?

What is

the urgency that lies at the heart of this demand?

These

questions, which naturally unfold from Heidegger's
statement, will remain, for the most part. unanswered.
Not because Heidegger would have failed to answer them,
but because the very raising of these questions involves
an understanding of time and actuality which Heidegger is
precisely attempting to put into question.

As we shall

see, the question of knowing how and·when Holderlin's
poetry could become actual, how and when a politics could
unfold from it, will not appear as a question.
it will appear as an impossible question.

Or rather,

At the point at

which poetry and politics are most explicitly related,

in

what could be interpreted as a· desire or a possibility to
build g_ politics. the very ideas of "building" and of
"politics" are disrupted.
Heidegger's analysis in §15 unfolds in two parts
that gather in a very condensed way what has been said so
far.

Heidegger first shows that insofar as poetry

institutes Being, it "is what is actual
Wirkliche] ." 54

[das

But what does it mean to "institute"?

It

means to bring to language that which is not yet actual,
to bring it to the very heart of a Dasein's people and
hence to ground this Dasein in history.

But it also means

to keep this grounding open, i.e., to keep the abysmal and
54 •

GA 39, 217.

My italics.
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uncanny relation to Being open. in such a way that the
people would gain a knowing of itself in this very
gesture.

It is the people's responsibility to keep such a

relation open.

There is perhaps a certain ethics at issue

in maintaining alive what was originally opened up by the
saying of the poet, viz. the very essence of the people.
Heidegger points to Sophocles' Antigone as an
example of such

op.~ning.

To be sure. this "example" is

not merely innocent, since the "great Greek beginning"-and that is the origin of the West--is what is at issue.
To what extent is "Antigone" grounding?
Sophocles' poem entitled "Antigone" is, as a poem, an
instituting of the whole Greek Dasein, for the poem as
the project (rooting and salvation) of Being grounds
the Dasein of human beings on earth before the face of
the Gods. Poetry as institution obtains the ground of
the possibility for which man in general settles on
earth in between earth and the Gods, i.e., becomes
historical, that is, can become a people (GA. 39. 216).
In other words. poetry opens up the space. the place or
the site within which man can become historical. i.e.,
essentially unfold in the dimension of the historicopolitical.

The political life is grounded on the

emergence of its place, of its there,--on what the Greeks
called the polis--which is itself opened up by the mythos
or the Sage of the poet.
Second, Heidegger shows how Holderlin is the "poet
of the future German Being."

There lies perhaps the

essential difference between Holderlin and the institution
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of the Greek

sein in Sophocles' poetry.

For

lderlin

is both the poet that poeticizes the Germans and the poet
whose saying remains to :Le taken up by his people.

Unlike

Sophocles' poetry, Holderlin's Dichtung arises from the
urgency felt before the flight of the gods.

In contrast

to the time of the Greeks, the time of Holderlin is a time
of distress and abandonment.

:Because the "t:da.y" ci- tr;e

"now" Holderlin is involved in is diff0ren:.
"today" of the Greeks.

the

it cannot simply be for Ger:na.ny's

future a matter of a return to the Greek origin.

Rather,

it is essentially a matter of enduring the distress of the
time in accepting to renounce the ancient gods.

Only in

the renouncement of what has passed can man hope to
encounter new gods and hence institute a new historical
beginning.

But the renouncement does not guarantee the

coming of the gods.

Holderlin's poetry is not messianic.

To follow its power only means that we are put in a
position in which a space can be freed for the coming of
the gods.

But the actual coming of the gods does not

depend on man's will.
save us from distress.

No praxis, no politics can actually
Only the gods can allow the

emergence of a new historico-political site.
In a way, then. the future does not belong to us.
The future is not ours.
will visit anew.

We cannot say "when" the gods

To say that Holderlin's poetry is still

ahead of us, that it still belongs to the future of the
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Germans is to say that it will perhaps always remain ahead
of us.

For there would be no date. no precise event that

could actually correspond to Holderlin's poetry:
For the "Now" of
Neither is there
and self-calling
originary sense,

his poetry there is no calendar date.
any need for a date.
For this called
"Now" is itself a date in an
that is--something given. a gift. 0 ~

The "now" of the tirr.e that will save us does
a date .

For i t

is

i ts e 1 f

a datum . a g i ft .

It i s

something that gives itself, something that never ceases
to give itself, to send and destine itself.

It is,

literally, a present--that is both something that never
ceases to come and a gift, both something that comes to
us. always already,

in the way of a gift. and yet

something that will perhaps never be ours.

It is. as it

were. the promise of a gift that always remains a promise.
Hence an Ere i gnis.

In the "now" of the poet, then,

not a matter of defining a precise instant.

Rather.

it is
it is

a matter of seeing how both future and past are gathered
in the present. in a kind of anterior future in which what
is happening has long since been sent. and hence decided,
and which thus opens up the future:
The Now come" shines from out of the present to speak
into the future.
And yet it first speaks in what has
already happened [in das schon Geschehene].
"Now"-11

~
GA 53, 8. Heidegger is commenting the first line
of the hymn "der Ister", which reads: "Jetzt komme,
Feuer!"
0

142
that means: something is already decided.
And this
precisely, that which has already occured [was sich
schon "ereiqnet" hat]. alone sustains all the
Y:-elations to what is coming. The "now" names an
Ere iqn is., ~ 6

The future is impending, and yet always postponed, for it
is always already coming.

is already past.

The future is passivity, for it

Hence, in the end, to be open to

lderlin's poetry as th.::,t which remains ahead

,.)f

us. as

that which belongs to our future. does not mean that this
poetry would need to be put to work or ",3.ctualized" in the
outside world.

For it is actual.

From the very outset.

And yet, at the same time, it cannot be said to produce
any effects or dictate any commandments, for. as Heidegger

puts it, the "knowing" within which it is caught "is
useless and has no 'value', is worthless and cannot be
simply accepted as a modality of the activities currently
underway."~ 7

Holderlin's poetry is actual in a non-

actual way, i.e .. in a way that resists the determination
of actuality as the actualization of something 'abstract'
or merely possible.

The actuality of the poetry demands

that we wait for the decisive hour, that we be open to the
coming of the gods.
or idle.
~6

~7

Such waiting, however.

It is not a move away from

wha~

is not passive

is happening.

Ibid. , 9.

Martin Heidegger. Beitraqe zur Philosophie (Vom
Ereignis), Gesamtausqabe 65 (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1989), p. 396. Henceforth GA 65.
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on the contrary.

It is. according to Heidegger, t

highest and most difficult ability by which to face
history:
warten-konnen. however. is not an inactive and blind
letting-off and letting-happen of the events; it is
not a closing one's eyes before the destruction [viz.
the destruction of the West, and specifically of
Germany]. Warten-kor.nen is the standing that has
already leaped ahead to the indestructible. to the
proximity of which the destruction
longs. l
the
valley to the mountain.~
8

In such Warten-konnen, then,
letting what is be.

it is essentially a matter of

To let something be, for Heidegger.

means to let it unfold according to its essence.

Here.

then, it is a matter of letting the homeland be as what it
is. and that is as Being.

In other words,

it is a matter

of a letting be in the way of a letting Being be.
Gelassenheit as Seinsverlassenheit.

Of a

Such letting be would

exceed the all too simple categories of "pessimism" and
"optimism" in terms of which the comportment of
Gelassenheit would tend to be considered.

As Heidegger

puts it in the Beitraqe. the ones involved in
Gelassenheit--and that is the "future ones" [
ZukUnftigen]--"know neither the dark 'resignation' which
no longer wills, for it has no future, nor the noisy
'optimism' which in spite all assurances does not yet will

GA 53,

68.
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truthfu 11 y ...

"!5 9

In the openness to the future.

it is net.

a matter of moods but of an essential relation to Bei
which determines the possibilty of the new encounter with
the Gods.
Such letting-be dictates no politics and no
praxis.

And yet "politics in the highest sense" is at

issue--1.e .. politics as the possiblity of a pclis:
space.

the p 1 ace or the site in which t11ie new god3 ca.'.; D':::

encountered.

!!59

t~e

GA 65, 397.

CHAPTER THREE
AWAY FROM THE ESSENCE
(A)

In his attempt to link essentially the poetic to
the political, in his effort to phrase the essence of the
political in terms of poetry, Heidegger merely confirms a
tendency that runs throughout the history of philosophy.
The entire history of Western thinking seems to be
sustained by the poetic "temptation"--unless it be a
"demand"--of (and one must hear the double genetive) the
political.

In other words, the entire Western political

discourse is a discourse about art, and specifically about
poetry and myth.

The specificity of Western political

discourse would lie in its unavoidable reference to art.
In this respect. the text that would mark the beginning of
political thought would also be the text in which the
question of poetics would emerge as such.
~hilosophical

The

text that would first break into the

question of politics would also be the text that would
broach and delineate the basic concepts of what will later
come to be called "poetics."
145

Such a text Heidegger would
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have himself identified in its originality, though not to
criticize it, but to confirm and pursue its fundamental
tendency.
In this description, one recognizes Plato's

-Republic.
about the

Indeed, it is in the Republic that a discourse
essence of the polis first emerges and,

strangely enough, in close connection with the question of
the poets and of the mythoi or "stories" the poets should
be allowed to relate in the polis.

The scene of the

Republic seems to have been paradigmatic for the entire
history of political thought, to the extent that in the
Republic the question of the poets and the poetic or the
mythic appears in its full problematicity: the poets who
tell false stories about the Gods and the heroes should be
excluded from the polis, and yet the poetic or the mythic
is essential to the constitution of the polis both in
words and in deeds:
"Come, then. says Socrates, like men telling tales
in a tale and at their leisure, let's educate the men
in speech ... "
"Shall we so easily let the children hear just any
tales fashioned by just anyone and take into their
souls opinions for the most part opposite to those
we'll suppose they must have when they are grown up?"
"In no event will we permit it," says Adeimantus.
"First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of
tales; and if they make a final tale, it must be
approved, but if it's not, it must be rejected. We'll
persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales
to their children and to shape their souls with tales
more than their bodies with hands. Many of those they
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now tell must be thrown out."1
Lacoue-Labarthe calls this scene "the primitive
scene of philosophy," i.e .. the political scene in which
philosophy emerges in its essential relation with what
Plato calls mythopoiesis. 2

This scene marks the way in

which poetry comes to be decisive for the political, the
way in which "true" poetry must ground the political and
"false" poetry must be radically separated from the
political order.

The decisive thing. therefore, is not so

much to trace poetry's effects in politics but rather to
know how and why the political as such is affected by art
or poetry.

In other words, the question is: how is it

that the political is driven towards the poetic?

What

about the poetic drive or Zug to the political?
Such a question. of course, can be addressed to
the Platonic text.

But it could also be addressed to

Aristotle, whose Poetics may have very much to do with the
political order, to Rousseau, Kant, Holderlin. Schelling,
a certain Hegel, Nietzsche or Wagner, all of whom, at a
certain point. in one way or another, felt the necessity
to appeal to art or poetry so as to as to disclose the
essence of the political.

Throughout, then, the reference

to poetry and to its founding myths would have been

176.

l.

Republic, 377a-377c.

2 •

Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe. L'Imitation des Modernes, p.
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unavoidable.

Heidegger himself--he perhaps more than

others, in the radicalization of the gesture--would have
answered such a necessity.
To trace out the return of the myth in its long
history, one would need to engage oneself in what could be
called a genealogy of Western mytho-polito-logy.

One

would need to inquire into what seems to be the mythic
necessity of the political, if by myth one indeed
understands the story or the narrative (whether strictly
poetic or "artistic" in any other way) that would
constitute the political in its essence.

The question

would be: How is it that. in the very constitution of its
essence, the political must have recourse to the mythic?
This task as a whole would of course extend beyond the
limits of this work.

Yet it remains decisive and to a

certain extent necessary with respect to Heidegger, if it
is true that Heidegger's thinking will have been the last
representation or enactment of the mytho-poetic scene, and
so the mark of the end or the closure of the political as
such.
For that which defines the political as such is
indeed the myth.

And Heidegger is right to say that

"history [and that is also the political for Heidegger]
is, if it is anything at all, mythology." 3

To inquire

into the political is primarily to inquire into the myth
3

EM. 119.

149

through which the political as such is founded.

The myth-

-and that is the expression, the communication and the
sharing of the myth--is the opening and founding gesture
of the political.
communitarian.

For the myth is essentially

It is that which brings a people together.

Even more: it is that which defines the very existence of
a people.

It is not surprising. then, that the greatest

effort of modernity to produce myths and to constitute a
mythology occurred in Germany, from the end of the
Seventeenth to the middle of the Twentieth Century, in a
country and at a time where the truly political stake was
precisely--and still is in a way--the question of the
identification and the constitution of Germany as Volk and
as Sprache.

This crucial political problem came to focus

on the question of language, and specifically on the
question of poetry and mythology.

The essential move at

the end of the Seventeenth Century toward the great Greek
beginning and toward the power of its mythology has played
a decisive role in the delimitation of the horizon from
which the political was envisioned and thought.

In that

respect, there is a certain continuity between "The Oldest
Systematic Program of German Idealism" (attributed to
Schelling, but written under the influence of Holderlin in
1796), which calls for a "new mythology," and specifically
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for a "rational mythology;" 4

Wagner, for whom "the myth

contains the common poetic power of a people;" 5

Nietzsche

(at least the Nietzsche of the Wagner period) or
Heidegger. for whom the political remains decisively
attached to the poetic or the mythic in an essential
sense.
The myth, then. is that which lies at the very
heart of the community.

It is the narrative through which

the community can be identified, articulated, communicated
and hence perpetuated.

In other words, the myth is that

through which the community is revealed to itself . 6

For,

as Nancy puts it, the myth is "neither a dialogue nor a
monologue, but the unique word of many who thus recognize
each other, who communicate and are united [communient] in
the myth." 7

To that extent, communism. in its effort to

Schel 1 ing (?) writes: "Before the Ideas are made
aesthetic, i.e., mythological, they are of no interest to
the people; and vice versa. a mythology is shameful for
the philosopher before it has been made rational." To
Schelling and Holderlin, one would need to add the
founders as well as the other "members" of the Atheaneum,
the most important of which are: August Wilhelm Schlegel,
Friedrich Schlegel, Caroline Michaelis, Schleiermacher,
Novalis, Tieck.
4

Quoted by Manfred Franck in Der kommende Gott
(Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 229.
5 •

This general statement also applies to the more
concrete and detailed works of sociologists such as Emile
Durkheim. Claude Levi-Strauss, Mircea Eliad, Marcel
Detienne. all of whom emphasize the social function of the
myth.
6 •

7

Nancy, CD, p. 128.
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opriate the "true" or "objective" essence of man as
a PP r
·a1 man and in its desire to center the life of the
eoc l
community around such essence would perhaps constitute one
of the most rigorous enactments of the myth.
What is also essential to the myth is that it is
meant to initiate a radical beginning.

The mythic

temptation always appears in times of distress and crisis,
and the "new mythology" is always appealed to with a view
to replacing the "old" and "dead" mythology, the no longer
functioning mythos.

The new myth will provide another

historical beginning, it will found the community anew.
And yet, in this very founding, it is always a matter of
recapturing the lost or forgotten origin.

It is always a

matter of bridging the gap that separates us from the
origin.

For the knowing of the origin opens up the

possibility of a future and asserts the power of the
people.

Here again, Heidegger will have allied himself

with the logic of the myth, even though his reading of
Holderlin can be said to function at the very limit of
myth.

Indeed, the god which is spoken of in the mythos is

perhaps never to come, and in a time of "distress" marked
by the absence of gods, it can only be a matter of freeing
the space for the hypothetical coming of a new god.

But

the very appeal to the god remains as the only political
alternative ("Only a god can save us"): the new humanity
can arise only out of a relation to the divine, and this
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can be done only under the condition that the people be
ordered to the founding saying of the poet.

The scene

remains fundamentally mytho-theo-teleological.
That which Heidegger would have failed to
acknowledge. thus rendering his own political misadventure
possible, would have been the political danger inherent to
the myth.

Specifically, Heidegger would have failed to

acknowledge that his time was living the greatest and most
destructive perversion of the myth in Nazism.

What our

time will have demonstrated and the general horizon from
which it compelJs us to think would be the extreme
radicalization--and also perversion--of the myth. whether
of Reason and Socialism in most Communist countries. or of
Man as Ubermensch in Nazism.a

The latter will not have

been totally foreign to Heidegger. even though the
thinking of the mythos he was engaged in had nothing to do
with the Nazi myth.

But even though Heidegger remained

withdrawn from such a myth, he never quite put himself in
a position to criticize the essence of the political as
art.

On the contrary.

His political move toward art in

general, and specifically toward Holderlin's poetry was
indeed a radical move away from the metaphysics of the

a
From the standpoint of the myth, which directs and
governs, excludes and punishes, Nazism and, let us say,
"Stalinism" are the same. The difference, of course,
would lie in the fact that whereas with Nazism the end of
the Reich also meant the end of the myth. the end of
Stalinism did not mean the end of Communism as such.
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Nazi myth.

But it was at the same time a decisive move

into the mythos as the essence of the political, a move
into the "truly" or "authentically" mythic.
In that respect. Heidegger's political engagement
in 1933 as well as his political problematics of the 30's
and 40's compel one to think the comb-ined closure of the
mythic and the political.

Heidegger's own political

errancy forces one into the question of the myth in its
connection with the political.

Heidegger suggests that

the saying of a new mythos or Dichtung discloses the space
for the coming of new gods.

But the real question one

needs to ask is whether the main political task today is
not to think the end of the myth and hence also of the
political as it never ceased to be considered since Plato.
In other words, against Heidegger. but also because of
Heidegger, one needs to think what J. L. Nancy calls "the
interrupted myth." 9

One needs to think the end of the

narrative that constituted the political in its essence.
Hence also the end of the political as such.
Heidegger failed to acknowledge the myth of the
myth, and that is also the myth of the political.
Heidegger failed to acknowledge the myth of the
politically founding saying.

Or--to put it differently--

he failed to acknowledge that as soon as the myth is
Jean-Luc Nancy, "Le mythe interrompu" in La
communaute desoeuvree (Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur,
1986). Henceforth CD.
9
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formulated, as soon as it becomes a stake as myth, it is
already interrupted, already absent, already separated
from its essence.

The "myth", i.e., "the poeticity of the

political and the politicity of the poetic," 10 in its
formulation of myth as myth--is itself a myth, i.e., a
poetizing and fictitious projection.

Surely. this does

not mean that Heidegger's conception of the myth can be
reduced to fiction, for the mythos Heidegger is speaking
of is essentially related to thinking, and that is
precisely to the difference between poetry in the sense of
fiction (what Heidegger would call Poesie) and thinking
poetry (i.e. Dichtung).

Nonetheless, the very appeal to

the myth as the historical and political founding of a
people is itself a myth in the sense of a fiction.
Indeed, to will to live under the power of the
myth is already to express its death.

To appeal to the

myth as myth, to appeal to its necessity as myth is
already to formulate the impossibility of its presence.
As soon as the mythic becomes an object of thought and
debate, as soon as it appears as a "solution" to a
historico-political "crisis," it can no longer operate as
myth.

The power of the myth cannot be anticipated.

It

can only be looked at and thought once it is no longer
operative.

To that extent, the creation of a myth is

itself a myth: the myth lives only in the affirmation of
10

Nancy. CD, p. 142.
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itS own death.

In that sense. our modernity (or post-

modernity) is nothing but the assertion of the impossible
myth, the assertion of the absence of relation to the
myth, in spite of the plurality of the appeals to the myth
and to its inititating power.

Today we are left with the

will to the myth and with the impossibility of its
achievement.

But, as Nancy puts it:

... we are neither in the life nor in the invention nor
in the word of the myth. As soon as we speak of
"myths," of mythology. we mean this negation at least
as much as the affirmation of something. That is the
reason why our [mythological] scene and our discourse
about the myth. the whole of our mythological thinking
composes a myth: to speak about the myth has always
been to speak about its absence. And the very word
"myth" designates just as well the absence of that
which it names (CD 132).
Hence the myth is a myth.

Yet nothing was more

"concrete," more monstrously concrete than, say, the Nazi
myth.

What is expressed in this tautological formulation

("the myth is a myth"), then, is the very essence of the
myth.

Indeed, the myth as the founding gesture of the

political is itself a myth in the sense of a fiction.

But

this f iction--and that is the fantasmatic projection of
the essence and the destiny of a people--is in turn
actual.

The myth is essentially paradoxical to the extent

that its utterance is always the designation of the
absence of that which it names, and yet it is in the name
of such absence that actuality is transformed.
Heidegger's reading of Holderlin does not escape this
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logic: there is something fictitious (and something
politically dangerous) about the way in which Heidegger
sees in Holderlin's poetry both the origin and the future.
both the essence and the destiny of the German people.
There is something politically dangerous (and also
inadequate, as will later be shown) in the affirmation of
the essence of the political as poetry, in the
'mythification' of the political.

In his attempt to

phrase the political in terms of a poetic essence.
Heidegger may have provided the most radical thinking of
the myth, even though the myth as such is hardly ever
considered in the Heideggerian text.

Heidegger's thinking

is exemplary not so much because of the analyses of the
mythic he would have provided, but rather because of the
rigorous effort he made to bring the poetic and the
political together.
What remains of the myth today is its own
interruption.

The proliferation of discourses about--and

temptations of--the myth which invade our modernity is
precisely the mark of the impossiblity of a mythic
humanity.

The myth--the poetic and the political united--

has lived its end.

What remains of the myth is the desire

for its actualization. and such a desire constitutes its
very interruption.

From Plato to Heidegger. that which

defined the political in its foundation. and that is the
poetic. is now interrupted.

One is now left with the end
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of the political.

To live the end of the political is to

acknowledge and assert the interruption of its myth.

This

implies both the acknowledgment of a fact and the
assertion of a demand, viz. that the myth does not return
so as to found the political anew.

The myth is

interrupted. and yet one must not cease to interrupt it.
For
... the very idea of the myth resumes perhaps by itself
what could sometimes be called the total
hallucination. sometimes the total imposture of the
self-consciousness of a modern world that exhausted
itself in the fabulous representation of its own
power.
In the idea of the myth is perhaps
concentrated the whole of Western pretension to
appropriate its own origin, or to steal its secret
from it, so as to identify itself, finally,
absolutely. around its own utterance and its own birth
(CD 117) .
And Nancy adds: "In that sense. we no longer have anything
to do with the myth."

One cannot oppose to the nazi myth

(which according to Nancy reveals the essence of the myth)
another myth, a new mythos or narrative that would
initiate a new beginning.

Unlike what Thomas Mann wrote

to Kerenyi in 1941, the task is not to "take the myth away
from intellectual Fascism so as to invert its function in
a human sense." 11
"interrupted".

Rather, the myth needs to be

And one needs to think and live at the end

Of the myth.

Quoted by J. L. Nancy in La Communaute
Desoeuvree, p. 116.
11
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(B)

What does all this imply?

Can the political be

thought separately from the mythic or the poetic?

Or does

it cease to be the political as soon as the myth is taken
away from it?

What remains of the political when the

political has come to an end?

How is the political

articulated in its very interruption?
What, then, if the political were to be thought
away from the poetic?

What if the essential thing about

the political today were precisely to think it without the
myth?

Is there anything. in the history of Western

thinking, that would enable us to think the political
order without ever appealing to the poetic?

What if the

polis or the community were not the place of a common
mythos that would reveal the polis in its essence, but
rather the space of the many (oi poloi). the space within
which the other would be disclosed as other and not as the
same?

What if there were something in the political.

'something' for which there would perhaps be no adequate
name, but that would nonetheless resist the mythic and
hence totalizing tendency of the political?
If it is true that the history of "political"
thought is indeed sustained by a tradition that runs from
Plato to German Romanticism and Idealism, up to Heidegger.
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there is also another tradition for which the artisticopoetic tendency to phrase the political is--if not absent-at least not central.

Such a tradition would be

represented by a range of thinkers--the most central
figures being Aristotle, Kant. Arendt, Lyotard, all of
whom would have put the political emphasis on man's
ability to deliberate and judge in a world essentially
shared by others.
Aristotle would perhaps be the major, or at least
the initiating figure of such tradition.

His writings

about politics are well known and to a certain extent his
concern could be said to have been more directly
"political" than Plato's.

Many of these writings are

actually directed against Plato.

It is very surprising,

then, that Heidegger never turns to Aristotle when his
analyses come to focus on the meaning of the Greek polis.
Everything happens as though Heidegger were very careful
to avoid confronting Aristotle.

Whenever Heidegger takes

up the issue of the polis--whether in the Rectoral
Address, in Introduction to Metaphysics or in the
Parmenides volume--he is faced with notions and
problematics that constitute the very heart of Aristotle's
meditation: praxis, poiesis, theoria, phronesis are words
that Heidegger comments upon, yet without ever mentioning
Aristotle.
In the Rectoral Address. for example, replying to
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the question "What is theoria for the Greeks?." Heidegger
writes:
One says: pure contemplation. which remains bound
only to the thing in question and to all it is and
demands. This contemplative behaviour--and here one
appeals to the Greeks--is said to be pursued for its
own sake. But this appeal is mistaken. For one
thing. "theory" is not pursued for its own sake. but
only in the passion to remain close to and hard
pressed by what is as such. But. for another. the
Greeks struggled precisely to conceive and to enact
this contemplative questioning as one. indeed as the
highest mode of enerqeia. of man's "being-at-work."
They were not concerned to assimilate practice
[Praxis] to theory: quite the reverse: theory was to
be understood as itself the highest realization
[Verwirklichung] of genuine practice. For the Greeks
science is not a "cultural good." but the
innermost determining center of the people-state
Dasein. 12
Now if the understanding of theoria as the "highest
realization" of praxis is indeed operative in Plato's
Republic. things seem to be quite different with respect
to Aristotle.

Indeed, from the very beginning of the

Nicomachean Ethics. and mostly as a reaction against
Plato. Aristotle is very cautious to draw the distinction
between theoria and praxis on the one hand, praxis and
poiesis on the other hand.

One recalls that. in the

Republic, Plato proposes to abolish the distinction
between poisesis and praxis, so that the fundamental
ambiguity and fragility of human affairs be done away
with.

In the City built in logos all citizens should
12

. Ed. Klostermann. 1983. pp. 11-12; eng. transl.,
pp. 472-73.
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fulfill a very specific activity and correspond to a
specific demand of the polis.
craftsmen: one man. one job.

They should be like
The city itself, as a

coherent totality. is conceived as a workshop in which
each citizen is to fulfill a mean defined by the
rigorously predefined ends of the polis.

In reducing the

organisation of the bios politikos to the one of a
workshop, Plato wishes to avoid the ambiguity and
uncertainty inherent to praxis.

As Arendt puts it:

"Exasperation with the threefold frustration of action
[and that is praxis in Arendt's vocabularyJ--the
unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of
the process, and the anonymity of its authors--is almost
as old as recorded history.":1 3

As a matter of fact.

it

started off with Plato. But the univocity of poiesis is
itself ruled by what Plato considers to be the highest
form of univocity. and that is the univocity of
theoretical life.

Theoria is nothing but the unobstructed

view of fully present and unambiguous Ideas.

And since

the activity of theoria is itself a praxis. indeed the
highest form of praxis, there is a certain kinship between
the activity of the philosopher, the activity of the
statesman and the activity of the craftsman, although
there are differences of level between the three.

But the

:1 3 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press. 1958). p. 220.
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important thing to know is that the statesman must
necessarily be a philosopher. and that he must rule the
QOlis as a craftsman.

In the Republic, as Arendt puts it.

"the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman
applies his rules and standards; he 'makes' his City as
the sculptor makes a statue." 14

The ultimate purpose of

such a reduction is to dismiss the role of doxa or opinion
in the political life: it is to take the ambiguous and
very often 'useless' essence of praxis away from the
political order.
Now Aristotle's political thought is directed
against such a view.

Unlike what Plato says, Aristotle

thinks that praxis differs essentially from both poiesis
and theoria. and that doxa alone--the right doxa. viz.
phronesis--is to rule the political life.

And if one is

to agree with Arendt, one will have to say that in
deliberately setting "the insight [this is Arendt's
translation of the Greek phronesis] of the statesman
against the wisdom of the philosopher, Aristotle was
probably following. as he did so often in his political
writings, the public opinion of the Athenian polis."H5
Such a statement, if it is true. would radically call into
14

Ibid .. p. 227; Arendt is refering to the Republic

420.
1

Hannah Arendt. "The Crisis in Culture" in Between
Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books. 1977). footnote
n° 14.
!5
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question what Heidegger says about phronesis in the
farmenides volume.
~public:

To the following statement in Plato's

"Those who are not rescued by phronesis drink

beyond any measure" (621 a). Heidegger provides this
comment:
phronesis means here the insight of that in-seeing.
which has a sight into what is authentically seeable
and unconcealed. The seeing which is alluded to here
is the seeing of the essential sight, i.e .. of
Philosophy. Phronesis means Philosophy and the word
says: having an eye for the essential (GA 54. 178).
Now if this is indeed an adequate comment on Plato's
understanding of phronesis. the clear distinction that
Aristotle draws between phronesis and sophia in the sixth
book of the Nicomachean Ethics would tend to put
Heidegger's comment into question. 16

Whereas theoria

corresponds to the part of logos "by which we perceive the
kinds of things whose principles cannot be other than they
are," phronesis and praxis in general correspond to the
part of logos "by which we investigate the kinds of things
whose principles may be other than they are." 17

The first

part Aristotle calls "scientific" (epistemonikon); the
second he calls "calculative" or "estimative"
( loqistikon).
16

Our comment only applies to the Ethics. for in
the Metaphysics (book M) and On the Heavens phronesis is
used in a very Platonist sense and is synonymous with
science (episteme or gnosis).
17 •

Nicomachean Ethics, 1139 a 5-10.
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The issue, however, is not to know whether
Heidegger provided an adequate explanation of what
QJ1ronesis 'really' meant for the Greeks.

In other words,

it is not a question of knowing whether Aristotle was
•closer' to what the Greeks 'really' thought about praxis.
Rather, it is a matter of wondering why, in a discussion
about the polis, and specifically about a notion as
politically determined as the notion of phronesis.
Heidegger exclusively turned to the Platonic text and
deliberately avoided the confrontation with Aristotle
whose political thought was so much opposed to Plato's.
In other words, it is a matter of knowing whether
Heidegger's philosophical choice is not also--and perhaps
primarily--a political choice.

Would the absence of

reference to Aristotle's political text constitute a
political rather than a philosophical lack?
How, then, does Aristotle's text resist
Heidegger's analyses of the polis and of praxis?

As we

suggested earlier. the answer is to be found in
Aristotle's effort to clearly distinguish between praxis,
poiesis and theoria, so as to delineate a space that would
be proper to praxis itself and hence to define the
specificity of the political life.

These distinctions are

perhaps most clearly traced out in the fifth chapter
("Action") of Arendt's The Human Condition.
recall her analysis:

To briefly

There are four major differences
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between poiesis (or "work") and praxis (or "action"), one
of which is a general distinction, the other three
distinctions being more specific.

Generally speaking,

then, the process of working or producing is definite.

It

has a definite arche or beginning: the project of the
product. and a definite telos or end: the completion of
the product.
skills.

It requires definite means and definite

Unlike the univocity of working, action is

essentially ambiguous.

It is ruled by principles that

cannot be as definite and as rigorous as the rules
governing poiesis or theoria. and it is always caught
within a pre-existent set of relations with others.

Hence

it involves much "difference of opinion and uncertainty,"
and for this reason. its investigation cannot reach the
exactness which "must be expected in other departments of
philosophy." 16

The three specific distinctions follow

from this general determination.

First, unlike working,

the process of which can be started all over again in case
of failure. the process of action is irreversible.

Or, as

Arendt puts it:
Whereas men have. always been capable of destroying
whatever was the product of human hands and have
become capable today even of the potential destruction
of what man did not make--the earth and earthly
nature--men never have been and never will be able to
undo or even to control reliably any of the
processes they start through action (The Human
Condition, 222-23).
16

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1094 b.
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second. whereas predictability rules the activity of
working, the outcome of action is unpredictable: he who
acts knows that he never quite knows what he is doing,
that he can become 'guilty' of consequences he never
intended or even foresaw--in short. that he is just as
much the patient and the victim as he is the doer of his
action.

Finally, whereas working appears as an anonymous

activity, i.e., as an activity through which the working
agent merely appears as the representative of a working
process, action reveals the agent as 'who'
he is) he is.

(and not 'what'

Praxis discloses the life of the agent in

its very 'whoness.'
Now that praxis has been distinguished from
theoria and poiesis, it is a matter of bringing to light
the very specificity of the bios politikos.
praxis?

What is

And in what sense would the Aristotelian

understanding of the political life call into question
Heidegger's conception of the polis as the poetic space in
which the disclosure of Being would occur?
Arendt's analyses are most useful.
19

Once again,

1 9

In the context of this work, it is not a matter
of Aristotelian exegesis. Much of what Arendt says with
regard to Aristotle could be nuanced or even put into
question.
But Arendt's reading of Aristotle is of great
help for whoever wants to think of the polis as a space
within which the sharing of words and deeds would be
privileged over a Platonist or Heideggerian conception.
For us, then, it is a matter of thinking the polis in
'horizontal' terms--in terms of interaction and exchange--
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According to Arendt, for the Greeks of the polis .

.

.Qfaxis seems to have primarily designated the sharing of
~ords

and deeds in a common realm.

It is the sharing of

speech and action. and not the walls or the laws of the
QOlis. that constituted the polis as such:
Of all the activities necessary and present in human
communities. only two were deemed to be political and
to constitute what Aristotle called the bios
politikos, namely action (praxis) and speech (lexis),
out of which rises the realm of human affairs (ta ton
anthropou praqmata, as Plato used to call it) (The
Human Condition, pp. 24-25).
Speech is therefore essential to the very constitution of
the political life.

But by speech one must not understand

the mvthos (what Heidegger would call the Dichtunq)
through which the essence of a people would be disclosed.
On the contrary, speech was promoted as the manifestation
of a plurality of opinions and as a means of exchange and
persuasion.

In a way, to belong to the polis was nothing

more than to talk to each other.

Such is the reason why

Aristotle's 'definition' of man as zoon politikon can be
understood only insofar as it is related to the other
definition according to which man is a

~

logon ekhon.

As Arendt puts it:
In his two most famous definitions, Aristotle only
more than in terms of a common relation to Being. We are
engaged in a thinking that would attempt to privilege the
plurality of opinions and actions over the univocity of a
people gathered around its common mvthos or Dichtunq.
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formulated the current opinion of the polis about man
and the political way of life. and according to this
opinion, everybody outside the polis--slaves and
barbarians--was ~ logou, deprived. of course, not
of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in
which speech and only speech made sense and where the
central concern of all citizens was to talk with each
other (The Human Condition, p. 27).
In the polis, then, individuals are related to other
individuals through words and deeds, and such a relation
discloses the citizens as 'who' they are.
"action" is essentially inter-action.

In this sense,

The polis is the

place in which the plurality of speakers and doers is
disclosed.

It is the place of the many (oi poloi).

In

other words, speech and action reveal the otherness and
the distinctness of the other.

In speech and action,

'I'

appear to the other as 'who' I am, i.e., as the doer of
such actions and the speaker of such words.

It is of the

utmost importance to emphasize the fact that Arendt
defines this ability to act and speak as a "setting
something into motion," as an ability to begin.

In the

activity of praxis, men (all men) are "newcomers" and
"beginners."

The power to begin belongs to the very

nature of the human condition as vita activa.

One recalls

that Heidegger reserved the privilege of the beginning to
the founders, and specifically to the poets of the polis,
and not to men qua men.

Action, origin and beginning--

that is arche--are in the hands of the citizens
themselves.

The members of the polis do not appear as
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such through the communion in the beginning initiated by
the poet.

Rather, each citizen, insofar as he speaks and

acts, is himself a beginner.

And so the polis is not the

space disclosed by the mvthos (or the Dichtunq) of the
poet on which the people as a whole would hinge.

Rather,

the polis is the space of the many disclosed through a web
of words and deeds.

Arendt writes:

The fact that man is capable of action means that the
unexpected can be expected from him. that he is able
to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this
again is possible only because each man is unique, so
that with each birth something uniquely new comes into
the world. With respect to this somebody who is
unique it can be truly said that nobody was there
before.
If action as beginning corresponds to the
fact of birth, if it is the actualization of the human
condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the
fact of distinctness and is the actualization of the
human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a
distinct and unique being among equals (The Human
Condition, p. 178).
Everything Arendt says here seems to radically oppose
Heidegger's conception of the political.

In Aristotle's

view, what .we have come to call the essence of the
political is irremediably bound to a notion of plurality.
The polis is essentially the sharing of a common concern
for a common realm through communication.

The polis is

nothing but the space within which people are essentially
with others and appear as such through action and speech.
But the action is the action of one specific agent. and
the speech is the speech of one specific speaker.

As soon

as the speech and the action become the speech and the
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action of an entire people. then the citizens are no
longer disclosed in their individuality and no longer
appear as who they are.

Again, such conception of the

political life is most remote from Heidegger's discourse,
whether in 1933-34, when the identity of the people was
being sought in the qeistige Flihrung, or later, when the
'whoness' of "Germany" was tailored to the Dichtung of
Holderlin.

Never did Heidegger even consider the

possibility of a political life that would depend on the
sharing of a plurality of deeds and speeches.

For action

and speech are in constant contact with what Arendt calls
the "web" of the acts and the words of other men.

Each

man is always already caught within this web of
relationships. so that his actions and his words are
always part of a larger scene and a larger text.

The

polis is like a web in which the acts and the words of men
would be woven together.

Action and speech would mark the

limit at which men would appear together as who they are.
Hence the polis would be nothing but the disclosive
exposure of the limit, nothing but the space that would
articulate men together in an inter-textuality.

The polis

would then perhaps be the spacing of differences and
particularities.

This is perhaps how one could understand

and reinterpret Arendt when she writes that
the polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in
its physical location; it is the organization of the.
people as it arises out of acting and speaking
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together. and its true space lies between people
living together for this purpose, no matter where they
happen to be.
"Wherever you go, you wi 11 be a po 1 is" :
these famous words became not merely the watchword of
Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that
action and speech create a space between the
participants which can find its proper location almost
any time and anywhere.
It is the space of appearance
in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space
where I appear to others as others appear to me, where
men exist not merely like other living or inanimate
things but make their appearance explicitly (The Human
Condition, pp. 198-99).
The plurality of actions and opinions is primarily
expressed in what is perhaps the most important feature of
praxis, viz. phronesis.

As has already been shown,

Heidegger's obliteration of the meaning this notion
conveys in the Aristotelian text is most remarkable, and
politically certainly not innocent.
threat inherent to phronesis?

What, then. is the

What is so remarkable about

Aristotle's phronesis that Heidegger would have
deliberately failed to take it into account?

And is this

political notion crucial to the point that no political
thinking could do without it?
In the Nicomachean Ethics, phronesis designates
the "virtue" (arete) of the calculative (loqistikon) or
opinative (doxastikon) part of the soul.

It is defined as

"a practical disposition with true logos concerning human
goods (1140 b 20) ."

Phronesis is neither an art (its aim

is not production or poiesis) nor a science (its object is
not necessary) but a practical disposition aimed at the
deliberation about what is good or bad for man.

Hence
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prudence is strictly human or anthropic: it is a virtue by
which man knows how to act according to what is good or
bad for man.· But what is essential about phronesis is
perhaps its origin. viz. the phronimos.

Whereas very few

people know how to define phronesis, anyone can recognize
a prudent man.

Phronimos is immediately identifiable

whenever it occurs.

For that

re~son

Aristotle suggests

that "we might arrive at the nature of prudence by
examining the nature of those whom we call 'prudent'
a 24)."

(1140

Through the mere observation of prudent men,

then, one can get to the heart of what prudence is.

But

what is perhaps most striking is that the whole of praxis-and hence also the whole of the political life--be
exclusively a matter of a true deliberation and a true
judgment that results in a true action.

The 'essence'--if

one can still speak in such a way--of the political would
be nothing more and nothing less than the practice of a
virtue difficult to define and yet easily identifiable.
Without prudence, there can be no praxis and no political
life, if by "political life" one understands the web and
the frailty of relationships within which men are caught
and with which they are compelled to cope.

This

understanding of the political life, in turn, would
perhaps put into question the very search for an
"essence."

The political life is perhaps that which would

most resist the move to the essence, that which would
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endanger its life in the very move to its essence.

In

that regard, it is crucial to note that Aristotle sees no
other possibility of defining, or rather circumscribing
what is proper to praxis than the mere observation of the
Qlurality of occurences of phronesis.

To live together in

a common space primarily means to let the members of the
polis practice a certain disposition by which they live
well together.
Heidegger would have failed to acknowledge this
essential feature of praxis and of the political matter as
a whole.

In moving from the political life and its

plurality of opinions and comportments to what he thought
to be the essence of such a life, Heidegger

w~uld

have

left aside the basic demands and prescriptions of the
polis.

In refusing to take the question of phronesis in

its relation to praxis seriously, both in his engagement
in 1933-34 and in his later writings, Heidegger became
unable to think what was politically so threatening and
destructive about Nazism.
politically overdetermined.

The philosophical elision was
Heidegger himself lacked

phronesis, that is essentially. judgment in the face of
the events.

Like Pythagoras or Parmenides, whom Aristotle

says are indeed respectable and admirable "philosophers,"
Heidegger would have lacked practical sense.

And this

sense--which Kant will merely designate as "judgment"--has
nothing to do with the greatness and the subtlety of the
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mind.

It is nothing other than common sense or true doxa.

And this, in turn, is a kind of political excellence, that
is, a "virtue" that arises from out of the political realm
and that is exercised in the realm of human affairs.

In

that respect, Aristotle would not be far from saying, with
Callicles, that philosophy (as the highest activity of the
intellect) drives man away from "all the things that need
to be known so as to become an accomplished and
distinguished man;" he is not far from considering that
philosophers "know nothing of the laws in their cities, or
of the language they should use in their business
associations both public and private with other men, or of.
human pleasure and appetites" and that, "in a word, they
are completely without experience of habits (ethon) ." 20

•

That is the reason why Aristotle chooses Pericles rather
than Pythagoras. Parmenides or Anaxagoras as the example
or the type of the prudent man.

Pericles and "others like

him" are prudent because "they are able to perceive
Ctheorein) what is good for themselves as well as for
other men." 21
kind of seeing.

Theorein means to see.

Hence prudence is a

But as distinguished from what Heidegger

seems to suggest. it does not mean to "have an eye for the
essential," and that is for Being.

In the context of

20

Gorqias, 484 ed.

2:1.

Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 b 8.
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m:axis. this particular seeing is aimed at the management
of human affairs and directed toward the others with which
the prudent man lives.

The absence of prudence or

judgment, then, would be a kind of blindness that would
result in the obliteration or the covering-up of the
political realm, and that is of the web of relationships
within which each man is caught.
Since prudence is aimed at the management of human
affairs. and since the opinions as well as the actions of
men are always caught in an already shared world, prudence
necessarily results in a common deliberation in which each
citizen is to participate.

Deliberation (bouleusis) is

what most reveals the plurality of opinions: it designates
the very hinge on which the bios politikos turns.

What is

crucial about the polis or the community is that everybody
be able to formulate his opinion. that everybody be able
to speak about the polis itself.

Such would perhaps be

the best definition of demokratia. a definition that
indeed refuses to privilege the efficiency and the
univocity of the polis over its plurality and its
plurivocity.

The unity and the subsistence of the polis

would be guaranteed only through the plurality of its
speeches and of its deeds.

The community would exist only

through the expression of its own explosion, through the
diffusion of its multiple voices. i.e. through the
unceasing exchange of words and deeds between its members.
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Hence the community would be most remote from the unifying
mvthos or discourse of the Flihrung, whether such Flihrung

-

be "spiritual" or "poetic."

The submission to or the

recognition of a unique voice in the political realm marks
the impossibility of deliberation and the death of
judgment.

The political life is most endangered when it

is centered around a common discourse, when it grounds its
essence on a unifying myth.

To inscribe deliberation and

judgment at the very heart of the political, on the other
hand, is to prevent oneself from the totalitarian closure
inherent in the mythic temptation; it is to resist the
myth of the poetic voice that opens up the future of an
entire people in the disclosedness of its concealed
origin.
Arendt never ceased to react against the coveringup of the essential role of judgment in the political
realm.

At the end of the final lecture of the course on

"Basic Moral Propositions," in a very Aristotelian
passage, Arendt denounces the evil implicit in the
inability or the refusal to judge:
In the last analysis ... our decisions about right and
wrong will depend upon our choice of company, with
whom we wish to spend our lives.
And this company [in
turn] is chosen [and this choice involves much of what
Aristotle calls bouleusis and proairesis] through
thinking in examples, in examples of persons dead or
alive, and in examples of incidents. past or
present... Morally and even politically speaking,
indifference, though common enough, is the greatest
danger ... Out of the unwillingness or inability to
choose one's examples and one's company, and out of
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the unwillingness to relate to others through
judgment, arise the real skandala, the real stumblingblocks which human powers cannot remove because they
were not caused by human and humanly understandable
motives. Therein lies the horror and, at the same
time. the banality of evil. 22
For Arendt, this "evil" is perhaps most proper to our
century and was best revealed in.its epitomized version,
viz. in Nazism.

The absence of judgment, and that is to

say primarily the absence of critical thinking, is what
enabled Nazi propaganda to spread as quickly and as easily
as it did.

The absence of judgment is the manifestation

of a politically desubstantiated life.
The problematic of judgment is perhaps what
constitutes the very center of Arendt's political
thinking.

This problematic arises mainly from a retrieval

and an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Judgment in
conjunction with his more directly historical and
political writings.

In Arendt's writings, judgment first

appears as a condition for acting, and in close connection
to the Aristotelian phronesis.

One finds different

accounts of judgment in connection with the vita activa in
the texts from the 60's, whether in "Freedom and
Politics," 23 in "Truth and Politics," or in "The Crisis of
22

Course given at the University of Chicago. The
last session was entitled "Some Questions of Moral
Philosophy" (Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Congress,
Container 40, p. 024651).
23 • "Freedom and Politics," in Freedom and Serfdom:
An Anthology of Western Thought. ed. Hunold, 1961.
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cu1ture." 24

Like phronesis, judgment is rooted in common

sense. which "discloses to us the nature of the world
insofar as it is a common world;" like phronesis too.
judgment "enables man to orient himself in the public
realm. in the common world."

Political judgment is also

the result of the gathering of other people's opinions
with whom one lives.

Such gathering is in itself both a

debate in which everybody tries to be persuasive and
convincing and a deliberation with oneself.

The activity

of judgment is aimed at the formation of opinions and at
the performance of actions in the political realm.

Hence

"judging is one, if not the most, important activity in
which this sharing-the-w9rld-with-others comes to pass." 2 l5
Yet if one turns to Arendt's writings of the 70's,
one sees a shift in intonation.

Indeed, judgment no

longer appears as a faculty operative in the vita activa.
It is now on the side of the vita contemplativa.
is now decisively aligned with thinking.

Judging

In the act of

judging it is no longer a matter of a deliberation between
political actors with a view to acting.

The emphasis has

shifted from the actor on the stage of the world to the
spectator in the hall.

It is now a matter of judging

24

"Truth and Politics" and "The Crisis in Culture:
Its Social and Its Political Significance," in Between
Past and Future (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
1961).
:a!S
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1977), p. 221.

179

events that have already occurred.
a matter of judging appearances.

In other words, it is
At this point, Arendt

turns to Kant's Critique of Judgment.

Now what is most

striking about Kant's analysis of judgment is that it does
not arise from a discussion about the political but from
the examination of the phenomenon of taste and hence from
an aesthetic concern.

The question, then, becomes to know

how Arendt can retrieve a theory of political (and not
aesthetic) judgment from the third Critique.

What about

the relation between aesthetic judgment and political
judgment?
For Arendt, politics is essentially a matter of
phenomenality or manifestation as self-disclosure in a
space of appearances.

Political things. whether words or

deeds, shine forth in the midst of beings, but in a world
essentially shared with others.

Just like works of art.

For both art and politics are rooted in common sense,
i.e., in what Kant calls the sensus communis.

This

"common sense" is no longer the good sense 26 of phronesis,
but rather the sense by which our strictly private and
"subjective" five senses are adjusted to a nonsubjective
and "objective" world which we share with others.

Both

art and politics "are phenomena of the public world."2 7
They both reveal a world which, from the very outset, is
26

What the French ca 11 "bon

27

"The Crisis in Culture," p. 218.
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shared with others.

Therefore the phenomenality of

politics is analogous to the phenomenality of art.
To say that the relation between art and politics
is analogous, however, is not tantamount to saying that
they are the same, nor, unlike what Heidegger suggests,
that the essence of art as "poetry" is itself the very
essence of politics.

Nor does it amount to what Walter

Benjamin denounced in Nazism, viz. "the aesthetization of
politics."

It is to draw the attention to a certain

kinship between the phenomenality of art and politics in
connection with the eyes of the spectator.

From this very

specific perspective, one can draw the analogy: as in
aesthetic taste, the political judgment of the spectator
involves "universality" (it involves the idea of humanity
as a whole) and "disinterestedness" (he is merely a
spectator and not an actor) .

The best and most famous

formulation of such a political judgment can be found in
Kant's commentary on the French revolution in Part II of
The Contest of Faculties.

Kant stresses that he is not

concerned with the actual deeds of the actors but only
with
the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals
itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and
manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy
for the players on one side against those on the
other, even at the risk that this partiality could
become very disadvantageous for them if discovered.
OWing to its universality, this mode of thinking
demonstrates a character of the human race at large
and all at once; owing to its disinterestedness. a
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moral character of humanity, at least in its
predisposition [my italics] .2a
Judgment in the face of events, and specifically
of extraordinary events like the French Revolution or the
National-Socialist revolution, is unavoidable and
irreplaceable.

For judgment, like thinking, entails a

withrawal from the actual deeds of men in order to reflect
on the meaning of what they do.

There is a certain

political responsibility of the spectator, and
specifically of the thinker.

But what if the thinker

refuses to consider. the problematic of judgment as
philosophically and politically relevant?

What if the

thinker refuses to see in the rise of events, in the daily
deeds and words of the plurality of the members of the
community the essential stakes of the political life, and
prefers to focus his political discourse on "the spiritual
destiny" of a people as a whole and on the mythes around
which this people would be gathered?
Heidegger's political misadventure may have
revealed the necessity--and that is the political demand-to think the community in terms of plurality of words and
deeds. of opinions and actions.

It may have also revealed

the resistance that politics (the political life) puts up

Kant, On History, ed. Lewis White Beck, trans. L.
W. Beck, R. E. Anchor, and E. L. Fackenheim, Library of
Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 14344.
28
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against the political. and that is to the move into the
essence of politics.

Heidegger's political misadventure

may have revealed the necessity of bringing politics back
to itself, back to the immediacy and the spontaneity of
its factuality.

And politics as factuality is precisely

the interruption--fracture, displacement, disturbance--of
the political constituted in the univocity of its myth.
But what if the possibility of such a community
were already at play in Heidegger, and specifically in the
text which marked the outbreak of his thought, viz. Being
and Time?

What if the project of fundamental ontology

could give way to an unsuspected and promising thinking of
the political, a thinking, moreover. that would work
against Heidegger's later texts?

CHAPTER FOUR
Being, Time and Community
Personne ne pense plus que la
realite d'une vie commune--ce
qui revient a dire de l'existence
humaine--depende de la mise en
commun des terreurs nocturnes et
de cette sorte de crispation
extatique que repand la mort.
Georges Bataille--L'experience interieure

Of the possibility, then. as slight as it may be,
but also as decisive as it could be, of the political in
Being and Time.

Of the possibility of what has often been

considered as an impossibility. 1

Of a reading of Being

and Time in which, to a certain extent,

it will be a

matter of reading Heidegger against Heidegger,
specifically against certain of his later writings.

Of a

reading of Being and.Time that would in a way resist that
in the name of which Heidegger engaged himself
politically.

In such a reading. it will be a matter of

putting the emphasis on thematics and analyses of
1

Mark Blitz's Heidegger's Being and Time and the
Possibility of Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Pr~ss, 1981), however, would be a remarkable exceptic
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Heidegger's that are usually set aside or considered as
merely derivative.

Specifically, it will be a matter of

carrying these analyses to their most extreme
possibilities, to the point. perhaps, at which the very
center of Being and Time would get displaced, if not
radically disrupted.

Hence of a disruptive accent.

But on what does such an accent bear?

On death.

Specifically, on the death of the Other and on the
connection of such a death with the very possibility of
the conununity: on death in its connection with Being-withone-another.

The task that would follow from such an

emphasis is often considered. as we suggested earlier, as
an impossible task.

For indeed, death. as my ownmost

possibility. is most remote from the innerworldly world of
equipment in which other Daseins are first encountered.
Being-towards-death, and that is relating oneself to one's
ownmost possibility, is the very possibility that undoes
all other possibilities. the relation that undoes all
other relations, whether to beings that are present-athand. to beings that are ready-to-hand, or to beings that
are in the world in the same way I, as a Dasein, am in the
world:
Dasein's death is the possibility of no-longer-beingable-to-be-there [die Moglichkeit des Nicht-mehrdasein-konnens].
If Dasein stands before itself as
this possibility. it has been fully assigned to its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before
itself in this way, all its relation to any other
Dasein have been undone [my emphasis]. This
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ownmost. non-relational [unbezligliche] possibility is
at the same time the uttermost one (250).
In other words. Dasein

itself to the extent that it

runs ahead to its death.

It is death, its own death, that

throws Dasein back entirely upon itself.

Insofar as death

is "essentially my own" (240). it not only cannot be
experienced by the Other but. as the "ownmost," it is also
the most nonrelational possibility.

In projecting myself

against my own self, death interrupts my relation to the
Other.

To be one's ownmost self is to be cut off from the

Other as Other.

For in the relation to the Other.

Dasein's ownmost Being is not what is at issue.
It would seem. then. that when the question gets
down to determining the ownmost Being of Dasein, and that
is Dasein's essence, any reference to Dasein's being in
the world with other Daseins, 2 to the nature of Dasein's
2

Daseins: The use of the plural form attached to
the word Dasein might strike as not being Heideggerian.
Indeed, Heidegger never speaks of Daseins, but always of
Dasein, and in such a way that it would seem that there
would be no space for difference in Dasein or between the
plurality of Daseins--whether the difference be a matter
of sex (is Dasein a male or a female? Could it be both?
And what about the sexual or the erotic in Being and
Time?) or a matter of merely pointing to the Other Dasein,
to the multiplicity of entities which have Dasein's kind
of Being in the same way I do. and which are nonetheless
different from me as well as from one another.
In only
speaking of Dasein, and in focusing on the ontological
difference, Heidegger would have repressed the very
possiblity of thinking the difference that would space the
plurality of Daseins. Even though such a thesis is to a
certain extent legitimate. we shall be engaged in a
reading that will attempt to show how the space of
difference and alterity can indeed be articulated in Being
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relation to other Daseins, is inevitably misleading and
necessarily irrelevant.

The investigation into Dasein's

essence would be most remote from any political or
communitarian concern.

Dasein's ownmost Being and

essential structure, its Being-towards-death, would
actually interrupt the moment of the political and
undermine its very essence.

Does this mean. then. that

there is no space for an authentic Being-with-one-another?
Does this mean that the Other is, from the outset and
inevitably. nothing but the anonymous "they"

which my own

Dasein. in its everydayness, gets identified with?

Can

the Other be something else than the very threat of my
ownmost potentiality-for-Being?

(A)

Before attempting to think the relation between
the Miteinandersein and death. it is necessary to
delineate the context within which the analysis of the
Being-with-one-another first arises.

For such context is

that which later in Being and Time determines the thinking
of the Other as well as what we believe to be the very
possibility of a retrieval of the question of the
community.
The Other first appears in the context of

and Time.
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innerworldly equipmentality.

Dasein is always already

engaged in a world constituted by ready-to-hand entities,
but it is also engaged in a world within which other
entities relate themselves to the entities ready-to-hand
in the same way Dasein is related to these very entities.
In other words, Dasein is, from the very outset, caught up
in a world shared by other Daseins:
Thus along with the work, we encounter not only
entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's
kind of Being (71).
Hence the Other first appears in a derivative or mediated
way: Other Daseins appear only insofar as they too are
related to the equipmental world I am involved in.

It is

important to note that, at this point, Heidegger calls
this other entity "Dasein" only insofar as it too relates
itself to the world as a user.

The Other is essentially

(and not temporally. hence not in a Hegelian way) that
which is mediated by equipment.

In other words, the other

Dasein is not Other as Other, but is only an other Dasein
among other Daseins caught up in the same world.

The only

relation I, as a Dasein, have with other Daseins. is a
relation mediated by the world of equipmentality, and
hence mediated by our "concernful" mode of being in the
world: Between the Other and "me," the world is always
already interposed.

It is perhaps for this reason that

Heidegger, at this point, does not refer to the other
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oasein as the Other.
But this does not mean that the other Daseins I
encounter in the world are merely "added on in thought to
some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand"
(118).

Dasein is not with other Daseins in a merely

derivative way.
with others.

Dasein is not first in the world and then

Rather, its Being-in-the-world necessarily

implies. as a mode of its Being. its Being-with- others.
In other words, Dasein is "essentially in itself Beingwith" (Mitsein)

(120).

Being-with, to which being with

the Other is terminologically and ontologically connected,
as well as Dasein-with, are already given with the Beingin-the-world of Dasein.

The chapter in which Heidegger,

for the first time, explicitly enquires into being-withone-another "leads to structures of Dasein that are
equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with and
Dasein-with (Mitdasein)" (114).

With respect to Being-

with, this does not mean that it arises with equal
originality alongside Being-in-the-world.

Rather, it

means that "the Being-in-the-world of Dasein is
essentially constituted through Being-with" (120).

Being-

with is an essential mode of Being of Dasein's Being-inthe-world.

Without this "with-like" (mithaften) way of

being in the world Dasein could not be what it is:
By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the
world is always the one that I share with Others. The
world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in
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is Being-with Others <118).
But what does it mean for Dasein to be essentially
with?
.------

Specifically. what does it mean for Dasein to be

essentially with other Daseins?

What does it mean for

Dasein to live in a world always already shared with
Others?

In Heideggerian terms. the question amounts to

knowing what the mode of Being of Dasein in its relation
to other Daseins is.

Heidegger calls Dasein's relation to

the Being of entities present-to-hand that do not have the
mode of Being of Dasein "concern" [BesorgenJ. On the other
hand. Dasein's relation to Others. in its being with
Others. is one of Flirsorge. of "solicitude".

It is

important to note that both concern and solicitude. "as
essential structures of the constitution of Dasein. belong
to the condition of possibility of existence in general"
(263).

At the same time, it is precisely for this reason

that "Being alongside the ready-to-hand belongs just as
primordially to Being-in-the-world as does Being-withOthers" (181).
~

In other words. Being-with-Others is just

constitutive mode of Dasein alongside other

constitutive modes.

It can in no way be privileged over

or isolated from the other modes of Being. because the
Other. who, in this respect, does not differ from the
ready-to-hand. is aligned with "me": "He is the projected
of my project." so that "Being-with-one-another is
essentially represented by the model of my relation to the
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other and not by the relation of the Other to me."3

Yet, for the purpose of this analysis, I shall
henceforth focus exclusively on the Being-with-one-another
and on the "solicitude" towards--or the "caring for"--the
Other.

In this regard. it is essential to note that the

only section explicitly devoted to the problematic of the
Miteinandersein in Being and Time. viz. S 26, is only
developed by Heidegger with a view to answering the
question concerning the "who" of everyday Dasein.

In

everyday life, Dasein encounters other Daseins "at work"
in the world.

For the most part, the life of Dasein is a

"concerful" life in which other Daseins, who are also
involved in a concernful relation to the world, are
encountered.

Hence the everyday life of Dasein in its

relation to other Daseins is a life mediated by the world
of entities present-to-hand in which it is involved.

So

that, proximally and for the most part. the relation of
Dasein to other Daseins. viz. Ftirsorge,

is a "deficient"

and "indifferent" mode of Being-with-one-another:
Being for. against or without one another, passing one
another by. not "mattering" to one another--these are
possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely
these last-named deficient and indifferent modes that
characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another
Michael Theunissen: The Other: Studies in the
Social Ontoloav of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber,
trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1986), p.
179. As we shall see later in our analysis, such
statement can be challenged if thought from the
perspective of the death of the Other.
3
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(121).
In other words, because of the average, everyday life in
which Dasein is involved, the Others, with which Dasein is
from the outset. are considered in terms of

Man. of

the "they", and thus form the horizon within which the
others. as Dasein-with, are thematized.
But if Heidegger mentions the deficient modes of
solicitude, he also mentions, in an anticipatory way,
i.e., in a way that anticipates the analysis of "Care as
the Being of Dasein." the positive modes of Ftirsorge. 4
Solicitude, in its positive mode, has two extreme
possibilities.

The first possibility is. for the most

part, linked to our concern with the ready-to-hand, and
thus constitutes an inauthentic possibility of solicitude.
Such a possibility consists in Dasein's taking the Other's
care away from itself in taking over its concern.

In such

a possibility. Dasein puts itself in the position of the
Other. so that the Other is "thrown out of his own
position" (122).

In taking the place of the Other, Dasein

throws the Other away from its place, displaces it in such
a way that the Other remains without a place, and hence
completely dependent on Dasein: "In such solicitude the

Both the analysis of Besorqen (the "taking care
of") and Ftirsorge (the "caring for") are, in a way,
anticipatory, for both will eventually have to be
elucidated from the analysis of Sorge ("care") as "the
Being of Dasein".
4
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other can become one who is dominated and dependent. even
if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from
him" (122).

Hence in Dasein's "leaping in for the Other"

[flir ihn einsprinqen] there is a danger of not letting the
Other be what it is, of not letting the Other be other.
Here is perhaps the first indication of a possibility of
radical alterity in Being and Time, a possibility that
will be confirmed and radicalized further on in the text.
In contrast to the leaping in for the Other,
Heidegger suggests that authentic solicitude consists in a
"leaping ahead of him" [ihm vorausspringen].

In such a

possibility, it is a matter for Dasein of giving the
Other's care back to itself, of "leaping ahead of the
Other in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being," so that
the Other becomes free for its own care.

In this mode of

solicitude, it is the very existence--and hence the very
Being--of the Other that is involved, and not only some
concern of his.

All of a sudden, my relation to the Other

in authentic solicitude appears as essential to the very
problematic of existence.

In one short paragraph,

Heidegger broaches what can be considered as the
possibility of an authentic Being-with-one-another, and
even, as we shall attempt to show, of the possibility of
the community.

Specifically, he broaches the space that

enables us to think the Other in its alterity, i.e.,
way that enables Dasein to render the Other free for

in a
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itself.

To have an authentic relation to the Other is to

comport oneself in such a way that the very existence of
the Other becomes an issue for the Other.

To comport

oneself in such a way is to enable the Other to become
free for itself. and that is to be engaged in its ownmost
existential possibilities.
essentially to be thought

"Freedom" and "existence" are
together:~

Dasein is always free

f.Qr. something, precisely because Dasein is an ek-sisting

being, i.e., a being whose Being consists in its very eksistence.

Dasein ek-sists in its being free for--whether

for care, for the call of conscience, for death or for any
existential possiblity.

Freedom is not a property of man,

but rather a mode of Being: in engaging itself into its
very own ek-sistence, Dasein becomes free for it.
But what must be the nature of authentic
solicitude so that it can free the Other for itself?
kind of comportment does this imply?
with-one-another is at stake?

What

What kind of Being-

Such questions lead us to

the threshold of the issue already broached, viz. the
question of the community.

But it is precisely at this

~
In order to think the belonging together of eksistence and freedom, one would need to turn to Vom Wesen
des Grundes and to the fourth section of Vom Wesen der
Wahrheit. where freedom gets identified with ek-sistence:
in engaging itself into the world, in standing outside
itself into the open [das Offene), into the space of
Unverbogenheit in which beings can come to presence,
Dasein is engaged into a letting-be [Seinlassen] of
beings. Such letting-be is what Heidegger calls
"freedom".

194
point that Heidegger closes off the discussion:
Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself
between the two extremes of positive solicitude--that
which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps
forth and liberates [vorspringend-befreinden].
It
brings numerous mixed forms to maturity; to describe
these and classify them would take us beyond the
limits of this investigation (my emphasis) (122) . 6
Hence it is perhaps beyond the limits of
Heidegger's investigation that one would want to venture.
Not. however, by way of completing a Heideggerian analysis
that would have remained uncompleted in Being and Time or
elsewhere.

It is not a matter of pursuing and completing

a predefined program.

Rather. it is perhaps, at this

point, i.e .. at the threshold of the question of the
community, a matter of thinking beyond Heidegger.

And

yet, everything that will be said henceforth will remain.
in a way. Heideggerian, for it will arise from out of a
reading of certain passages of Being and Time.
Specifically. it will arise from out of a certain
interpretation of death, of the death of the Other. and of
Dasein's transcendence.

So that our question. viz. the

question of the nature of the relation of Dasein to the
Other in authentic solicitude, needs to be postponed once
6
Rather. Heidegger proceeds to describe the
Miteinandersein of everyday Dasein, for, "proximally and
for the most part," the Others are encountered in the
world of Dasein's concern.
In such Being-with towards
Others. Dasein is never itself. But then who is Dasein in
everyday Being-with-one-another? The answer is: das Man.
the "they".
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again.

CBl
Why death?

Because death, as we suggested

earlier. is Dasein's ownmost possibility. the possibility
that threatens and undoes all other possibilities. the
horizon within which each Dasein lives and ek-sists as a
being for which its own Being is an issue.

Death is the

mark of Dasein's Eigentlichkeit, that is the mark of its
authenticity and its ownness.

Hence death, as the mark of

Dasein's transcendence, can appear as the very
impossibility of the community.

Death, which is alway ffiY

death. will always remain withdrawn from the political
life.

It resists the being-in-common, to the point that

it would become impossible to think something like an
authentic Being-with-one-another, i.e .. a Being-with-oneanother at the very center of which Dasein's transcendence
could be situated. a Being-with-one-another of which the
essence would precisely be the death of the Other.

Yet it

is this impossibility that Heidegger invites us to think,
or rather provokes us to think.

For his analysis of death

in its connection to the Being-with-one-another remains at
the level of inauthenticity.
What. then. about the relation between death and
Being-with-one-another?

Is the Miteinandersein void of
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any understanding of death?
show.

Not quite, as S 51 seems to

But the understanding of death that publicness has

is a deficient understanding expressed in "idle talk."
Indeed, for the "they" death is not Dasein's ownmost
possibility.

It is not even a possibility.

Rather, it is

an event, and a rather usual and meaningless one:
People who are no acquaintances of ours are "dying"
daily and hourly.
"Death" is encountered as a wellknown event occuring within-the-world (253).
To the "they" death is a mere Vorhandene.

Even though it

happens to everyone, it never destabilizes the "they"
which remains unaltered by this very common event.

People

die, everybody will die, eventually: death is "obvious."
But the life of the "they" never stops, it is never
threatened.

In other words, when taken over by the

"they," "dying, which is essentially mine in such a way
that no one can be my representative, is perverted into an
event of public occurence which the "they" encounters"
( 253) .

Hence any attempt to think the death of the Other
would be inauthentic thinking.

Such a thinking would

express itself in a deficient mode of discourse, viz. idle
talk.

Indeed, such a thinking does not consider death in

its dimension of possibility, but rather as an inevitable
and hence trivial event.

In other words, the thinking of

the death of the Other is inauthentic insofar as it fails
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to acknowledge the uniqueness or the irreducible
"mineness" of death.

The thinking of death in general

leaves the essence of death aside.

It is an anonymous

thinking for an anonymous death, a thinking for which
"people" die:
Factically one's own Dasein is always dying already;
that is to say. it is in Being-towards-its-end.
And
it hides this fact from it.::;elf by recoining "death" as
just a "case of death" in Others--an everyday
occurence which, if need be, gives the assurance still
more plainly that "oneself" is stil 1 "living" (254).
But what kind of "living" is at stake here?

What are the

essential features of a living-together which has an
inauthentic understanding of death?

What is the

connection between a Being-in-common and death?

If Being-

with-one-another is thought from the "they," and that is
from an abstraction within which all Daseins are
interchangeable and replacable; if the "they" refuses to
Dasein its transcendence and its uniqueness. of which
Being-towards-death is the mark, then a certain conception
of the community, and a certain conception of the
political life is already under way: a community as unity,
as totality, as communion and as fusion--in other words, a
community which represses the essential transcendence of
Dasein, a community turned towards its own immanence: an
imploded community.

If, on the other hand, Dasein is

defined in terms of its Being-towards-death, and that is
of its mineness. then the space of the Being-with-one-
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another will no longer be the space of the "they," but the
space of the co-appearance of each Dasein in its
transcendence, without any possibility of fusion or
communion.
What would need to be recognized. then, in the
thinking of Being-towards-death as Dasein's ownmost
possibility, is Dasein's transcendence.

Insofar as the

very structure of Dase in is a structure of e:<cess,. of
tn1nscendence. of a possibility that is always the
possibility of one specific Dase in. the Other will always
remain Other.

The Other cannot be brought back to the

Same (to myself. to the community).

It always already

exceeds the communion. the totality in which the "they"
would entangle it.

What is at stake here is indeed the

ontological possibility of an ethics and a politics, a
possibility grounded in Dasein's transcendence.
Heidegger considers such possibility of an
authentic Being-with-one-another in § 60. This section is
the last section of the second chapter of the second
division.

The chapter as a whole is devoted to the

question of "Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic
Potentiality-for-Being. and Resoluteness."

In this

chapter. then, it is a matter of knowing whether there is
an authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein that will be
attested in its existentiell possibility by Dasein itself.
In chapter I. Heidegger revealed the ontological·
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possibility of such a potentiality-for-Being in Dasein's
Being-towards-death.

But the question is now:

Does Dasein ever factically [my emphasis] throw
itself into such a Being-towards-death? Does Dasein
demand ... an authentic potentiality-for-Being
determined by anticipation [Vorlaufen]? (266)
So here, in chapter II, Heidegger inquires into the
authentic possibility of Dasein's existence, a possiblity
that would be the result of Dasein's own demand.

Such is

"resoluteness" [Entsclossenheit], at which Heidegger
arrives in

§

60.

Entsclossenheit is the word Heidegger

uses to name Dasein's authentic disclosedness
[ErschlossenheitJ attested in Dasein itself by its
conscience.

Entschlossenheit, then, is the authentic

truth of Dasein, and, as such, it is the most "primordial"
one.

Entschlossenheit, along with its attestation in

conscience, involves the three determinations of Beingthere in the world, viz. the "state of mind"
[Befindlichkeit], "understanding" [VerstehenJ, and
"discourse" [Rede]. along with their authentic modalities,
viz. "anxiety" [Angst], "Being-guilty" [Schuldigsein] and
"reticence" [Verschwiegenheit].

Each of these modes of

Being have the characteristic of individualizing Dasein in
its conscience. of cutting Dasein off from the "they" in
which Dasein is involved, proximally and for the most
part.
One would think. then, that Dasein's
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"resoluteness" is nothing but a cutting itself off from
the world. an interiorization of its self in its
11

conscience

11
•

It is actually quite the opposite.

For

"resoluteness" is Dasein's authentic mode of
disclosedness, and that is its authentic way of projecting
itself into the possibilities into which it is thrown.

So

that the "conscience" in which Dasein's "resoluteness" is
attested is not to be thought in terms of the conscience
or the interiority of a "subject" withdrawn from the
world.

Dasein's conscience is never

am--is--not a suject.

mx.

conscience for "I"

The conscience of Dasein is rather

the interruption of any self-consciousness. for the inner
life of self-consciousness is. according to Heidegger.
always already outside of itself. thrown into the world.
Dasein's conscience points to the very engagement of
Dasein into the world. and to the possiblity of its being
free for this world.

Dasein's conscience is the "call" to

its own self (as opposed to the "they-self") that arises
from out of the world and that engages Dasein within the
world, along with the world.

And that is precisely the

reverse of interiority and isolation:
When the they-self is appealed to. it gets called to
the Self. But it does not get called to that Self
which can become fqr itself an object on which to
pass judgment, nor to that Self which inertly dissects
its "inner life" with fussy curiosity, nor to that
Self which one has in mind when one gazes
"analytically" at psychical conditions and what
lies behind them. The appeal to the Self in.the theyself does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it
11

11
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can close itself off from the "external world". The
call passes over [Uberspringt] everything like this
and disperses it. so as to appeal solely to that Self
which, notwithstanding, is in no other way than Beingin-the-world (my emphasis) (273).
What Entschlossenheit primarily does, then, is to take the
they-self away from itself. to "leap over" it and
"dispers" it. so that each Dasein is left with its own
Self. and with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.
But does this mean that insofar as "resoluteness"
individualizes Dasein and undoes inauthentic Being-withone-another, it also renders impossible any kind of
authentic relation to the Other?

Or does it mean. on the

contrary. that insofar as it discloses Dasein
authentically into the world, it becomes at the same time
the very condition of possiblity of an authentic--and that
is to say free--relation of Dasein to the other Daseins
with which it is in the world?

Heidegger is quite clear

if brief on this issue:
Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first
makes it possible to let the Others who are with it
"be" in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being. and to
co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which
leaps forth and liberates (vorspringend-befreiendenJ
(298).

This passage not only points to the possibility of an
authentic Being-with-one-another, but also determines the
nature of the relation of resolute Dasein to the Other.
To that extent, it provides an answer to the question that
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we raised in discussing S26 7 and that remained unanswered
at that time.

The difficulty with which the question of

the authentic relation to the Other has to cope can be
formulated in the following way: to relate oneself
authentically to the Other is to relate oneself to the
Other in such a way

th~t

the Other's ownmost potentiality-

for-Being will be revealed to it.

But how can Dasein help

the Other relate itself to what is most proper to it?
Surely. if what is at issue is the Other's ownmost and
proper potentiality-for-Being, then Dasein, as the Other
of the Other, will have no access to such owness.

Were

Dasein able to do so, what it would relate itself to in
the Other would no longer be the Other's ownmost Be1ng.
but rather something that could be pointed to or even
taken up by Dasein itself.

It would seem, then, that the

relation of Dasein to the Other would be nothing but a
relation of disowning, of dispropriation, of alienation.
Such would indeed be the case if the very nature of the
relation to the Other were not a relation of "letting-be".
What Heidegger understands by a "letting-be" of the Other,
and what we ourselves understand by it after Heidegger. is
what needs to be clarified.

For such understanding will

be crucial to the question of the community.
In authentic Being-with-one-another. it is a
matter of letting the Other be in its ownmost
See above, p.9.
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potentiality-for-Being.

Hence it is not a matter of

pointing to that ownmost possibility, of showing it as
that which has to be taken up by the Other.

For that

possibility, as the Other's ownmost possibility, is not
something that can be pointed to.

Nor is it a matter of

remaining passive, withdrawn from the Other's ownmost
Being. not concerned by the Other.
attitude.

It is not a "selfish"

Rather, it is a matter of engaging oneself with

the Other, for the sake of the Other, in such a way that
the Other gets thrown back to itself, and that is to its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to its death as its
ownmost and uttermost possibility.
however, is not the work of Dasein.

Such throwing back,
Nor is it an order or

an injunction that the Other would take upon itself.
Rather, it is a withdrawal that calls the Other upon
itself, a kind of active passivity or passive activity by
which the Other would be faced with its ownmost Being.
But insofar as this ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the
Other's and essentially not mine, I can in no way tell the
Other what this potentiality consists in.

Nor can I. for

the same reason, i.e .. because of the transcendence of the
Other. appropriate or reappropriate its ownmost Being with
a view to insribing it within a larger project, a work or
a program.

In my authentic relation to the Other. I am

related to it in a way that radically excludes any
teleological undertaking, even if this undertaking were to
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be done for the sake of the Other.

In resolutely

comporting myself to the Other. I do nothing but primarily
acknowledge the infinite transcendence of the Other, a
transcendence that I, as resolute Dasein, can only
acknowledge because of my own transcendence, because of my
Q!ffi. awareness of Dasein's existential excessive structure.

In resolutely comporting myself to the Other I do nothing
but acknowledge and mark the impossible communion or
fusion of the Others under a common program or a common
end that would realize the Others' ownmost Being.
Even though this acknowledgment does not
constitute rules for a praxis. and least of all for a
politics, it perhaps points to the very essence of what it
means to live within a common space, and hence it points
to the horizon from which any authentic politics could
unfold.

This. to say the least, suspends and interrupts

the praxical and political notions with which we are daily
involved, viz. notions such as "nation," "people,"
"class," "State," etc., all of which conceive of men as
subjects that can be brought together under larger
universalities which, in turn, are themselves thought as
subjects.

In revealing Dasein's essential transcendence

as the very heart of authentic Being-with-one-another,
Heidegger radically puts into question these subjectal
universalities, in such a way as to engage anew the
question of our Being-together.

So that now it would be a
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matter of asking whether something essentially other is at
issue in our Being-with-one-another.

This other thing,

following the thinking of Jean-Luc Nancy, can be called
the community. 8

We thereby wish to point to something

that never ceases to come to us (insofar as it constitues
what is common to us) and which remains nonetheless
withdrawn from what we usually call the society or the
political life, yet allowing it from its very retreat.

( c)
Mourir sans but: par la
(ce mouvement d'immobilite),
la pensee tomberait hors
de toute teleologie ...
Maurice Blanchot--L'ecriture du desastre.

Being-with-one-another, Being-there-with-others,
what could be called the community, cannot be thought of
in terms of comm.munion . of fusion.

For Dasein, in the

mineness of the Being-towards-death which marks its
authenticity, manifests its transcendence with regard to
the "others" considered as an anonymous mass (as "they").

e
Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, La communaute desouvree,
Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986. The remaining part of
this chapter is engaged in an attempt to show how
Heidegger's text can open the way to analyses that perhaps
exceed Heidegger's "intentions," but that in any case
reveal the unsaid of the text. Even though Nancy situates
himself at a certain distance from Heidegger, we believe
that most of what he says can be unfolded from out of
Heidegger's text.
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Indeed. the community is interrupted, fractured by the
uniqueness or the singularity of Dasein. a uniqueness that
it would not be able to include or to reappropriate in a
fusional totality.

Such would be the community: a

tactical Being-with-one-another that would take Dasein's
transcendence, i.e., Dasein's ownmost possibilities, upon
itself.

In other words, the community would not present

itself as a coherent whole within which each Dasein would
have its "place" or "function" 9 --in other words. not as a
performative totality functioning on the basis of an
individual or atomistic understanding of man. a totality
which would actualize the essence of man, but rather as a
"rapport" which would ex-pose Dasein in its Being-withother-Daseins, according to its existential structure.
Because of its existential-ecstatic structure,
Dasein cannot be thought of as an individuality, since
this (political) notion presupposes for Dasein the
possibility of its being an atom, an immanent substance
that would stand for itself.

The ecstatic existence of

Dasein is precisely the impossibility of what Nancy calls
an "immanence."

By immanence Nancy means any thinking or

ideology which thinks of itself and of the world as a

9

Such conception runs throughout the entire history
of metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel, and lies at the very
heart of our contemporary political regimes. whether
"capitalistic" or "communist".
In such conception, the
political community is thought as a signifying totality,
as a living organism.
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work, and hence as something which has to bring an essence
into being, specifically the essence of man.
"Immanentism'' is a humanism.

In it, man--a certain

conception of man--is both arche and telos, both the
origin and the end.

In that sense, Nancy means by

immanence nothing else than what Heidegger means by
humanism.

We shall nonetheless keep Nancy's vocabulary.

for the notion of immanence is opposed to the
transcendence of Dasein and is a more directly political
notion in Nancy 10

•

Dasein is the being whose death cannot

be put to work: it can neither be appropriated nor
recuperated nor superseded in a organic totality, in a
communion of bodies and souls that would live on and
through its dead.

As such, death is the very interruption

and the very impossibility of an organic totality which.
in turn,

is nothing but the idea of a universal immanence.

of a plural unity which functions as a Subject.
What Being and Time teaches us,

implicitly but

insistently, is that our Being-with-one-another cannot be
dissociated from.our implicit understanding of death, or,
as Nancy puts it, that "death cannot be dissociated from
the community, for the community is revealed in death--and
The word "immanence" is actually substituted for
the word "totalitarianism" which Nancy had used previously
on certain occasions. See, among other texts, the
"Opening Remarks" in Rejouer le politigue (Paris: Galilee,
1981) and "Le retrait du politique" in Le retrait du
politique (Paris: Galilee, 1982). These two texts also
bear the signature of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe.
10
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reciprocally." 11

Death. or rather the way in which we

comport ourselves to it. commands a certain conception of
life. and specifically of our living-with-one-another.

A

community which does not understand death as a
possibility, and as one's ownmost possibility, is a
community which allows itself to put its dead to work.
i.e .. a community whose dead do not die "for nothing".
The death of the members (and here the organic vocabulary
is adequate) of the community is not a "useless" death,
for insofar as the excess and the absolute loss in the
Other's death is denied, death can be superseded, and the
community of the dead becomes that upon which the
community of the living can be elevated,

justified.

The

living community can speak and act in the name of the
dead, and that is always, sooner or later, more or less
violently, more or less obviously, in the name of death
itself, i.e., in the name of an impersonal death. of an
immanent death.

In the name of death and of its deads,

which are conceived.both as arche and telos, the conununity
can require of its members that they not only die, but
also kill for the community's sake. that their death be
turned into something usefull, something creative: Into a
work--whether a "work of art" (Goebbels). a work of Reason

11

Ibid .. p.39.
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or of Spirit.12
Authentic community, i.e .. the community that is
revealed in the death of the Other. suspends and
interrupts the community of immanence, the community of
what chapter three revealed as the myth.

It is attached

to death as the very possibility of its existence. but to
death as the very impossibility of its being put to work.
The death to which the community is attached does not
bring about the transition of the dead being to some
communial intimacy.

The community. on the other hand,

does not bring about the transfiguration of its dead in
some substance or subject--whether Nation. State. native
Soul or Blood, Humanity.

The community is precisely that

which takes this impossibility upon itself.

It is a

community of what Nancy. after Blanchot, calls the
"desoeuvrement." i.e .. a community that undoes and
undermines the finalities at play in a work. and which
does so by revealing itself as that which is workless.
12
Spirit, Geist. from Hegel to Heidegger (at least
to a certain Heidegger), is the word which signified the
collectivity as project and the project as collective.
Geist is the word for the arche-teleological principle
that guides men in their deeds and in history. How can
Heidegger have put to work such a notion in his political
engagement. after having shown in Being and Time the
necessity of avoiding [vermeidenJ it? To what extent the
introduction of such a vocabulary and its use in
connection with the notion of Volk dismissed and denied
the possibilities laid out in Being and Time, and
specifically death as Dasein's ownmost possibility, is
something that still needs to be thought. On the use of
Geist in Heidegger's texts, see J. Derrida, De l'Esprit:
Heidegger et la question, Paris: Galilee, 1987.
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that which consumes itself in a pure loss--death--, in an
excess that will not let itself be superseded:
Ne comptez pas sur la mort, la v6tre, la mort
universelle. pour fonder quoi que ce soit, pas meme la
realite de cette mort si incertaine et si irreelle
qu'avec elle s'evanouit ce qui la prononce. 13
In other words, the community does nothing but reveal to
its members their finitude. along with the excess by which
this finitude is marked: death as the ownmost and
uttermost possibility.

Or. as Heidegger puts it in Being

and Time, it does nothing but reveal this being in which
"death. guilt. conscience. freedom and finitude reside
together equiprimordially [qleichursprlinglich
zusammenwohnen]" (385).

Such residing- together Heidegger

also calls "fate" (Schicksal), and it is also identified
as the very condition of possibility of Geschichtlichkeit.
Hence the community would be the space within
which I, as a resolute Dasein. would be conscious of the
necessary f initude and the absolute transcendence of the
death of the Other.

The community would be nothing but

the ex-hibition or the ex-position of the limit at which,
on which and from which I would appear with--and relate
to--the Other as Other.

13

It would be the space within

Maurice Blanchot, L'ecriture du desastre, Paris:
Gallimard, 1985, p. 143.
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which singularities (and not individuals)i4 would appear
together.

How is this ex-position articulated?

What kind

of discourse, what kind of praxis unfolds from such a
community?

To what extent am I "consciously" attached to

or involved in this articulation?
To the extent. precisely. that resoluteness is
attested by Dasein's conscience.

Conscience is said to

"the cal 1 [Ruf] of care"

Now the cal 1 is a mode

(§

57).

of discourse [Rede). and discourse "is a primordial
existentiale [Existenzial] of disclosedness" (161).
Insofar as disclosednes is primarily constituted by Beingin-the-world, discourse too must have a specifically
worldly kind of Being.

Discourse's way of Being-in-the-

world is language [Sprache].

Insofar as language

expresses Dasein's thrownness into the world, and not
Dasein's "inner life," it is essentially Mitteilung.
Mitteilen, in German, or at least in Heidegger's German.
means both to communicate and to share.
share that which is communicated.
itself is a sharing.

One does not

Rather, communication

Communication is not the

transmission of an interiority into an exteriority. but
rather the expression of the fact that the inside is
Unlike individuals or individualities.
singularities are precisely that which calls for division,
that which is always already shared among the others.
Singularities are unique in their transcendence, but such
transcendence is never withheld from the world. Rather.
this transcendence is the mark of Dasein's authentic
engagement into the world.
14
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always already outside, in the world and with the ot
"Communication is never anything like a conveying of
experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior
of one subject into the interior of another" (162).

For

Dasein is essentially not a subject, i. e., not an
immanent and self-sustaining structure with an 'inner.
life' of its own that would eventually unfold into the
external world.

Rather. in communication,

"the

articulation of Being with one another understandingly is
constituted." so that through it "a co-state-of-mind
[Mitbefindlichkeit] gets 'shared'" (162).

Insofar as

Dasein is not a subject. communication is essentially a,
sharing--the sharing of a space within which Daseins
appear

togethe~

in their ec-static ex-istences.

And the

community would be the space of such Mitteilung, the space
of the communication that shares and of the sharing that
communicates.

Mit-teilen: to communicate, to share. to

share a common space in the very communication of this
space.

But how is this space being communicated?

What

kind of communication is at play in such sharing?
Since Dasein is not a subject, since communication
is not the expression of the inner life of Dasein. but
rather the expression of its always already being involved
with others in a common space.

language cannot have the

meaning, the use and the effects it usually has.

In

communication as Mitteilunq, it cannot be a matter of
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communicating one's own experiences, of defining programs
or projects: of putting language to work in such a way
that it would produce works around which and in which a
community would communicate--as in a communion.

In such

communication, it is rather a matter of acknowledging the
worklessness of ianguage in its essential dimension of
sharing.

The language of the Mitteilunq produces nothi

It is rather that which inscribes Daseins in their
differences and their singularities. that which ex-poses
them to one another and marks this exposition as the very
limit at/on which they co-appear.

But this co-appearing

itself is constituted by the sharing: the Mitteilung is
the very distribution and the very spacing of Daseins
whereby Daseins become other for one another in a common
space.

Hence the Mitteilung privileges the articulation

of Daseins in their differences over the organization of
the community; it privileges the ex-plosion of Daseins in
their multiplicity over their implosion in society.
Communication inscribes--ex-cribes--the sharing:
it writes it.

It is a kind of writing, a writing that

writes the desoeuvrement of the community--in thinking. in
language, and perhaps most of all in literature (precisely
not as a whole of literary works. not as "books" 1 l5, but as
1.l5
The community cannot be articulated like a Book..
Like most political societies, Books function as selfenclosed and self-sustained identities: as immanent
structures or Subjects. Hence the end of the Book would
also signify the possibility of the community.
In the
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a writing that inscribes the sharing of singularities, a
writing that inscribes the limit of our co-appearing).

As

such, it is perhaps most remote from the techno-social and
perform.ative language of society. the language that
results in "ambiguous and jealous stipulations and
Lalkative fraternizing in the "they" and in what "they"
want to undertake." 16

The society or Gesellschaft--and by

society we mean the overstructured space of technology-would be suspended and interrupted by the Mitteilung of
the community or the Gemeinschaft.

Literature would be

that which would most resist the efficiency and
performativity of the Gesellschaft. that which would
endanger it in revealing itself through another use (that
would precisely not be a use) of language.

But the

community is not to take the place of society.

It is

rather to interrupt it, in such a way that the society
would get dis-placed, dis-located in this very
interruption.

But such displacement does not constitute a

common program or an elaborated project.

The community,

the Mitteilunq is not something to come; it does not
belong to the future.

Nor does it belong to the past, in

the way of a paradise lost that could be recovered through
some reconstruction.

For the community was never actually

question of the community. writing itself becomes an
issue, a truly political issue.
16

•

Sein und Zeit, 298.
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"there."

It never happened; it was never an event.

And

yet it has always already occured; it is constantly
occuring, constantly coming to us, in the way of a call
that would never cease to call.

It is a call, a call that

calls for itself, for the actualization of its own
desoeuvrement.

Like Being.

And it is perhaps our

responsibility to hear the call and to comport ourselves
resolutely to it.

There is perhaps a proper (eigentliche)

political dimension in this call. a dimension to which we
must not remain deaf.

For what is at issue in this call

is Dasein's authenticity, and that is primarily Dasein's
transcendence.
Dasein's conscience, then, the conscience at the
very extreme of conscience,--since for conscience it is no
longer a matter of desire and self-recognition. but of
responding resolutely to the call of its own facticity-can only happen as the communication of the community, and
as that which the community communicates: as language, as
writing--as literature.

So here we are, once again, faced

with the question of literature as the very center of the
question of the political.

It is no longer a matter of

poiesis as poetry (although it £S!D. be a matter of poetry)
or myth, but rather of literature as the very inscription
and articulation of Daseins in their differences, as the
writing that differs and spaces--as the writing, perhaps,
of differance.

For writing marks the spacing of Daseins
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and articulates them together in such spacing.

But

writing also differs. i. e., postpones, the moment of the
techno-social,

i~

such a way that this moment would

essentially differ from itself.

What this indicates is

that the demand of the community be perhaps essentially
scriptural. i. e., that the community be articulated in
and as writing--which does not mean that the members of
the community be necessarily involved in the actual
writing and reading of "books".

17

For the writing

referred to is not the work of a subject that would be
communicated to the community.

Rather. the community as

writing indicates that the community must be articulated
in its own desoeuvrement, and that the language of the
Mitteilung is such as to respond to such a demand.

This

prescription. of course, does not make a politics. nor an
ethics--although an insistent and persistent demand never
ceases to emanate from the community (the community is in
fact this very demand).

It dictates, literally, nothing.

And yet. it constitutes the limit or the horizon from
which a certain politics could unfold.

1 7

It constitutes the

The community as writing would actually be the
mark of the end or the closure of what Derrida calls the
"Book." For the Book is itself the expression of a full
speech, the locus of a logos (or a mvthos) and a voice
present to itself and to its world, through which history
as such can happen. The articulation of the community as
writing would mark the closure of the political understood
as logo- or rather as mythocentrism. i.e., as the founding
and living speech in the communion of which the people as
a whole would be united.
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delimitation of a politics of transcendence and of
finitude: a politics of freedom.

CONCLUSION
At the very end of this work, Heidegger's
political discourse can be resumed in its specificity as
well as in its general cont

With regard to the

latter. the following conclusion can be drawn: in
addressing the question of the political in terms of art.
and specifically in terms of poetry as Dichtunq, Heidegger
allied himself with a problematic that was first
formulated in Plato's Republic.

But above all, he

situated himself on the horizon of an historical and
political debate that was initiated in Germany at the very
beginning of the Nineteenth Century.

This horizon was

marked by a philosophical emphasis on art--and
specifically on the mythic vocation of language--through
which the German people was to exist as such.
words.

In other

like the discourse of most German philosophers·of

the past three hundred years. Heidegger's own discourse
focused on the question of Germany's identity.
such a thing as Germany?
"people?"

Is there

Can one talk of a German

Where does the essence of Germany lie?

Such

were the questions that constituted the very heart of
218
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Germany's political debate.

And to a certain extent. one

can assert that Germany is still concerned with these
questions.

In order to answer these crucial questions and

to delineate the possibility of a truly German existence.
German thinkers turned to the Greek model.

Through the

appropriation or the reappropriation of Ancient Greece, of
it::; myths and of its art. it was a matter of originating
something radically new.

For the German people. it was a

matter of identifying itself and of producing its own
essence through a privileged relation with Ancient Greece.
Lacoue-Labarthe designates this problem of
identity and identification as the question of mimesis. 1
This notion is the political notion par excellence. i.e ..
the notion in which the whole of the political drama since
Plato is concentrated.

2

The structure of mimesis is

complex and can be in no way reduced to the operation by
which an "original" would be reproduced in a "copy."

The

logic of mimesis is contradictory: the German mimesis of
1

Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politigue.

chap. 8.
2 . If this holds true for Ancient Greece and German
thought. art and literature, it is not self-evident for
the rest of the West. One might think. of course, that
the Italian and the French Renaissance constituted the
mimetic gesture par excellence. Yet the political
dimension of such a gesture is not obvious. France, for
example, never suffered Germany's identity and
identification crisis. The question of language was never
a central political issue as it was in Germany. The
political problems were more directly religious and
representative.

220

Ancient Greece is in search of a model by which it would
itself become a model. autonomous and spontaneous.

As

Lacoue-Labarthe puts it:
What the German imitatio is in search of in Greece is
the model--and hence the possibility--of a pure
springing up, of a pure originality: the model of a
self-formation. 3
This model. Lacoue-Labarthe adds.

is "explicitly

Heidegger's in the Rectoral Address."

It is still

Heidegger's in 1967:
It is necessary to take the step back. Back to where?
Back to the [Greek] beginning ... But this step back
does not mean that the world of Ancient Greece would
need to be brought back to life in one way or
another ... 4
The contradiction, therefore.

lies in the fact that the

appeal to the model is such as to initiate a radically new
beginning. i.e .. such as to free the derivative from the
origi na 1 .
Heidegger will not have been extraneous to such
imitation.

His entire "political" discourse. according to

Lacoue-labarthe, will have been governed by the logic of
imitation.

From 1933 to the very end of his life,

Heidegger never ceased to think the possibility of the
political from the horizon of the great Greek beginning,
Ibid., 121.
4

Lecture held at the Academy of Sciences and Arts
of Athens on April, 4, 1967.
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and specifically from an endlessly renewed meditation on
techne.

Through and through, the question of history and

of the political remained attached to the question of art,
and specifically to the saying of Holderlin. the major
stake of which was the possibility of a relation to the
gods.

Till the very end, the only political alternative

to the distress of the West was located in the essence of
the political. and that is in art as Dichtung.

Heidegger

never even considered the possibility of another
problematic.

To the following question raised in the

Athens lecture: "What about art today in the eyes of its
ancient provenance?," Heidegger replies:
The ancient gods have fled.
Holderlin, who
experienced this loss more than any other poet before
and after him, asks in the elegy devoted to the god of
the wine Dionysos and entitled "Bread and Wine":
Wo. wo leuchten sie denn, die Fernhintreffende
Sprtiche?
Delphi schltimmert und wo tonet das groBe Geschick?
(IV)
After two thousand five hundred years, is there today
an art that stands under the demand under which art
once stood in Greece? And if not. what is the region
from which the demand to which modern art in all its
domains answers originates? The works of art no longer
spring from the stamped limits of a world of the
popular and the national [Ihre Werke entspringen nicht
mehr den pragenden Grenzen einer Welt des Volkhaften
und NationalenJ. They belong to the universality of
world civilization.
The traces of a secret "mimetology" can be
detected into the very last writings of Heidegger.

From

the very start to the very end, Heidegger's dis.course wi 11

222
have been sustained by the mimetic logic.

With the

exception. perhaps (and this Lacoue-Labarthe would have
failed to acknowledge), that Heidegger engages this
imitation in the process of its own completion and
interruption.

For Heidegger's reading of Holderlin does

not pi-omote a "new mythology": for us Westerners (and
specifically Germans) it cannot be a matter of creating
new gods and new heroes with which the entire people could
be identified.

Holderlin's mythos is void of any heroic-

tragic pathos.

Rather, it is a matter of enduring a time

of distress marked by the absence of the gods.

But no

Dichtung, and a fortiori no historico-political will can
bring the gods back.
depend on human will.
coming.

The coming of the gods does not
We can only free the space for such

Now this may very well be historically and

politically unacceptable.

Yet this also designates the

impossibility of creating or inventing new gods, of
identifying oneself as a people through a common
projection of oneself in the myth.

It is, in a way, to

undermine the very function of the myth and to radically
put into question the very possibility of a mythology.
The time of distress--the flight of the gods--echoed in
Holderlin's poetry designates the impossibility of the
mythic--the appeal to the presence of gods.

The relation

to the gods has now become a relation of impossibility, or
at least a relation of absence; hence a relation which is
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exclusive of the myth, for the myth is precisely defined
in terms of a voice fully present to itself and to those
who are united in it.

The Holderlinian myth operates at

the very limit of the myth: it is. as it were. a myth
without myth. a myth about the impossibility of the myth.
In that sense, Holderlin (and Heidegger) would be freed
from the Romantic version of the myth.

The operation at

the limit of the myth would mark the specificity of
Heidegger's discourse on art and poetry in connection with
the political.
But Heidegger's discourse also remains decisively
attached to the mythic temptation, and that is to the
relation to the gods.

Indeed, the relation to the gods

(as absent gods) remains the central trait of the
political discourse.

The political discourse as a whole

is ordered to the relation with the gods.

The gods are

the cause of our distress. and yet only they can save us,
even though they are perhaps never to come.

This is

politically (and philosophically) non satisfying as well
as unacceptable.

For the world in which I (as Dasein) am

immerged and in which other Daseins are encountered
forbids me to abstract myself from this decisive
everydayness and to measure the present of a common life
from the standpoint of a transcendence and a future which
will perhaps never be.

As Arendt repeatedly pointed out.

our life is a common life. and that is a web of
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relationships in which each particularity is trying to say
who he is through a series of words and deeds.

To think

history and to think politics is primarily to be engaged
in the articulation of these particularities in their
differences.

Heidegger will have refused to answer such a

demand. even though Being and Time broached the way for
the thinking of the community, not in terms of art and
myth. but in terms of what in chapter 4 is called
"writing."
Hence everything seems to happen as though the
question of the political could not be separated from the
question of language in the widest sense. whether as
mythopoiesis in the Platonic sense. as logos or lexis in
the Aristotelian (and to a certain extent Arendtian)
sense, or as communication in the sense of writing.

It is

as though a discourse about the political--whether polis.
State or community--had to be at the same time a discourse
about discourse--whether understood as logos, mythos.
Sprache or Mitteilunq.

The reason for such belonging-

together lies in the fact that the relation to language is
constitutive of our very being-with-one-another.

To think

the political under the horizon of the constitutive mythos
is to prepare the way to a community of immanence. i.e.,
to a community the members of which live in and through
the communion of the common mythos.

To think the

community as communication and "writing," on the other
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hand. i.e. . to think of the community as the very limit en
and at which Daseins appear as who they are, is to render
radically impossible the gathering of the members under a
"spiritual mission" or a "destiny."

Thus it is also to

render impossible the closure of the community.
Heidegger will have perhaps been the ultimate as
well as the most revealing figure of a metaphysical scene
born some two thousand five hundred years ago in which the
drama of the political in its relation to the poetic was
being enacted.

For Heidegger radicalized the poetic or

mythic tendency already at play in Plato, inverting, as it
were, the two poles of the mimesis, so that the political
would come to imitate the poetic. or at least the poetic
would found and initiate the political as such.

Yet

Heidegger will have also marked the outcome of this scene.
i.e., its most radical and theatrical expression as well
the impossiblity of keeping the scene alive.
hand, Heidegger's political

engagement~

On the one

and, to a certain

~
Even though Heidegger's engagement remained
totally withdrawn from that which constituted the very
content of the Nazi myth, Heidegger's thinking remained at
an almost absolute point of proximity to that which
constituted the greatest perversion--and also the closing
scene--of the mythic temptation. Willy-nilly Heidegger
found himself to be in collusion with the extreme (and
murderous) aesthetization of the myth. Moreover, even
more so after his breaking-off with Nazism, Heidegger kept
trying to think the possibility of the political from a
reflexion on art and on language as myth, without ever
being able to put into question the political danger
inherent in the myth. The myth is essentially total:
totalizing and totalitarian.
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extent. his reading of H6lderlin. will have served tc mark
the interruption of this drama, the impossibility of the
political as such,

i.e., the impossibility of its essence

and of the will to its essence; on the other hand,
Heidegger's Being and Time gives way to the truly
communitarian and scriptural demand that unfolds from such
impossibility.

The demand consists in thinking the

political apart from the poetic or the mythic.

It

consists in thinking the community as writing. i.e .. as
the limit on which and at which Daseins appear in their
transcendence.

The demand requires that one be engaged in

the writing and the inscription (or rather in the exscription) of the limit. and that is. simultaneously. in
the disruption and the destruction of the myth.

The

writing of the community designates the end of the
political as mythocentrism.
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FIRST CHORUS FROM SOPHOCLES' ANTIGONE
There is much that is strange, but nothing
that surpasses man in strangeness.
He sets sails on the frothing waters
amid the south winds of winter
tacking through the mountains
and furious chasms of the waves.
He wearies even the noblest
of the gods, the Earth.
indestructible and untiring.
overturning her from year to year,
driving the plows this way and that
with horses.
And man. pondering and plotting,
snares the light-glidding birds
and hunts the beasts of the wilderness
and the native creatures of the sea.
With guile he overpowers the beast
that roams the mountains by night as by day.
he yokes the hirsute neck of the stallion
and the undaunted bull.
And he has found his way
to the resonance of the word,
and to wind-swift all-understanding,
and to the courage of rule over cities.
He has considered also how to flee
from exposure to the arrows
of unpropitious weather and frost.
Everywhere journeying. inexperienced and without issue.
he comes to nothingness.
Though no flight can he resist
the one assault of death,
even if he has succeeded in cleverly evading
painful sickness.
Clever indeed, mastering
the ways of skill beyond all hope,
he sometimes accomplishes evil,
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sometimes achieves brave deeds.
He wends his way between the laws ofthe ·earth
and the adjured justice of the gods.
Rising high above his place,
he for who the sake of adventure takes
the non-being for being loses
his place in the end.
May such a man never frequent my hearth;
may my mind never share the presumption
of him who does this.

HoLDERLIN'S HYMN "GERMANIA"
Not them, the blessed, who once appeared,
Those images of gods in the ancient land,
Them, it is true. I may not now invoke. but if,
You waters of my homeland, now with you
The love of my heart laments, what else does it want, in
Its hallowed sadness? For full of expectation lies
The country, and as though it had been lowered
In sultry dog-days, on us a heaven today,
You yearning rivers, casts prophetic shade.
With promises it is fraught, and to me
Seems threatening too, yet I will stay with it,
And backward now my soul shall not escape
To you the vanished, whom I love too much.
To look upon your beautiful brows, as though
They were unchanged, I am afraid, for deadly
And scarcely permitted it is to awaken the dead.
Gods who are fled!
And you also, present still,
But once more real, you had your time, your ages!
No, nothing here I'll deny and ask no favours.
For when it's over, and Day's light gone out.
The priest is the first to be struck, but lovingly
The temple and the image and the cult
Follow him down into darkness, and none of them now may
shine.
Only as from a funeral pyre henceforth
A golden smoke, the legend of it, drifts
And glimmers on around our doubting heads
And no one knows what's happening to him. He feels
The shadowy shapes of those who once were here,
The ancients. newly visiting the earth.
For those who are to come now jostle us,
Nor longer will that holy host of beings
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Divinely human linger in azure Heaven.
Already, in the prelude of a rougher age
Raised up for them, the field grows green, prepared
Are offerings for the votive feast and valley
·
And rivers lie wide open round prophetic mountains.
So that into the very Orient
A man may look and thence be moved by many
transformations.
But down from Aether falls
The faithful image. and words of gods rain down
Innumerable from it. and the innermost grove resounds.
And the eagle that comes from the Indus
And flies over the snow-covered peaks of
Parnassus. high above the votive hills
Of Italy, and seeks glad booty for
The Father. not as he used to, more practised in flight.
That ancient one. exultant. over the Alps
Wings on at last and sees the diverse countries.
The priestess. her. the quietest daughter of God,
Too fond of keeping silent in deep ingenuousness,
Her now he seeks. who open-eyed looked up
As though she did not know it. lately when a storm.
Threatening death, rang out above her head;
A better destiny the child divined.
And in the end amazement spread in heaven
Because one being was as great in faith
As they themselves, the blessing powers on high;
Therefore they sent the messenger. who, quick to recognize
her.
Smilingly thus reflects: you the unbreakable
A different word must try. and then proclaims,
The youthful, looking towards Germania:
"Yes. it is you. elected
All-loving and to bear
A burdensome good fortune have grown strong.
Since. hidden in the woods and flowering poppies
Filled with sweet drowsiness. you. drunken, did not heed
Me for a long time, before lesser ones even felt
The virgin's pride, and marvelled whose you are and where
from,
But you yourself did not know. Yet I did not misjudge you
And secretly, while you dreamed. at noon,
Departing I left a token of friendship.
The flower of the mouth behind, and lonely you spoke.
Yet you. the greatly blessed, with the rivers too
Dispatched a wealth of golden words, and they well
unceasing
Into all regions now. For almost as is the holy
The Mother of all things. upholder of the abyss.

234

Whom men
Now full
And full
And full

at
of
of
of

other times call the Concealed,
loves and sorrows
presentiments
peace is your bosom.

0 drink the morning breezes
Until you are opened up
And name what you see before you;
No longer now the unspoken
May remain a mystery
Though long it has been veiled;
For shame behoves us mortals
And most of the time to speak thus
Of gods indeed is wise.
But where more superabundant than purest wellsprings
The gold has become and the anger in Heaven earnest,
For once between Day and Night must
A truth be made manifest.
Now threefold circumscribe it,
Yet unuttered also, just as you found it,
Innocent virgin, let it remain.
Once only, daughter of holy Earth.
Pronounce your Mother's name. The waters roar on the rock
And thunderstorms in the wood, and at their name
Divine things past ring out from time immemorial.
How all is changed!
And to the right there gleam
And speak things yet to come, joy-giving, from the
distance .•
Yet at the centre of Time
In peace with hallowed,
With virginal Earth lives Aether
And gladly, for remembrance, they
The never-needy dwell
Hospitably amid the never-needy,
Amid your holidays,
Germania, where you are priestess and
Defenceless proffer all round
Advice to the Kings and the peoples."

HoLDERLIN'S HYMN "THE RHINE"
To Isaak von Sinclair
Amid dark ivy I was sitting, at
The forest's gate, just a golden noon,
To visit the wellspring there, came down
From steps of the Alpine ranges
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Which, following ancient lore,
I call the divinely built, the fortress of the Heavenly,
But where, determined in secre·t
Much even now reaches men; from there
Without surmise I heard
A destiny, for, debating
Now this, now that in the warm shade,
My soul had hardly begun
To make for Italy
And far away for the shores of Morea.
But now, within the mountains,
Deep down below the silvery summits.
And in the midst of gay verdure.
Where shuddering the forests
And the heads of rocks overlapping
Look down at him, all day
There in the coldest chasm
I heard the youth implore
Release; and full of pity his parents heard
Him rage there and accuse
His Mother Earth and the Thunderer
Who fathered him, but mortals
Fled from the place, for dreadful,
As without light he writhed
Within his fetters, was
The demigod's raving.
The voice it was of the noblest of rivers,
Of free-born Rhine,
And different were his hopes when up there from his
brothers
Ticino and Rhodanus
He parted and longed to roam, and impatiently
His regal soul drove him on towards Asia.
Yet in the face of fate
Imprudent it is to wish.
The sons of gods, though,
Are blindest of all.
For human beings know
Their house, and the animals
Where they must build, but in
Their inexperienced souls the defect
Of not knowing where was implanted.
A mystery are those of pure origin.
Even song may hardly unveil it.
For as you began, so you will remain,
And much as need can effect,
And breeding, still greater power
Adheres to your birth
And the ray of light
That meets the new-born infant.

236

But where is anyone
So happily born as the Rhine
From such propitious heights
And from so holy a womb.
To remain free
His whole life long and alone fulfil
His heart's desire. like him?
And that is why his word is a jubilant roar,
Nor is he fond, like other children,
Of weeping in swaddling bands;
For where the banks at first
Slink to his side, the crooked,
And greedily entwining him,
Desire to educate
And carefully tend the feckless
Within their teeth, he laughs,
Tears up the serpents and rushes
Off with his prey, and if in haste
A greater one does not tame him,
But lets him grow, like lightning he
Must rend the earth and like things enchanted
The forests join his flight and, collapsing, the
mountains.
A god. however, wishes to spare his sons
A life so fleeting and smiles
When. thus intemperate but restrained
By holy Alps, the rivers
Like this one rage at him in the depth.
In such a forge. then, all
That's pure is given shape
And it is good to see
How then, after leaving the mountains.
Content with German lands he calmly
Moves on and stills his longing
In useful industry, when he tills the land,
Now Father Rhine, and supports dear children
In cities which he has founded.
Yet never. never does he forget,
For sooner the dwelling shall be destroyed,
And the laws, and the day of men
Become iniquitous, than such as he
Forget his origin
And the pure voice of his youth.
Who was the first to coarsen,
Corrupt the bonds of love
And turn them into ropes?
Then, sure of their own rights
And of the heavenly fire
Defiant rebels mocked, not till then
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Despising mortal ways,
Chose foolhardy arrogance
And strove to become the equals of gods.
But their own immortality
Suffices the gods, and if
The Heavenly have need of one thing,
It is of hereoes and human beings
And other mortals. For since
The most blessed in themselves feel nothing
Another, ·if to say such a thing is
Permitted, must, I suppose.
Vicariously feel in the name of the gods,
And him they need; but their rule is that
He shall demolish his
Own house and curse like an enemy
Those dearest to him and under the rubble
Shall bury his father and child,
When one aspires to be like them, refusing
To bear with inequality, the fantast.
So happy he who has found
A well-allotted fate
Where still of his wanderings
And sweetly of his afflictions
The memory murmurs on banks that are sure,
So that this way, that way with pleasure
He looks as far as the bounds
Which God at birth assigned
To him for his term and sight.
Then, blissfully humble, he rests,
For all that he has wanted,
Though heavenly, of itself surrounds
Him uncompelled, and smiles
Upon the bold one now that he's quiet.
Of demigods now I think
And I must know these dear ones
Because so often their lives
Move me and fill me with longing.
But he whose soul, like yours.
Rousseau, ever strong and patient,
Became invincible,
Endowed with steadfast purpose
And a sweet gift of hearing,
Of speaking, so that from holy profusion
Like the wine-god foolishly, divinely
And lawlessly he gives it away,
The language of the purest, comprehensible to the good,
But rightly strikes with blindness the irreverent,
The profaning rabble, what shall I call that stranger?
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The sons of Earth, like their mother are
All-loving, so without effort too
All things those blessed ones receive.
And therefore it surprises
And startles the mortal man
Whe he considers the heaven
Which with loving arms he himself
Has leaped upon his shoulders,
And feels the burden of joy;
Then often to him it seems best
Almost wholy forgotten to be
Where the beam does not sear,
In the forest's shade
By Lake Bienne amid foliage newly green,
And blithely poor in tones,
Like beginners, to learn from nigthingales.
And glorious then it is to arise once more
From holy sleep and awakening
From coolness of the woods, at evening
Walk now toward the softer light
When he who built the mountains
And drafted the paths of the rivers,
Having also smiling directed
The busy lives of men,
So short of breath, like sails,
And filled them with his breezes,
Reposes also, and down to his pupil
The master craftsmen, finding
More good than evil.
Day now enclines to the present Earth.
Then gods and mortals celebrate their nuptials,
All the living celebrate,
And Fate for a while
Is levelled out, suspended.
And fugitives look for asylum,
For sweet slumber the brave,
But lovers are
What always they were, at home
Wherever flowers are glad
Of harmless fervour and the spirit wafts
Around the darkling trees, but those unreconciled
Are changed and hurry now
To hold out their hands to the other
Before the benevolent light
Goes down, and night comes.
For some, however,
This quickly passes, others
Retain it longer.
The eternal gods are full
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Of life at all times; but until death
A mortal too can retain
And bear in mind what is best
And then is supremely favoured.
For hard to bear
Is misfortune, but good fortune harder.
A wise man, though, was able
From noon to midnight, and on
Till morning lit up the sky
To keep wide awake at the banquet.
To you in the heat of a path under fir-trees or
Within lhe oak forest's half-light. wrapped
In steel, my Sinclair. God may appear. or
In clouds, you'll know him, since. youthfully, you know
The good God's power, and never from you
The smile of the Ruler is hidden
By day, when all
That lives seems febrile
And fettered. or also
By night, when all is mingled
Chaotically and back again comes
Primaeval confusion.

HoLDERLIN'S "HOMECOMING"
To his relatives
1
There in the Alps a gleaming night still delays and,
composing
Portents of gladness, the clouds cover a valley agape.
This way, that way roars and rushes the breeze of the
mountains,
Teasing. sheer through the firs falls a bright beam, and
is lost.
Slowly it hurries and wars, this Chaos trembling with
pleasure,
Young in appearance, but strong, celebrates here amid
rocks
Loving discord, and seethes. shakes in its bounds that are
timeless,
For more bacchantically now morning approaches within.
For more endlessly there the year expands, and the holy
Hours and the days in there more boldly are ordered and
mixed.
Yet the bird of thunder marks and observes the time, and
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High in the air, between peaks. hangs and calls out a
new day.
Now, deep inside. the small village also awakens and
fearless
Looks at the summits around, long now familiar with
height;
Growth it foreknows, for already ancient torrents like
lightning
Crash. and the ground below steams with the spray of
their fall.
Echo sounds all around and, measureless. tireless the
workshop,
Sending out gifts, is astir, active by day and by night.
2
Quiet. meanwhile. above, the silvery peaks lie aglitter.
Full of roses up there, flushed with dawn's rays, lies
the snow.
Even higher, beyond the light. does the pure. never
clouded
God have his dwelling, whom beams, holy, make glad with
their play.
Silent, alone he dwells, and bright his countenance shines
now,
He, the aethereal one, seems kindly, disposed to give
life,
Generate joys, with us men, as often when, knowing the
· measure,
Knowing those who draw breath, hesitant, sparing the God
Sends well allotted fortune both to the cities and
houses,
Showers to open the land, gentle. and you, brooding
clouds,
You, then, most dearly loved breezes, followed by
temperate springtime
And
with a slow hand once more gladdens us mortals grown
sad,
When he renews the seasons, he, the creative, and
quickens,
Moves once again those hearts weary and numb with old
age,
Works on the lowest depths to open them up and to brighten
All, as he loves to do; so now does life bud anew,
Beauty abounds, as before, and spirit is present. returned
now,
And a joyfull zest urges furled wings to unfold.

3

Much I said to him: for whatever the poets may ponder,
Sing, it mostly concerns either the angels or him.
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Much I besought, on my country's behalf, lest unbidden one
day the
Spirit should suddenly come, take us by storm
unprepared;
Much, too, for your sake to whom, though troubled now in
our country,
Holy gratitude brings fugitives back with a smile.
Fellow Germans. for your sake! Meanwhile the lake gently
rocked me,
Calmly the boatman sat, praising the wheather, the
breeze.
Out on the level lake one impulse of joy had enlivened
All the sails, and at last. there in a new day's first
hour
Brightening, the town unfurls. and safely conveyed from
the shadows
Cast by the Alps, now the boat glides to its mooring and
rests.
Warm the shore is here. and valleys open in welcome,
Pleasantly lit by paths. greenly allure me and gleam.
Gdrdens. foregathered. lie here and already the dew-laden
bud breaks
And a bird's early song welcomes the traveller home.
All seems familiar; even the word or the nod caught in
passing
Seems like a friend's, every face looks like a
relative's face.

4
Your native country and soil you are
walking.
What you seek, it is near. now comes to meet you halfway.
Nor by mere chance like a son a wandering man now stands
gazing
Here by the wavelet-loud gate, looking for names to
convey
Love to you in his poem. Lindau, the favoured and happy!
Not the least of our land's many hospitable doors.
Urging men to go out allured by the promise of distance,
Go where the wonders are, go where that god-like wild
beast.
High up the Rhine blasts his reckless way to the plains of
the lowlands,
Where out of rocks at last bursts the lush valley's
delight,
Wander in there, through the sunlit mountain range. making
for Como,.
Or, as the day drifts on. drift on the wide open lake;
Yet you door that are hallowed, me much more strongly you

And no wonder!
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urge to
Make for home where I know blossoming pathways and
lanes.
There to visit the fields and the Neckar's beautiful
·
valleys,
And the woods. green leaves holy to me, where the oak
Does not disdain to consort with quiet birches and
beeches.
Where amid mountains one place holds me, a captive
content.
5
Voice of my town, of my
mother!
How to your sound respond things that I learned long
ago!
Yet they are still themselves! More radiantly, almost,
than ever,
Dearest ones, in your eyes joy and the sun are alight.
Yes, it's all what it was. It thrives and grows ripe. but
no creature
Living and loving there ever abandons its faith.
But the best thing of all. the find that's been saved up
beneath the
Holy rainbow of peace, waits for the young and the old.
Like a fool I speak. In my joy. But tomorrow and later
When we go outside, look at the living green field
Under the trees in blossom. on holidays due in the
springtime.
Much of those things with you. dear ones, I'll speak and
I'll hope.
Much in the meantime I've heard of him, the great Father.
and long now
I have kept silent about him who on summits renews
Wandering Time up above and governs the high mountain
ranges,
Him who soon now will grant heavenly gifts and calls
forth
Song more effulgent, and sends us many good spirits. No
longer
Wait now. preservers, the year's angels, 0 come now and
you,

There they too receive me.

6

Angels, too. of our house, re-enter the veins of all life
now.
Gladdening all at once, let what is heavenly be shared!
Make us noble and new! Till nothing that's humanly good,
no
Hour of the day without them. them the most joyful!, or
such
Joy as now too is known when lovers return to each other,
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Passes, not fitting for them, hallowed as angels demand.
When we bless the meal, whose name may I speak, and when
late we
Rest from the life of each day, tell me, to whom give my
thanks?
Him, the most High. should I name then? A god does not
love what's unseemly,
Him to embrace and to hold our joy is too small.
Silence often behoves us: deficient in names that are
holy,
Hearts may beat high, while the lips hesitate, wary of
speech?
Yet a lyre to each hour lends the right mode. the right
music,
And, it may be, delights heavenly ones who draw near.
This make ready, and almost nothing remains of the care
that
Darkened our festive day. troubled the promise of joy:
Whether he likes it or not. and often. a singer must
harbour
Cares like these in his soul; not, though, the wrong
sort of cares.

